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Answering the Call for Scholarship: The 
Journal of International Crisis and Risk 
Communication Research
Matthew W. Seeger 
Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan, USA
In the foundational work Normal Accidents, Charles Perrow (1984) 
observed that advances and globalization of technology were creating 
a form of “interactive complexity” where seemingly minor failures 
could escalate and cascade throughout a system, leading to devastat-
ing accidents. Furthermore, as technology became more ubiquitous 
and complex, such accidents become normal in the sense that they 
are programmed into systems. Tight coupling; lack of buff ers; and 
interactive, unanticipated nonlinear interactions may create systemic 
collapse. Simply put, crises of signifi cant magnitude are, as Perrow 
predicted, increasing in frequency and intensity (Helsloot, Boin, Jacobs, 
& Comfort, 2012). The magnitude, complexity, and frequency of such 
events challenge the existing conceptualization of crisis management 
in general and crisis communication specifi cally (Topper & Lagadec, 
2013). Communication is essential to understanding and managing 
crises in two general ways. First, communication is necessary for mean-
ing making around what are very uncertain and equivocal events. 
Second, communication is instrumental as part of the crisis and risk 
management functions (Sellnow & Seeger, 2013). This includes ac-
tivities such as environmental scanning for risks, creating an eff ective 
response, resolving crises, and learning the lessons from these events. 
CONTACT Matthew W. Seeger, PhD • E-mail: matthew.seeger@wayne.edu • 5104 Gullen Mall, Wayne 
State University, Detroit, MI 48202
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Coordinated responses, cooperation, evacuations and warning, risk 
education, processes of crisis planning and crisis decision-making, 
memorializing and grieving, resolving, and repairing all require com-
munication.
This journal, more than 15 years in the making, grew out of a recog-
nition that crisis and risk communication are growing research topics 
with important applied, global, and interdisciplinary dimensions. This 
diverse body of research follows a variety of methodological and epis-
temic traditions, and although other traditional outlets for communica-
tion scholarship have been open to publishing crisis and risk research, 
the volume of work warrants a dedicated journal. Topical conferences, 
such as the International Crisis and Risk Communication Conference 
and the biannual European Communication Research and Education 
Association Crisis Communication Conference, as well as handbooks, 
including the Handbook of Crisis Communication (Coombs & Hol-
laday, 2011), the Handbook of Crisis and Risk Communication (Heath 
& O’Hair, 2010), the Handbook of International Crisis Communication 
(Schwarz, Seeger, & Auer, 2016), and research and theory texts, such as 
Theorizing Crisis Communication (Sellnow & Seeger, 2013), are further 
evidence that a focused academic journal is needed. These outlets also 
demonstrate that the field is maturing and relevant.
Crisis and risk communication also have important interdisciplinary 
connections, and we believe that grounding this journal in the com-
munication field, with its tradition of eclectic approaches to inquiry, 
allows investigators to make important contributions across related 
fields. Psychology has contributed significantly to the literature on risk 
perception, while economics has pioneered understanding of risk as-
sessment, and both include work in risk communication. Risk Analysis 
is one primary outlet for this work. Sociology and, to a lesser degree, 
anthropology have focused on issues surrounding warnings, evacua-
tion, and coordination, and much of this work appears in the Journal 
of Contingencies and Crisis Management. Communication researchers 
seeking outlets for their work have turned to more general journals, 
such as the Journal of Applied Communication Research, Management 
Communication Quarterly, or one of many journals in public relations.
The Journal of International Crisis and Risk Communication Research 
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(JICRCR) also acknowledges the close intersection of crisis and risk 
communication. Several important efforts have been made to connect 
what have historically been separate domains of research inquiry and 
practice (Heath & O’Hair, 2010; Reynolds & Seeger, 2005). Risk and 
crisis communication can be understood as two interconnected pro-
cesses in a larger system of managing, responding to, and understand-
ing an emerging threat. They may also be understood as counterpoints 
such that crisis is the manifestation of a risk and the failure to manage 
it successfully. Heath and O’Hair (2010) described crisis and risk as 
fundamentally linked. JICRCR’s attention to both phenomena creates 
opportunities to explore those linkages.
The inaugural issue of JICRCR reflects the range and reach of cri-
sis and risk communication research. This includes qualitative and 
quantitative approaches to crises that are functions of organizational 
decisions, natural disasters, and emerging diseases and crises that are 
associated with a wide range of cultures and locations.  In addition, the 
journal is inclusive of local, state, federal, and international perspectives 
and of work from the research, policy, and practitioner communities.
Climate change, emerging diseases, population migration and dislo-
cation, breakdowns in civil society, aging infrastructure, rising expecta-
tions, limitations and competition for critical resources—food, water, 
energy—technological complexity and collapses, and many other forms 
of natural, human-caused, and interactive events will challenge and, in 
many cases, overwhelm our communication processes and capacities. 
Systemic research is one important element in understanding, manag-
ing, responding to, and learning from these events. 
Matthew W. Seeger, PhD, is a faculty member and administrator at 
Wayne State University. His research concerns crisis and risk commu-
nication; health promotion and communication; crisis response and 
agency coordination; the role of media, including new media; crisis 
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On Sunday, April 9, 2017, United Airlines sought to substitute four 
fl ight crew members for passengers already seated on United fl ight 
3411 traveling from Chicago, Illinois, to Louisville, Kentucky. Three 
passengers accepted travel vouchers, but United stopped short of of-
fering the maximum amount possible, and no one else volunteered to 
leave the airplane. Chicago security personnel then physically removed 
a passenger, David Dao, from the fl ight. On Monday morning, Audra 
Bridges, a passenger on the fl ight, “posted a video of the incident on 
Facebook, which has been shared more than 49,000 times and viewed 
3.8 million times” (Marotti & Zumbach, 2017). The video of the incident 
showed a bloody, screaming man being dragged through the aisle and 
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Crisis and Image Repair at United Airline s: 
Fly the Unfriendly Skies
William L. Benoit
Department of Communication Studies, University of Alabama at Birmingham, 
Birmingham, Alabama, USA
ABSTRACT
In April 2017, United Airlines had a passenger removed from one of its airplanes. Video of the 
bleeding man being dragged off  through the aisle went viral the next day. United’s initial response 
attempted to downplay this off ensive act (relying primarily on diff erentiation and mortifi cation, 
but not really apologizing for this off ensive act). This stance provoked outrage and ridicule. This 
study applies image repair theory (Benoit, 2015) to the discourse in this case study. United’s CEO, 
Oscar Munoz, was forced to off er a “do-over,” stressing mortifi cation and corrective action that were 
actually directed to the off ensive act. United fi nally arrived at the proper response, but it came 
too late to realize its full potential. This essay argues that corrective action can be an important 
strategy in crisis communication theory; it also explains that social media have changed the crisis 
situation (with nearly instant and widespread criticism) and compressed the time in which those 
accused of wrongdoing can respond.
KEYWORDS: Image repair; case study; United Airlines; social media; corrective action
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off the plane (Singh, 2017). Dao’s injuries included a “concussion, a 
broken nose, and two lost teeth” (McCann, 2017).
United Airlines CEO Oscar Munoz initially tried to downplay the 
situation; rather than apologizing for his company’s outrageous behavior 
toward Dao, he suggested that Dao’s belligerent behavior caused the 
incident. Notably, Munoz apologized to the other passengers on the 
flight, but not to Dao. United’s initial response was spread via social 
media, making things worse for United. A Harris Poll (2017) revealed 
that the percentage of consumers who thought United Airlines had a 
“bad” or “very bad” reputation soared from 7% in 2016 to 42% after the 
incident. A survey from Public Policy Polls found that “40% of those 
surveyed believe United is the worst airline in the country” (Gonzales-
Ramirez, 2017). Carol Gstalder, senior vice president at the Harris Poll, 
noted that “United’s six-fold increase in negative corporate reputation 
sentiment shows us once again how quickly and severely a company’s 
corporate reputation can be damaged” (Harris Poll, 2017). On Tuesday, 
shares of United stock dropped $1.4 billion (Shen, 2017). Undeniably, 
United Airlines faced a serious crisis. This article analyzes United’s at-
tempt to repair its image in this debacle. First, I discuss corporate crisis 
communication in general and research applying image repair theory 
to corporate scandals. Then, I use image repair theory to analyze the 
company’s statements in this case. Finally, I discuss implications of the 
analysis for theory and practice.
Literature Review
Corporate Crisis Communication
Scholars have brought a number of perspectives to bear on the topic of 
crisis communication. Three key works focused on crises in corporate 
communication: Hearit (2006) articulated the idea of crisis communica-
tion by apology, and Coombs (2012, 2013) developed situational crisis 
communication theory. The rhetoric of renewal, explicated by Seeger, 
Sellnow, and colleagues (e.g., Seeger & Griffin-Padgett, 2010; Seeger, 
Ulmer, Novak, & Sellnow, 2005; Sellnow & Seeger, 2013; Ulmer, Seeger, 
& Sellnow, 2007), is another important approach to crisis communica-
tion. Because a person’s or organization’s reputation is so important, 
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crises usually prompt messages to control or eliminate damage. This 
analysis depends on image repair theory, so that literature will be ex-
amined more closely.
Image Repair Theory
Benoit (1995a, 1997, 2015) created image repair theory by drawing on 
rhetorical theory (Burke, 1970, 1973; Ware & Linkugel, 1973; Scott & 
Lyman, 1968). This approach to crisis communication discourse be-
gins with two key assumptions: (a) Communication is a goal-oriented 
activity and (b) a fundamental goal of communication is maintaining 
a positive reputation. Image repair discourse is a response to actual or 
anticipated threats to face. Such threats consist of two elements: (a) an 
offensive act that is (b) attributed to the target (see Pomerantz’s, 1978, 
analysis of complaints or Benoit, 2017; Benoit & Glantz, 2017). Image 
repair theory identifies 5 general strategies and a total of 14 strategies 
(see Benoit, 2015; see Table 1).
The United crisis, a video of a passenger being dragged off an air-
plane followed by an inept initial response, cries out for corrective 
action. This strategy has been used frequently in image repair, with 
mixed results. This section reviews uses of corrective action that were 
relatively successful and other instances of this strategy that were less 
effective.
Following the first episode of Tylenol poisoning, Johnson and John-
son used denial, bolstering, and corrective action (tamper-resistant 
packaging). This image repair effort was remarkably effective. President 
Reagan initially attempted to deny knowledge of the Iran–Contra affair. 
He repeatedly stressed good intentions and tried to minimize perceived 
harms. Ultimately, however, evidence emerged that forced him to 
reverse his position, admitting responsibility and taking corrective 
action to prevent recurrence of similar problems. Only then did his 
popularity reverse its downward spiral.
AT&T lost its long-distance telephone service in 1991 because of a 
power outage. At that time, air traffic control relied on land lines to 
direct airplane movement, so, in addition to the disruption of long dis-
tance, air travel was degraded. AT&T published a full-page newspaper 
advertisement that effectively used mortification, corrective action, and 
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did not perform act; act is 
not harmful
Tylenol did not poison 
capsules
Shift blame





offensive act just a response 
to an earlier offense
firm left state because of 
new taxes
Defeasibility lack of information or ability
executive not informed of 
changed meeting time
Accident mishap
tree fell on tracks, causing 
train wreck
Good intentions meant well




stress defender’s good traits 
or acts
Exxon claimed “swift and 
competent oil spill cleanup”
Minimization
offense less serious than it 
appears
few harmed by water 
pollution
Differentiation
act less offensive than 
other, similar acts




act justified by more 
important values
research uses animals to 
help create drugs for people
Attack accuser
reduce credibility of 
accuser; suggest victim 
deserved offense; shift 
audience attention from act
Pepsi owns restaurants 
and competes for your 
customers
Corrective action
fix problem or prevent 
recurrence
AT&T promises to spend 
billions to improve service
Mortification apologize
AT&T apologized for service 
interruption
Note. See Benoit (1995a, 1997, 2015).
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bolstering to repair the company’s image (Benoit & Brinson, 1994). This 
strategy was employed successfully in this case.
In the early 1990s, Dow Corning was criticized for the alleged dan-
gers of its breast implants. Its defense began with denial. Later, it used 
a mild form of mortification (i.e., saying it did not express its concerns 
for women adequately) without admitting to the dangers of its implants, 
and finally, Dow used corrective action when it ceased production of 
the implants (Brinson & Benoit, 1996). The corrective action muted 
the criticism, although arguably, it should have come sooner.
In 1996, a secret tape recording of executives at Texaco was leaked to 
the public. African American employees were described in the conver-
sation as “black jelly beans” who were “glued to the bottom of the jar” 
(Brinson & Benoit, 1999, p. 484). These revelations prompted outrage, 
so the company developed several messages utilizing bolstering, cor-
rective action, mortification, and shifting blame. The most interesting 
strategy in its successful defense was shifting the blame to “bad apples” 
in the company, who were punished.
British Petroleum (BP) put out a number of newspaper and television 
ads about the Gulf of Mexico oil spill (Benoit, 2015). The company used 
mortification, bolstering, and corrective action. Some of the spokes-
people the company used were local residents. A novel element of BP’s 
image repair effort was that it not only promised corrective action but 
also gave progress reports.
Other instances of corrective action were less successful. Exxon’s 
response to the Valdez oil spill shifted the blame for the accident to 
Captain Hazelwood and for the delay in the cleanup to slow authoriza-
tion from the state of Alaska and the U.S. Coast Guard. It attempted to 
minimize the size of the problem, bolstered its image as a concerned 
company, and promised corrective action to alleviate any damage. 
However, the state of Alaska and the U.S. Coast Guard were poor 
choices for targets for blame. Exxon’s attempts to minimize the extent 
of the problem were graphically denied by television and newspaper 
coverage. Similarly, description of a slow and apparently inept cleanup 
undermined both its attempts to bolster its image and the credibility of 
its promised corrective action. Thus Exxon’s image restoration campaign 
was relatively ineffectual.
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Union Carbide’s response to the Bhopal, India, gas leak that killed 
thousands and injured hundreds of thousands comprised bolstering 
and corrective action in the form of aid to victims. Although these 
strategies were appropriate, they failed to address a very important 
question: What, if anything, would Union Carbide do to prevent another 
tragedy? Failure to answer this most important question undermined 
the image repair effort.
The California Department of Consumer Affairs accused Sears 
Auto Centers of consumer fraud in 1992. Sears employed newspaper 
advertisements, television spots, and other messages to carry its de-
fense through two phases. At first, the company used denial and at-
tack of accuser. When California’s accusations were corroborated by 
accusations of auto repair fraud in New Jersey, Sears finally announced 
corrective action. It never apologized for fraud, and the defense was 
largely ineffectual (Benoit, 1995b), including corrective action that was 
not employed quickly enough to be effective.
U.S. Airways flight 427 crashed in September 1994 while approaching 
the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, airport, killing 132 people. The company 
took out full-page newspaper advertisements to repair its image. It 
made use of three image repair strategies: bolstering, denial, and cor-
rective action. However, Benoit and Czerwinski (1997) characterized 
its proposed action as “pseudo-corrective action.” The changes it pro-
claimed “were not designed to actually improve its safety, but simply 
to convince the flying public of USAir’s current safety” (p. 51). This 
defense was ineffective.
Newt Gingrich was accused of improprieties in a multi-million-
dollar book deal. One of the image repair strategies he employed was 
corrective action by returning the advance. Kennedy and Benoit (1997) 
argued that if the book deal were on the up and up—as Gingrich 
asserted—there would be no need to return the advance. Gingrich’s 
action merely shifted when he would accrue the profits from the deal; 
it did not ensure that the deal was proper.
Garry Trudeau’s comic strip Doonesbury advanced several criti-
cisms of the tobacco industry, arguing that tobacco products are dan-
gerous and addictive—and these accusations were intensified with 
the argument that tobacco products were deliberately marketed to 
children (Benoit & Hirson, 2001). The Tobacco Institute (an industry 
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organization) created a pamphlet to respond to the attack: Smoking 
and Young People: Where the Tobacco Industry Stands. The Tobacco 
Institute’s message employed denial, corrective action, blame shifting, 
bolstering, and good intentions. However, these strategies did not work 
well together. Corrective action is not consistent with denial (there is 
no need to alter marketing procedures if the companies are not market-
ing to children); key accusations in the attack were ignored (the public 
widely believes tobacco to be dangerous); and the implementation of 
the strategies in discourse was weak (e.g., the pamphlet denied that 
advertising caused smoking without any evidence).
Several hundred people died in automobile crashes when Firestone 
tires failed (“blowouts”). The company attempted to shift blame to 
Ford (many of these accidents happened in Ford Explorer vehicles). 
Firestone used bolstering and denial, strategies that were undermined 
by its use of mortification and corrective action. Furthermore, the 
corrective action in this case was too vague to be persuasive (Blaney, 
Benoit, & Brazeal, 2002).
Hurricane Katrina caused death, injury, dislocation, and property 
damage. President Bush was accused of leading a slow and inept re-
sponse. He utilized bolstering, defeasibility, and corrective action to 
respond to these accusations. Bolstering could not counter his slow 
response, defeasibility portrayed Bush as not being in control of events, 
and his corrective action was too little, too late.
Grunenthal offered image repair for the birth defects that arose 
from its drug thalidomide. The company used mortification, correc-
tive action (past and future), defeasibility, and differentiation. Its use of 
corrective action was vague, and the company waited almost 50 years 
before apologizing (Benoit, 2015). The New Orleans Saints football 
franchise was revealed to have paid bounties to players who hurt op-
posing players. The organization proffered a defense of mortification, 
corrective action: ineffectual, paying to hurt opposing players is terrible 
sportsman [person] ship (Benoit, 2015). Rupert Murdoch’s News of the 
World was shown to have engaged in relentless phone hacking, with 
targets including victims of crimes. The mogul used mortification, 
corrective action, and compensation. However, his defense was not 
timely enough to be effective (Benoit, 2015).
These case studies indicate some of the conditions that influence 
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the persuasiveness of corrective action. The defense should actually fix 
(and/or prevent future occurrences of) the problem. To have the best 
chance of success, the person or organization employing corrective 
action should do so in a timely fashion (note that in the contemporary 
environment of social media, corrective action should be used very 
quickly indeed). The defense should be internally consistent (e.g., do 
not deny the existence of a problem and propose corrective action).
United Airlines’s Defense
United Airlines’s image repair evolved through two phases. At first, the 
discourse attempted to downplay the offense, relying mainly on differ-
entiation and mortification. United’s initial response provoked outrage. 
The second phase appeared to emerge grudgingly, using mortification 
and corrective action. The “phases” of image repair have become highly 
compressed with the advent of social media (consider the time it took 
for the phases of President Reagan’s Iran–Contra defense to develop).
Differentiation: “Re-accommodating Passengers”
United’s CEO Oscar Munoz released a statement on the Monday af-
ternoon following the event. He used bolstering, explaining that “all of 
us here at United” were upset by the event. He also offered two apolo-
gies (mortification): “I apologize for having to re-accommodate these 
customers” (Thomas, 2017; see also United News Release, 2017a) and 
for the “over-book situation” (McCann, 2017). Both of these apologies 
incorporated differentiation: “re-accommodate” sounds less offensive 
than “drag passengers off an airline,” while “over-booked” sounds better 
than “we kicked a seated passenger off an airplane to make room for 
our employees.” United had not gotten off to a good start in this crisis.
On Monday, Munoz also sent a letter to United employees, which 
quickly became public. In it, the CEO used provocation, characterizing 
Dao as “disruptive and belligerent.” The CEO also put defeasibility into 
play, stating that “our agents were left with no choice but to call Chicago 
Aviation Security Officers to assist in removing the customer from the 
flight” (McCann, 2017). Munoz also employed bolstering, reassuring 
his employees, “I want to commend you for continuing to go above 
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and beyond to ensure we fly right.” Munoz declared that “treating our 
customers and each other with respect and dignity is at the core of 
who we are” (McCann, 2017). These utterances clearly implied that no 
wrongdoing occurred. Munoz did apologize to other passengers on the 
flight, but not to Dao (McCann, 2017). Observers were unlikely to see 
United’s treatment of Dao as commendable or to believe that United’s 
philosophy was “treating customers . . . with respect.”
Mortification and Corrective Action: United’s “Do-Over”
On Tuesday, United’s CEO apparently realized he was piloting his com-
pany into a hurricane; he radically changed the course of his defense. 
Munoz declared, “It’s never too late to do the right thing” (Mutzabaugh, 
2017; see also United Press Release, 2017c). He asserted that he was “dis-
turbed” by the events of Sunday (McCann, 2017), enacting bolstering. He 
also offered another apology: “My deepest apologies for what happened.” 
He explicitly included the victim (although he did not mention Dao by 
name): “I deeply apologize to the customer forcibly removed and to all 
of the customers aboard. No one should ever be mistreated this way.” 
He also declared, “We take full responsibility” (McCann, 2017; see also 
United News Release, 2017b). Thus, in his “do-over,” Munoz utilized 
mortification, saying that he was disturbed, that the offensive act was 
clearly wrong, and that he accepted responsibility for it (eventually).
Once United confessed that it had treated Dao badly, corrective 
action was needed. Munoz declared, “We will work to make it right” 
(McCann, 2017). He asserted, “I have committed to our customers 
and our employees that we are going to fix what’s broken so this never 
happens again.” He ended his statement by assuring his audience, “I 
promise you we will do better” (McCann, 2017). This phase of the im-
age repair effort sounded sharply different from the prior phase. This 
is a clear illustration of corrective action.
On Wednesday, Munoz appeared on ABC’s Good Morning America, 
saying that he felt “shame” when he watched the video, enacting mor-
tification again. He reiterated his use of corrective action: “This can 
never—will never—happen again on a United Airlines Flight. That’s 
my premise and that’s my promise” (McCann, 2017). Later that day, the 
CEO announced that he would give a complete refund to everyone who 
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had been on the flight (McCann, 2017), an instance of compensation.
The key elements of Phase 2 were repeated on Thursday. Mortifi-
cation surfaced again when Munoz said, “We continue to express our 
sincerest apology to Dr. Dao.” The CEO also returned to corrective 
action: We will “make this right”; “we cannot stress enough that we 
remain steadfast in our commitment to make this right” (McCann, 
2017; United Press Release, 2017c). United’s promise of corrective ac-
tion was made more specific (Mann, 2017):
We are committing that United will not ask law enforcement officers 
to remove passengers from our flights unless it is a matter of safety 
and security. Second, we’ve started a thorough review of policies that 
govern crew movement, incentivising volunteers in this situation, how 
we handle oversold situations and an examination of how we partner 
with airport authorities and local law enforcement. Third, we will fully 
review and improve our training programs to ensure our employees 
are prepared and empowered to put our customers first.
These instances of corrective action aimed at preventing recurrence 
of the offensive act.
Evaluation
It was a mistake to drag a passenger off the airplane: The crisis prob-
ably could have been avoided if United had not waited until after 
passengers had boarded to squeeze its flight crew onto the airplane 
or, alternatively, if United had offered larger flight coupons to encour-
age passengers to deplane. Furthermore, if United had realized how 
damaging the video was, Munoz would never have tried to downplay 
its offense (characterizing its act as “re-accommodation” and as an 
instance of overbooking). However, United’s initial response not only 
failed to put out the public relations fire but actually threw fuel on the 
flames, making the crisis even worse. Contrast Munoz’s characteriza-
tion of Dao as “disruptive and belligerent” with his assertion that “no 
one should ever be mistreated this way.”
The initial defense used an interesting, and ineffectual, combination 
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of differentiation and mortification (I do not argue that it is impos-
sible for differentiation and mortification to work together; they did 
not work well in United’s defense). United did not apologize for the 
actual offensive act depicted in the video but for two less offensive 
actions: “reaccommodating” a passenger and “overbooking.” The mil-
lions who viewed the video would not be likely to agree that United 
was merely working to “re-accommodate” a passenger. For example, as 
@sassylibrarian1 wrote, “Nice to know ‘re-accommodate’ on United now 
means ‘drag you violently out of your seat’” (Thomas, 2017). Further-
more, the flight was not overbooked, despite Munoz’s apology for the 
“over-book situation”; United wanted to put its employees onto a fully 
booked (and already boarded) flight. Munoz was correct to say that 
“it’s never too late to do the right thing.” That does not mean, however, 
that doing the “right thing” eventually will work as well as it would 
have worked if it had been implemented in a timely fashion. United 
eventually adopted a reasonable defense—apologizing for its actual 
offense and detailing multiple steps to prevent similar episodes—but 
this should have been its initial position.
Discussion
One implication of this case study is that the rapid rise of new tech-
nology is now a fundamental element of the crisis communication 
situation. Contemporary society has embraced social media and the 
capability of smartphones to record photos and/or video of instances 
of misbehavior. Furthermore, the ability of the Internet and social 
media to provide almost instantaneous distribution of incriminating 
pictures, videos, and other accusatory messages has forever altered 
crisis communication (see, e.g., Glantz & Benoit, 2017). Persuasive at-
tacks or criticisms are an important component of the current media 
environment. Corporations such as United Airlines are often very 
conservative. However, that stance is at odds with the need to react 
almost instantaneously to crises.
United Airlines had previously suffered Internet-facilitated damage 
to its image. United baggage handlers damaged a guitar in transit; when 
the victim received the run-around from United, a video called United 
22 benoit
Breaks Guitars went viral (Carroll, 2009) and forced the company to 
address the offensive act. However, it does not appear as if the com-
pany learned its lesson. The Internet allowed the latest crisis to unfold 
seemingly at hyperspeed, with the offensive act committed on Sunday, 
the initial defense and outraged reactions occurring on Monday, and 
the revised defense appearing on Tuesday. It is vital for corporations, 
organizations, and individuals to understand the nature of our current 
media environment.
Corporate image repair efforts, as in political image repair (Benoit, 
1982, on Watergate; Benoit, Gullifor, & Panici, 1991, on Reagan), have 
evolved through phases before (see, e.g., Benoit, 1995b, on Sears; Brin-
son & Benoit, 1996, on Dow Corning). The simple fact that Munoz felt 
forced to enact a do-over is clear evidence that his initial stance was inef-
fectual. The new position was the right one; unfortunately for United, 
it came too late—and shifting his position so violently undermined 
Munoz’s credibility. Another implication of this case study is the idea 
that it is not enough to apologize for something—one must apologize for 
the perceived offense. Using mortification is likely to damage face: No 
one enjoys confessing wrongdoing. Munoz’s attempt to limit the embar-
rassment of mortification by reducing the offensiveness of the offensive 
act for which he apologized—apologizing for “re-accommodating” a 
passenger rather than apologizing for dragging a bloody passenger 
off the plane—backfired as the response to the video mounted. It is a 
wonder that United’s stockholders have not reaccommodated Munoz 
by freeing him for other employment opportunities.
Conclusion
This essay reinforces the importance of corrective action as a potential 
strategy in crisis communication theory. Initially, situational crisis com-
munication theory included corrective action as an option for crisis 
communication (see Coombs, 1998; Coombs & Holladay, 2004). How-
ever, later incarnations of the theory omitted this important possibility 
(Coombs, 2012; see also Coombs & Holladay, 1996). Corrective action 
is not always appropriate, nor is it necessarily persuasive. However, it 
must be a strategy in the toolbox of crisis communication.
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Beginning in September 2012, a major health crisis in the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia (KSA) erupted. The coronavirus Middle East respiratory 
syndrome (MERS-CoV), a serious and sometimes fatal infection, had 
infected more than 1,668 people by August 3, 2017, and taken the lives 
of 684 people in the KSA (Ministry of Health of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia [MOH], 2017). These numbers ranked the KSA as the country 
with the highest number of cases in the world, prompting the Ministry 
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of Health of the KSA (MOH) to take action (Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention [CDC], 2015, 2017; MOH, 2017). The problem 
is that initial responses from the MOH left KSA residents confused, 
angry, and suspicious of the MOH’s mixed messages. Saudis were first 
told by minister of health Abdullah al Rebeeah that he had no idea 
why the disease was spreading across the KSA, but instead of offering 
precautionary measures, he said that no clinical measures were needed 
(Alomran, Knickmeyer, & McKay, 2014). This created a megacrisis for 
the KSA, which faced a significant threat to the health of its people 
without knowing why or how to stop the virus from spreading.
A megacrisis is defined as “a set of interacting crises that are severe 
in impact, complex in nature, and global in fallout, with no seeming 
end in sight” (Yen & Salmon, 2017, p. 1). The impact of MERS-CoV on 
not only the KSA but also the world defined MERS-CoV as a mega-
crisis. The World Health Organization (WHO; 2016) has stated that 
other countries, such as South Korea, are in states of high alert, with 
fears that the outbreak could cause severe harm to health and the eco-
nomic and social services of countries where health systems continue 
to be unprepared. Furthermore, the WHO (2016) warned that hospital 
outbreaks of MERS-CoV in the KSA “could escalate both nationally 
and internationally into a perpetual global health threat” (para. 1). The 
number of deaths, the absence of vaccines to treat the disease, and the 
complexity of the disease and how it transmits further qualify MERS-
CoV as a megacrisis.
It took the firing of Abdullah al Rebeeah and the hiring of a new 
minister of health before the MOH launched a comprehensive cam-
paign on March 4, 2015, called “We Can Stop It,” on its website. The 
goals of the campaign were to educate the public about MERS-CoV 
and to inform them about prevention best practices (MOH, 2015). The 
campaign incorporated both traditional and social media that included 
key messages and specific preventive actions. This may indicate that 
people started to gain trust in the information the MOH disseminated 
after its initial response to the MERS-CoV crisis. Nonetheless, the ex-
tent to which this campaign has been effective in terms of education 
and prevention, and in improving the MOH’s credibility, is unknown.
The purpose of this study is to assess the extent to which KSA resi-
dents are adhering to the preventive measures promoted by the MOH’s 
The Health Belief Model and Preventative Measures 29
“We Can Stop It” campaign. Using the health belief model (HBM), 
we surveyed students from King Saud University (KSU) to assess the 
credibility of the MOH’s messages. We then analyzed the perceived 
susceptibility and perceived severity of contracting the disease along 
with the perceived benefits of and perceived barriers to following the 
MOH’s prevention recommendations. We further analyzed the extent to 
which the campaign messages impacted cues to action and self-efficacy 
to perform the recommended preventive behaviors.
Case Study
The MOH was established in 1951 and charged with carrying out health 
affairs in the kingdom, including all regulations, laws, and legislation 
for all governmental and private health sectors in the KSA. It monitors 
and regulates health institutions’ performance and offers training to all 
health practitioners. Approximately 6%–7% of the country’s budget is 
allotted annually to the MOH to develop and enhance health services 
(MOH, 2017). Much of the money is spent on awareness and educa-
tion campaigns, using multiple communication channels that include 
traditional media and, more recently, social media.
The first case of MERS-CoV was documented in the KSA in Sep-
tember 2012. The WHO (2015) defined MERS as a “viral respiratory 
disease caused by novel MERS-CoV” (para. 1). Its symptoms include 
severe acute respiratory illness, with fever, cough, shortness of breath, 
congestion in the nose or throat, and possible diarrhea (CDC, 2015; 
MOH, 2017). The virus circulated mainly in countries inside the Ara-
bian Peninsula, such as the KSA, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, 
and Qatar, as well as in some Middle Eastern countries, such as Turkey 
and Egypt (WHO, 2015a). Although the majority of cases of MERS-
CoV are attributed to human–human infections, camels are believed to 
play a significant role in transmitting the disease among human beings. 
However, researchers have not yet determined the exact role and route 
of the transmission (WHO, 2015b).
Initial Crisis Response
When the outbreak of MERS-CoV first hit the KSA, the MOH did a 
poor job of providing clear and updated information. For example, 
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during a news conference, Minister al Rabeeah told the public that he 
had no idea why MERS was spreading across the KSA and said that no 
clinical measures were needed during pilgrim season, a time during 
which the KSA hosts millions of people every year from all around the 
world (Alomran et al., 2014). The MOH provided no guidelines, leav-
ing people and health care providers panicked, confused, and angered 
(British Broadcasting Corporation, 2014). There was also no precrisis 
planning, meaning that the MOH had to start from scratch in under-
standing the virus and how to communicate preventive measures to 
the public. Saudi physicians and some international virologists from 
research centers echoed the public outcry, stating that poor commu-
nication and lack of accountability have hindered the KSA’s ability 
to handle such crises (Reuters, 2014). Poor communication from the 
MOH trickled down to other health entities, intensifying the problem 
and creating a lack of communication and mismanagement between 
hospitals, government departments, and laboratories. This caused delays 
in reporting and recording MERS-CoV cases, according to some Saudi 
physicians (Reuters, 2014). As a result, Minister al Rabeeah was fired 
from his position. Two other ministers were hired and fired within a 
short period of time. It was not until 2014, two years after the initial 
outbreak, that people witnessed dramatic changes in how the MOH 
communicated with the public. This provided new hope for change 
and improvement in the MOH’s policies concerning how it handles 
crisis responses (Reuters, 2014).
New Efforts, New Hope
The MOH took significant steps to reduce the spread of MERS-CoV 
by implementing new communication strategies and prevention 
guidelines. The MOH stated that it “put in place measures to ensure 
best practices of data gathering, reporting (and) transparency are 
strictly observed” and “to ensure that from now on, case information 
will be accurate, reliable and timely” (Reuters, 2014, para. 5). In an ef-
fort to regain the public’s trust, the MOH established a Command and 
Control Center (CCC) in June 2014 consisting of physicians, scientists, 
and experts in partnership with international organizations, such as 
the WHO. The CCC’s role is to conduct research, control infection, 
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manage clinical operations, and conduct data analysis with regard to 
MERS-CoV (MOH, 2017; Reuters, 2014). As a result, the MOH started 
to establish two-way communication by releasing more accurate and 
timely information to the public through multiple communication 
channels, including social media in different languages.
On March 4, 2015, the MOH launched its most aggressive and com-
pre hensive MERS-CoV campaign, called “We Can Stop It.” The aim 
of this campaign was to increase awareness about MERS-CoV and 
inform the Saudi people about best practices to prevent the spread of 
MERS-CoV disease (MOH, 2015). Traditional media, including radio, 
television, and newspapers, and social media are being used to reach 
various audience segments. Preventive messages are being conveyed 
through posters, brochures, and interviews with health experts. Key 
messages include (a) information on how the virus is transmitted, (b) 
signs and symptoms, and (c) what to do if one feels sick. Additional 
resources are also provided.
The campaign has disseminated short videos via social media to 
deliver preventive and instructional health messages to encourage 
individuals to wash their hands with soap for at least 20 seconds, fol-
low a healthy diet to boost the immune system, exercise, avoid camels, 
and wear masks as well as instructing them how to sneeze to avoid 
the spread of germs. Table 1 provides examples of key executional and 
preventive messages distributed via multiple communication channels.
The use of Twitter has been instrumental in increasing awareness 
and knowledge of the disease while offering preventive measures. 
People are asked to link their Twitter accounts to the “We Can Stop It” 
campaign to receive and retweet weekly updated health messages from 
the MOH. The number of participants on Twitter has reached more 
than 8,480,718 (MOH, 2017).
The developers of this campaign further recognized the importance 
of audience segmentation, a key ingredient to a successful campaign that 
was missing from earlier efforts. Campaign messages were developed 
specifically for high-risk groups: (a) parents and teachers, (b) patients 
and their families, (c) health care professionals, (d) camel herders, 
and (e) those in the workforce (MOH, 2017). Although the frequency 
of coming into contact with a camel depends on individual lifestyle, 
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TABLE 1 Key Preventive Messages Described in the Campaign Materials 
Channel Type of message Message
Posters distributed in hospitals, 




Definition of MERS-CoV, how 
it transmits, and its symptoms; 
poster also includes the MERS-
CoV preventive measures, such as 
wearing a mask and using a tissue 
when coughing and sneezing
Videos distributed via the 
MOH’s YouTube channel and 
social media, such as Twitter 
and Facebook
Preventive How to avoid MERS-CoV through 
adopting health behaviors like 
frequent handwashing
Videos distributed via the 
MOH’s YouTube channel and 
social media platforms
Preventive What to do if a person develops 
MERS-CoV symptoms
Videos mainly circulated via 
the MOH’s Twitter, Facebook, 
and YouTube accounts by 
including #MERS-CoV
Educational The proper way of wearing and 
using masks
Videos mainly circulated via 
the MOH’s Twitter, Facebook, 
and YouTube accounts by 
including #MERS-CoV
Educational Important guidelines outlining 
how to handle camels and avoid 
those infected with MERS-CoV 
Twitter: People were 
encouraged to participate 
in a campaign in Twitter by 
registering their accounts with 
the MOH. The MOH would 
tweet about MERS-CoV weekly 




All information related to MERS-
CoV and healthy behaviors
TV Educational, 
preventive, Q&A
All information related to MERS-
CoV and healthy behaviors 
discussed with health experts and 
officials from MOH and different 
hospitals 
Radio Updates and 
reports 
What the MOH is doing to reduce 
MERS-CoV 
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campaign messages address this audience because Riyadh and Jeddah 
have the largest camel trades in the country.
Literature Review on Health Belief Model
The HBM was developed in the 1950s with the aim of explaining and 
predicting individuals’ health behaviors (Champion & Skinner, 2008; 
National Cancer Institute, 2005). The HBM is a psychological mod-
el developed by psychologists Hochbaum, Rosenstock, and Kegels 
(1952/2016), who worked for the U.S. Public Health Service (Glanz, 
Rimer, & Lewis, 2002; Janz & Becker, 1984), and was first used to gain 
a better understanding of why free tuberculosis (TB) health screening 
programs were not very successful (Glanz et al., 2002; Hochbaum, 1958; 
Janz & Becker, 1984). Particularly, the HBM aims to aid understanding 
of why individuals do not adopt disease strategies and behaviors during 
health campaigns and refuse to engage in preventive behaviors (Hayden, 
2013; Hochbaum, 1958; Janz & Becker, 1984; Thweatt & Query, 2005).
The HBM encompasses four dimensions: perceived susceptibility, 
perceived severity, perceived benefits, and perceived risks. Perceived 
susceptibility posits that the more an individual perceives the risk of 
a disease, the more likely he or she will be to engage in behaviors to 
decrease that risk (Glanz et al., 2002; Hayden, 2013; Hochbaum, 1958; 
Janz & Becker, 1984). Perceived severity includes some evaluation of 
the consequences of an illness based on medical information and 
knowledge as well as some beliefs about the negative consequences 
of a certain behavior or disease that might occur for an individual 
(Hayden, 2013; Janz & Becker, 1984). The third dimension, perceived 
benefits, suggests that individuals perceive the value and usefulness of 
adopting new behaviors in regard to minimizing the risk of an illness 
and will likely adopt new behaviors based on their perceptions of their 
benefits in reducing threats (Hayden, 2013; Janz & Becker, 1984). The 
fourth dimension, perceived barriers, is the most powerful dimen-
sion of HBM (Janz & Becker, 1984), in that individuals evaluate the 
obstacles and difficulties they might encounter when adopting a new 
behavior. This dimension, however, might result in individuals giving 
up on adopting a new behavior (Hayden, 2013; Janz & Becker, 1984). 
34 alsulaiman and rentner
Individuals usually evaluate the benefits and consequences of a new 
behavior before overcoming the old one (Hayden, 2013).
The HBM also suggests that besides the four perceptions, individu-
als’ behaviors can be influenced by what is called a cue to action, which 
includes external and internal cues. External cues are events, people, 
mass media, health providers, and any external factor that can trigger 
people to change their behaviors (Hayden, 2013; Janz & Becker, 1984). 
Internal cues include psychological cues, such as pain and symptoms, 
that trigger individuals to adopt a new behavior (Janz & Becker, 1984). 
Moreover, Bandura integrated a self-efficacy dimension into the model 
in 1988 (Rosenstock, Strecher, & Becker, 1988). This dimension is 
concerned about an individual’s own ability and capability to make a 
change, such as adopting new, healthier behaviors. Studies found that 
individuals who believe in their ability to achieve, and skill in achiev-
ing, a certain goal are more likely to attain that goal (Hayden, 2013).
Recently, the HBM has been widely used in health education cam-
paigns and programs (Glanz et al., 2002) and has shown significant 
success in encouraging individuals to take preventive measures and 
adopt new behaviors to address diverse health issues around the world 
(see, for a study of vaccines among hemodialysis patients, Adams, Hall, 
& Fulghum, 2014; for a study of reducing hypertension among women 
by encouraging physical activity, Hoseini, Maleki, Moeini, & Sharifirad, 
2014; for a study of a nutrition program by increasing calcium intake 
among girls in high schools, Naghashpour, Shakerinejad, Lourizadeh, 
Hajinajaf, & Jarvandi, 2014; and for a study of injury prevention among 
high school students, Cao, Chen, & Wang, 2014). Compared to other 
models, the HBM expands to support and maintain health behavior 
change interventions (Champion & Skinner, 2008). Additionally, the 
model has been applied to many health behaviors and in many cam-
paigns, including in several Arab countries, such as Jordan, the KSA, 
and Egypt, and has shown significant results (see, for a study of breast 
cancer in Jordan, Mikhail & Petro- Nustas, 2001; for a study of colorectal 
cancer screening in the KSA, Almadi et al., 2015; and for a study in the 
practice of self-examination for breast cancer among Saudi women, 
Abolfotouh et al., 2015).
The HBM is suitable for assessing the impact of the MOH’s messages 
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on the perceived susceptibility and perceived severity of contracting 
the disease and on the perceived benefits of and perceived barriers to 
following MOH preventive guidelines. The following three research 
questions (RQs) were derived from this review:
RQ1: To what extent is the MOH seen as a credible source of informa-
tion on MERS-CoV?
RQ2: What is the impact of the “We Can Stop It” campaign on the 
perceived susceptibility and perceived severity of contracting the 
disease and on the perceived benefits of and perceived barriers to 
following MOH preventive guidelines?
RQ3: To what extent have the MOH’s campaign messages impacted 
cues to action and self-efficacy?
Method
The Campaign
The “We Can Stop It” campaign includes components on how the dis-
ease is transmitted, signs and symptoms, and what to do if one feels ill. 
Additional tactics include awareness presentations in schools, shopping 
malls, and universities; established school guidelines to educate par-
ents, teachers, and students on the proper ways to prevent MERS-CoV; 
presentations across the country by health experts; and social events 
to teach prevention of the disease. This study focuses specifically on 
key preventive messages described in the campaign materials. These 
include washing hands frequently, wearing a mask when visiting sick 
people, staying away from camels, getting enough sleep and exercise, 
eating a healthy diet, and covering the mouth when coughing and sneez-
ing. Many of these prevention tactics are demonstrated on posters and 
in videos and are shared on the MOH’s website and on social media.
Institutional Review Board Approval
This study was reviewed and approved prior to its implementation by 
the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of Bowling Green State Univer-
sity (BGSU), Bowling Green, Ohio. The study was also reviewed and 
approved prior to its implementation by the Deanship of Scientific 
36 alsulaiman and rentner
Research at KSU, Riyadh. After obtaining approval from the IRB at 
BGSU and the Deanship of Scientific Research at KSU, the researcher 
contacted the Deanship of E-Transaction and Communication to dis-
seminate the e-mail invitation with the survey link.
Sample
A convenience online sampling method was used among college stu-
dents at KSU. KSU enrolls approximately 50,000 students. The city 
of Riyadh was selected because it is one of two major cities with the 
highest number of MERS-CoV cases in the KSA (MOH, 2015). The 
university hosts domestic students from regions across the country as 
well as international students.
Data were collected at the end of the spring semester and the begin-
ning of summer 2016. An invitation to participate in an online survey 
designed through Qualtrics was sent to the Deanship of E-Transactions 
and Communications at KSU, and from there, it was sent directly to 
the students by e-mail. Three reminders were sent. A total 875 students 
participated in the survey, with a completion rate of 63% (n = 551). All 
data were analyzed using SPSS.
Instrument
The researchers used the HBM Scale (Champion, 1993) but modified 
the scale to make it applicable to this study by substituting MERS-CoV 
for breast cancer. For example, the original scale asked respondents to 
agree or disagree with the statement “It is extremely likely I will get 
breast cancer,” while in this study, the item was modified to read “It is 
extremely likely I will get MERS-CoV.” The questionnaire consisted of 
43 items addressing the HBM’s variables. Seven questions examined per-
ceived severity, five questions perceived susceptibility, seven questions 
perceived barriers, seven questions perceived benefits, eight questions 
cues to action, and nine questions perceived self-efficacy. A 5-point 
Likert scale was used, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree). Higher scores on the six scales mean greater perceived severity, 
perceived susceptibility, perceived barriers, perceived benefits, cues to 
action, and self-efficacy, respectively. Internal consistency of the origi-
nal scale was measured using Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficients, 
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which yielded results from .80 to .93. The content validity of this scale 
was also tested by three well-known judges who were familiar with 
the HBM (Champion, 1993). The scale used in this study was tested 
for reliability and validity and showed similar results to Champion’s 
scale (Table 1). The study also adapted Meyer’s media credibility scale 
of five dimensions—believability, accuracy, trustworthiness, fairness, 
and completeness—to assess the credibility of coronavirus messages 
disseminated across different communication channels (Meyer, 1988). 
Meyer’s scale shows high reliability and high validity (West, 1994).
Respondents who never sought MERS-CoV information were 
blocked from answering and assessing the credibility of communi-
cation channels (media credibility scale) as well as the likelihood of 
using different communication channels to seek MERS-CoV infor-
mation; they were automatically diverted to demographic questions. 
The questionnaire also included the MOH’s recommended measures 
to prevent MERS-CoV.
Validity of HBM MERS-CoV scale
Prior to IRB approval, the survey went through translation and va-
lidity processes. The English-language questionnaire was assessed 
for content and face validity by three experts from BGSU who were 
professors and experts in health communication. Changes were made 
based on the experts’ recommendations. Additionally, the researcher 
sent the questionnaire to a doctor and an epidemiologist to ensure 
appropriateness of language used, comprehension, and correctness of 
terminology. Modifications were made based on all experts’ recom-
mendations and notes.
After the editing process, cognitive testing was conducted by giving 
the survey to three English speakers. Each English speaker was asked to 
review the clarity, easiness, and appropriateness of the survey language. 
Comments and problems led to some revisions to the language and 
format of the questionnaire. After ensuring the clarity of the language 
used in the instrument, two native Arabic speakers who studied in the 
United States and hold master’s degrees translated the questionnaire 
into Arabic. The researcher verified the translation to ensure that the 
correctness of the translation reflected the study aim and scope. Finally, 
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the translation of the questionnaire was reviewed and verified by a fac-
ulty member in the Department of Arabic at KSU who held a master’s 
degree in linguistic studies from the United Kingdom. Modifications 
were made to several items on the Arabic questionnaire regarding word 
choice and grammar. The researcher then conducted a pilot study by 
asking five college students, both male and female, to take the Arabic 
and English questionnaires to ensure clarity of the language. Few items 
were adjusted based on students’ comments. Participants in the study 
were allowed to choose the language of the study (Arabic or English).
Reliabilities of the HBM subscales in this study were analyzed using 
Cronbach’s alpha. Results were similar to the original scales Champion 
(1993) obtained (Table 2).
Results
Descriptive Statistics
Of the 875 students who participated in the survey, 65% were women 
and 35% were men. Approximately 80% of the students were aged 18–24 
years, followed by 18% who were 25–34 years old. Approximately 12% of 
respondents were first-year students, 17% were second-year students, 
17% were third-year students, and 16% were fourth-year students. Ap-
proximately 12% were fifth- and sixth-year students. Graduate students 
accounted for approximately 26% of the respondents (Table 3). 
TABLE 2 Health Belief Model Reliability





Cues to action .80 .83
Self-efficacy .82 .88
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Research Question 1
Participants in the study were first asked questions related to informa-
tion seeking regarding MERS-CoV. These questions asked participants 
how often they sought information about MERS-CoV, where they first 
sought this information, and their likelihood of using various com-
munication channels when seeking information. The study found that 
approximately 52% of participants sought MERS-CoV information 
one to two times a year, 23% sought it once every other month, 10.3% 
TABLE 3 Characteristics of the Study Sample







First year in college 64 11.62
Second year in college 92 16.70
Third year in college 95 17.24
Fourth year in college 88 15.97
Fifth year in college 45 8.17
Sixth year in college 25 4.54





Health or related major 163 29.58
Agriculture or related major 8 1.45
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sought it once every month, 10% sought it one to two times per month, 
5% sought it one to two times a week, and less than 1% sought MERS-
CoV information daily.
Approximately 87% said they would first go to the Internet. Ap-
proximately 72% of Saudis say they are very likely or likely to seek 
information about MERS-CoV from their doctors. The MOH Twitter 
site and website ranked as the third and fourth most highly chosen 
communication channels for seeking information, with 70% and 65%, 
respectively. Interestingly, traditional media outlets did not rank highly 
as information-seeking channels, with 40% citing TV, 17% citing radio, 
and 13% citing newspapers as their likely or very likely sources for seek-
ing information about MERS-CoV.
Participants were asked to what extent the crisis information ob-
tained about MERS-CoV from each medium is believable, accurate, 
trustworthy, unbiased, and complete (Meyer, 1988). A 5-point Likert 
scale ranging from 1 (not accurate at all) to 5 (very accurate) was used for 
all five dimensions. Higher scores in the five dimensions mean greater 
believability, accuracy, trustworthiness, unbiasedness, and complete-
ness. Participants were given 16 communication channels, such as the 
WHO, the CDC, family and friends, and doctors or health providers, 
to rate credibility in regard to MERS-CoV information. The study 
showed that the MOH’s website rates as the most believable (M = 4.56, 
SD = 0.76), the most accurate (M = 4.44, M = 0.78), the most trust-
worthy (M = 4.45, SD = 0.80), and the most complete source (M = 4.13, 
SD = 1.00), and it rated highly for being unbiased (M = 3.51, SD = 
1.26). The MOH’s Twitter account was ranked second after its website 
in regard to believability (M = 4.46, SD = 0.83), accuracy (M = 4.30, 
SD = 0.89), and trustworthiness (M = 4.37, SD = 0.85) and rated highly 
for being unbiased and for being complete. The MOH’s YouTube chan-
nel had strong scores on believability (M = 4.30, SD = 0.90), accuracy 
(M = 4.17, SD = 0.92), and trustworthiness (M = 4.24, SD = 0.91) but 
lower scores on completeness (M = 3.85, SD = 1.07) and being unbiased 
(M = 3.45, SD = 1.18). The MOH’s Facebook page was not seen to be as 
accurate (M = 3.97, SD = 1.00) or as trustworthy (M = 4.01, SD = 1.02) 
as its website or Twitter site.
Therefore, when combining the media credibility subscale, the 
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descriptive analysis shows that the MOH’s website is perceived to be 
most credible (M = 21.17, SD = 3.33), followed by the WHO (M = 20.71, 
SD = 3.72), the MOH Twitter site (M = 20.63, SD = 3.61), the CDC 
(M = 20.38, SD = 3.89), and the MOH YouTube channel (M = 20.14, 
SD = 3.78).
Research Question 2
Kruskal–Wallis, with questions that have three choices (yes, no, I don’t 
know), and Mann–Whitney, with two choices (yes, no), were run to 
test the correlations between the HBM subscales and adherence to the 
preventive measures that the MOH has delivered and recommended.
Frequency of handwashing. Respondents were asked about the 
frequency of daily handwashing. The data for individuals’ HBM sub-
scales were analyzed using the Spearman correlation coefficient. The 
findings are summarized in Table 4.
The results show that perceived severity (p < .05) and perceived 
barriers (p < .001) are significantly related with the frequency of hand-
washing. Perceived barriers are negatively related with the frequency 
of handwashing. Thus respondents with higher perceived barriers are 
less likely to wash their hands than those with lower perceived bar-
riers. The results also show a positive relationship between perceived 
severity and the frequency of handwashing. Respondents with higher 
perceived severity scores are more likely to wash their hands than those 
with lower scores. The relationship between perceived susceptibility 
and benefits and the frequency of handwashing was not significant.
Wearing masks when visiting sick people. Respondents who said 
TABLE 4 Subscale Correlations
Subscale Spearman rho SD M
Susceptibility 0.078 0.74 2.25
Severity 0.085* 0.77 2.59
Benefits 0.075 0.61 3.78
Barriers −0.271** 0.69 2.43
*p < .05. **p < .001 (2-tailed).
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they visited sick people were asked if they wore a mask. The nonpara-
metric Kruskal–Wallis test indicates that the perceived susceptibility, 
χ2(2, N = 552) = 8.443, p < .001, perceived severity, χ2(2, N = 552) = 6.982, 
p < .05, perceived benefits, χ2(2, N = 552) = 30.445, p <.001, and perceived 
barriers, χ2(2, N = 552) = 42.996, p <.001, have significant relationships 
with the preventive measure of wearing a mask when visiting sick 
people. The data show that people with higher susceptibility scores 
(Mdn = 13) are more likely to adhere to this behavior than those with 
lower scores (Mdn = 12). The results also show that respondents with 
higher benefits scores (Mdn = 28) are more likely to wear a mask than 
those with lower scores (Mdn = 26). However, respondents with high 
severity scores (Mdn = 18) are less likely to wear a mask than those 
with lower scores (Mdn = 16). Similarly, respondents with higher bar-
riers scores (Mdn = 18) are less likely to wear a mask when visiting 
sick people than respondents with lower barriers scores (Mdn = 14).
Staying away from camels. Respondents were asked if they kept 
away from camels. The Mann–Whitney U-test indicated that perceived 
benefits, U = 7,747.5, p < .001, and barriers, U = 9,565.0, Z = −3.322, 
p < .001, have significant relationships with this preventive measure. 
Respondents with higher benefits scores (Mdn = 27) are more likely 
to keep away from camels than those with lower scores (Mdn = 25). 
Additionally, respondents with higher barriers scores (Mdn = 20) are 
less likely to follow this preventive measure than those with lower 
scores (Mdn = 16). Relationships between susceptibility and severity 
and staying away from camels were not significant.
Getting enough sleep. Participants were asked if they got enough 
sleep every day. Participants defined for themselves if they thought they 
were getting enough sleep and answered this question yes or no. The 
Mann–Whitney U-test was used to examine the association between 
each subscale of the HBM and the preventive MERS-CoV measure of 
getting enough sleep. The findings indicate significant relationships 
between perceived severity, U = 29,095.0, Z = −2.551, p < .05, perceived 
benefits, U = 29,819.0, Z = −2.837, p < .05, and perceived barriers, 
U = 28,597.5, p < .01, and getting enough sleep. Respondent with high 
benefit scores (Mdn = 27) are more likely to get enough sleep than re-
spondents with lower scores (Mdn = 26). In contrast, respondents with 
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high barriers scores (Mdn = 17) and severity scores (Mdn = 19) are less 
likely to get enough sleep than those with lower scores (Mdn = 16 and 
Mdn = 18, respectively). No significant relationship was found between 
perceived susceptibility and this particular behavior.
Following a healthy and balanced diet. The Mann–Whitney 
U-test was used to examine the relationship between each subscale 
of the HBM and the preventive MERS-CoV measure of following a 
healthy and balanced diet. A significant relationship was found for 
the perceived severity, U = 33,935.0, Z = −1.960, p < .05, and perceived 
barriers, U = 30,888.0, Z = −3.602, p < .001. Respondents with higher 
severity scores (Mdn = 18) were more likely to follow a healthy and 
balanced diet than those with lower scores (Mdn = 17), whereas those 
with higher barriers scores were less likely to follow a healthy diet 
(Mdn = 16). The relationship between susceptibility and a healthy and 
balanced diet is not significant.
Covering the mouth or using a tissue when coughing or sneez-
ing. The Mann–Whitney U-test indicated that there is a significant 
relationship between perceived benefits and the preventive measure 
of covering the mouth or using a tissue when coughing or sneezing, 
U = 10,754.5, Z = −4.785, p < .001. Respondents with high perceived 
benefits scores (Mdn = 27) are more likely to cover their mouths when 
sneezing than those with lower scores (Mdn = 25). The Mann–Whitney 
U-test also showed a relationship between perceived barriers and the 
preventive measure of covering the mouth when sneezing, U = 11,727.0, 
Z = −3.993, p < .001. Those with high barriers scores (Mdn = 19) are less 
likely to cover their mouths when sneezing than respondents with lower 
barriers scores (Mdn = 16). However, the Mann–Whitney U-test indi-
cated that neither perceived susceptibility nor perceived severity is sig-
nificantly related with covering the mouth when sneezing or coughing.
Taking time to exercise weekly. The data for the individuals’ HBM 
subscales were analyzed using the Spearman correlation coefficient. 
Results indicate significant relationships between perceived severity, 
p < .01, perceived benefits, p < .01, perceived barriers, p < .01, and the 
preventive measure of exercise. Perceived severity and perceived bar-
riers were negatively correlated with time spent on exercise. In con-
trast, perceived benefits was positively correlated with time devoted to 
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exercise every week. The relationship between perceived susceptibility, 
p = .279, and time spent on exercising was not significant.
Research Question 3
Frequency of handwashing. Respondents were asked about the 
frequency of daily handwashing. The data for the individuals’ HBM 
subscales were analyzed using the Spearman correlation coefficient. 
The results show that cues to action, p < .001, ρ = .190, and self-efficacy, 
p < .01, ρ = .145, are positively correlated with the preventive measure 
of handwashing. Respondents with higher cues to action and self-
efficacy scores are more likely to wash their hands than respondents 
with lower scores.
Wearing a mask when visiting sick people. Respondents who 
said they visited sick people were asked if they wore a mask. The 
nonparametric Kruskal–Wallis test indicated that cues to action, 
χ2(2, N = 552) = 35.698, p < .001, and self-efficacy, χ2(2, N = 552) = 38.884, 
p < .001, are significantly related to the preventive measure of wear-
ing a mask when visiting sick people. The data show that people with 
higher cues to action scores (Mdn = 36) are more likely to adhere to 
this behavior than those with lower scores (Mdn = 32) or those who do 
not visit sick people (Mdn = 33). The results also show that respondents 
with higher self-efficacy scores (Mdn = 39) are more likely to wear a 
mask than those with lower scores (Mdn = 35).
Staying away from camels. Respondents were asked if they kept 
away from camels. The Mann–Whitney U-test indicated that cues to 
action, U = 10,652.0, Z = −2.336, p < .05, and self-efficacy, U = 7,620.0, 
Z = −5.088, p < .001, are significantly related with this preventive 
measure. Respondents with higher cues to action scores (Mdn = 33) 
are more likely to keep away from camels than those with lower scores 
(Mdn = 32); however, respondents with higher self-efficacy scores 
(Mdn = 36) are less likely to follow this preventive measure than those 
with lower scores (Mdn = 33).
Getting enough sleep. Participants were asked if they get enough 
sleep every day. The Mann–Whitney U-test was used to examine the 
association between each subscale of the HBM and the preventive 
MERS-CoV measure of getting enough sleep. The study indicates 
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significant relationships between cues to action, U = 26,772.0, Z = 
−3.878, p < .001, and self-efficacy, U = 28,106.0, Z = −3.117, p < .01, and 
getting enough sleep. Respondents with high cues to action scores 
(Mdn = 33) are more likely to get enough sleep than respondents with 
lower scores (Mdn = 32). Respondents with high self-efficacy scores 
(Mdn = 36) are more likely to get enough sleep than those with lower 
scores (Mdn = 35).
Following a healthy and balanced diet. The Mann–Whitney 
U-test was used to examine the relationship between cues to action, self-
efficacy, and the preventive MERS-CoV measure of following a healthy 
and balanced diet. A significant relationship was found for the perceived 
cues to action, U = 22,755.0, Z = −7.987, p < .001, and self-efficacy, 
U = 28,228.0, Z = −5.036, p < .001. Respondents with higher cues to 
action scores (Mdn = 35) are more likely to follow healthy and bal-
anced diets than those with lower scores (Mdn = 31.5). Also, respon-
dents with higher self-efficacy scores (Mdn = 37) are more likely to 
follow healthy and balanced diets than respondents with lower scores 
(Mdn = 36).
Covering the mouth or using a tissue when coughing or sneez-
ing. The Mann–Whitney U-test indicated that there is a significant re-
lationship between perceived cues to action and the preventive measure 
of covering the mouth or using a tissue when coughing or sneezing, 
U = 12,067.5, Z = −3.719, p < .001. Respondents with high cues to action 
scores (Mdn = 33) are more likely to cover their mouths when sneez-
ing than those with lower scores (Mdn = 30). The Mann–Whitney 
U-test also shows a positive correlation between self-efficacy and the 
preventive measure of covering the mouth when sneezing, U = 11,018.5, 
Z = −4.566, p < .001. Those with higher self-efficacy scores (Mdn = 36) 
are more likely to cover their mouths when sneezing than respondents 
with lower scores (Mdn = 33).
Taking time to exercise weekly. The data for both cues to action 
and self-efficacy scales were analyzed using the Spearman correlation 
coefficient. The data show significant relationships between cues to ac-
tion, p < .001, ρ = .240, and the time devoted to exercising every week. 
The data also show that self-efficacy, p < .01, ρ = .122, also is positively 
correlated with time devoted to exercising every week.
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Discussion
MOH as a Credible Source
The results show that the MOH website and social media are like-
ly places for Saudi people to seek information on MERS-CoV, after 
Internet searches. Physicians ranked third. Interestingly, although 
physicians ranked third for seeking information, they ranked sixth 
as most credible source. The MOH website ranked first as the most 
credible source for MERS-CoV information, followed by the WHO, 
the MOH’s Twitter page, the CDC, the MOH’s YouTube channel, and 
doctors and health care providers. This finding is compatible with 
the report recently released by the Saudi online newspaper Makkah, 
which stated that the MERS-CoV topic was among the most searched 
on the MOH’s website (“Seasonal Influenza,” 2017). This may indicate 
that the MOH was able to regain trust when it implemented strategic 
communication during the “We Can Stop It” campaign, thus showing 
high Web traffic from users searching for MERS-CoV information.
Although these findings indicate that the MOH is seen as a credible 
source, five credibility measures were applied to better understand if 
there are differences in believability, accuracy, trustworthiness, being 
unbiased, and completeness among the 16 communication channels. 
The MOH website and MOH Twitter account ranked first and second, 
respectively, for most believable, accurate, and trustworthy. The MOH 
website also ranked first for most complete information on MERS-CoV.
Perceived Susceptibility and Severity
Only one preventive measure was significantly related to susceptibility. 
Those who perceived a higher risk of contracting MERS-CoV were 
more likely to wear a mask and see the benefit of doing so. As part of 
the campaign, posters depicted people wearing a mask when visiting 
sick people, thus indicating that this guideline was being followed.
The severity of contracting the virus is positively correlated with 
handwashing and eating a healthy and balanced diet, meaning the 
more people perceive they are at risk for contracting MERS-CoV, the 
more likely they are to wash their hands frequently and eat healthier. 
Surprisingly, wearing a mask, getting enough sleep, and getting enough 
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exercise are negatively correlated. This means that although people 
perceive the severity of contracting MERS-CoV as being great, they 
have not been influenced to get more sleep or exercise, eat a healthier 
diet, or wear a mask when visiting sick people. Perhaps this disconnect 
is due to a mentality of believing that they will not get sick, or perhaps 
they have not yet encountered anyone with the virus. This warrants a 
second phase of this campaign, which should focus on susceptibility to 
the disease. Campaign messages based on Ajzen and Fishbein’s (1980) 
theory of reasoned action could be useful in moving people toward 
practicing the MOH’s recommended preventive behaviors (Ajzen, 2012).
Perceived Benefits and Barriers
Five preventive measures were associated with benefits of practicing the 
behaviors. These were wearing a mask when visiting sick people, staying 
away from camels, getting enough sleep, getting enough exercise, and 
covering the mouth or using a tissue when coughing or sneezing. Key 
campaign messages providing step-by-step guidance through verbal 
and visual methods may have contributed to these healthy practices. 
Interestingly, the practices of frequent handwashing and eating a healthy 
and balanced diet were not significant.
Not surprisingly, if barriers to practicing these recommendations 
are high, people are less likely to practice them. This is the case for 
washing hands frequently, staying away from camels, getting enough 
sleep and exercise, eating a healthy and balanced diet, and covering the 
mouth or using a tissue when coughing or sneezing. Several explana-
tions can be offered here. For camel herders, it is not possible to stay 
away from camels—their livelihood. If people are working long hours 
at a job and/or tending to family needs, sleep and exercise may suf-
fer. If people do not have access to a tissue, they may cough or sneeze 
into their hands, which is an unsanitary practice. Decreasing barriers 
to practice is probably the greatest challenge this campaign faces, as 
many situations, such as being a camel herder or being a working par-
ent, cannot be changed. At the same time, campaign messages should 
continue to remind people to practice these healthy behaviors when 
possible.
Interestingly, wearing a mask when visiting sick people is seen 
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as a barrier, yet people are also more likely to practice this behavior. 
This is the only barrier that respondents say they are willing or able to 
overcome, meaning practicing this behavior is important to them in 
preventing the spread of MERS-CoV.
Cues to Action and Self-Efficacy
Respondents with higher cues to action, both external and internal, are 
more likely to perform all of the recommended preventive guidelines 
than those with lower scores. These included washing hands frequently, 
staying away from camels, getting enough sleep, getting enough exercise, 
eating a healthy and balanced diet, and covering the mouth or using a 
tissue when coughing or sneezing.
External cues are those factors that trigger people to change their 
behavior and may include events, people, mass media, and health 
providers, among other factors. Internal cues include psychological 
cues, such as pain and symptoms that trigger individuals to adopt a 
new behavior. It is reasonable to argue that, to some extent, the ex-
ternal cues the “We Can Stop It” campaign provided contributed to 
the practice of the behaviors. It is also reasonable to argue that many 
health providers adopted the MOH guidelines and that use of tradi-
tional and social media helped moved the campaign messages into the 
public sphere.
Self-efficacy was positively correlated with five of the six recom-
mended preventive guidelines; that is, Saudi people are more likely 
to wash their hands frequently, get enough sleep, get enough exercise, 
eat a healthy and balanced diet, and cover the mouth or use a tissue 
when coughing or sneezing if they have higher levels of self-efficacy. 
The campaign messages teach people how to perform a new behavior 
and stress that they have the ability and capability to make change. The 
more people believe in their ability and skill to achieve a certain goal, 
the more likely they will be to attain that goal. Key campaign messages 
may have contributed to providing the self-efficacy people needed to 
perform these behaviors.
Self-efficacy was negatively correlated with staying away from 
camels. This makes sense in that those who work with or around camels 
would not have the ability to stay away from them.
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Overall Impact
In the “We Can Stop It” campaign, two-way communication replaced 
the MOH’s one-way model of communicating during the megacrisis 
of the initial MERS-CoV outbreak. Although no benchmark study is 
available with which to assess credibility levels of the MOH at the be-
ginning of the crisis, media coverage, public outrage on social media, 
and the firing of the minister of health all pointed to failures to com-
municate effectively. Since launching the “We Can Stop It” campaign, 
the MOH has become the first place Saudis go to seek information 
on MERS-CoV, after Internet search engines. This is consistent with 
Fox and Duggan’s (2013) study that found that the majority of Internet 
users in the United States go first to the Internet search engines, such 
as Google and Yahoo!, to seek health information. Ranking the MOH 
as the first place to seek MERS-CoV information after the Internet 
search engines also is consistent with crisis communication guidelines 
in which an organization should position itself as the main source of 
information to tell its side of the story during a crisis (Coombs, 2014). 
Being the main source of information during a crisis ensures that an 
organization will be in charge of handling the flow of accurate informa-
tion (Coombs, 2007). The MOH, in fact, declares its website to be the 
main hub for MERS-CoV information. Furthermore, the study found 
that the MOH’s website is seen as the most credible source of informa-
tion among 15 other communication channels, including international 
organizations. This success could partially be attributed to the imple-
mentation of a strategic communication plan and effective policy that 
emphasizes transparency, accountability, accuracy, and engagement 
with the public, as seen in the “We Can Stop It” campaign.
The study also found that the majority of participants are more likely 
to use social media to seek information about MERS-CoV than tradi-
tional media. This is consistent with the Pew Research (2016) findings 
that traditional media in the United States are witnessing a dramatic 
decrease in use among younger generations, especially newspapers. 
Those aged between 18 and 29 years, the primary demographic of this 
study, depend less on traditional media for information than any other 
age group. This age group is more likely to use digital media, apps, 
and social networking sites to seek information, according to the Pew 
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research report. The emphasis on social media, especially Twitter, has 
allowed the public to be more interactive with the MOH. For example, 
the MOH tweets weekly updates on new cases and provides specific tips 
on how to avoid the virus. People are then encouraged to retweet these 
health messages, providing others with consistent, accurate, and timely 
updates. With approximately 8.5 million followers, the MOH Twitter 
site has proven to be an effective two-way communication tool. What 
has shown to be the least effective of MOH’s communication tools is its 
Facebook page, which ranked lowest of all the MOH’s communication 
channels. Facebook, in general, ranked low on all measures of cred-
ibility, indicating that Facebook is not the strongest or best method to 
reach Saudi people with pertinent health information.
Regarding campaign messages, participants who had high scores 
on the HBM five dimensions (susceptibility, severity, benefits, cues to 
action, and self-efficacy) were more likely to comply with the MOH’s 
guidelines and instructions. For instance, people with higher self-
efficacy, cues to action, and perceived severity were more likely to wash 
their hands than those with lower scores. Respondents with high HBM 
scores were more likely to wear a mask when visiting sick people. Such 
findings are consistent with Champion’s (1990) correlations between 
high HBM scores and the frequency of breast self-examination.
The study also found that respondents with high barriers scores 
are less likely to follow the MOH’s MERS-CoV preventive measures, 
hence the importance of reducing these barriers by addressing the chal-
lenges and obstacles that prevent Saudis from performing the MOH’s 
recommended behaviors. Further studies could help the MOH better 
understand what people need to overcome the barriers and then provide 
effective communication strategies to address these needs.
The study showed that Saudis have the self-efficacy to follow the 
campaign’s recommendations, except for staying away from camels. 
This shows the importance of campaigns providing the necessary tools 
to change a behavior.
Limitations
This study had three limitations. The first was the use of a convenience 
sample. Although a convenience sample is less expensive than other 
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types of sampling, it can provide useful information for researchers 
in a short period of time (Wimmer & Dominick, 2011). Cost was the 
prohibitive factor in gaining a sample from the larger population. The 
second limitation was the use of college students as the unit of analysis. 
It is worth noting, however, that KSU is located in Riyadh, the city with 
the largest number of MERS-CoV cases. It is the largest university in 
the country and hosts both domestic students from various regions and 
international students. Third, nonresponse bias was another limitation 
of this study. Although the e-mail invitation to participate in this study 
was sent to all KSU students, only 875 participated in the study, leaving 
a large number of KSU students who might carry different perspec-
tives about the topic under study. Fourth, the study did not include 
baseline data or a control group to assess the credibility of the MOH’s 
MERS-CoV messages; rather, it relied on participant self-report after 
the MERS-CoV crisis.
Finally, we recognize that people may have been practicing preven-
tive behaviors before the campaign or are practicing them without hav-
ing been exposed to the campaign; however, we assert that the MOH’s 
strong credibility has positively influenced attitudes and behaviors in 
following preventive recommendations.
Conclusion
The results from this study indicate that the MOH has gained credibility 
since hiring a new minister of health and launching the “We Can Stop 
It” campaign. The results further illustrate that the campaign is hav-
ing a positive impact in that the majority of participants are practicing 
most, but not all, of the preventive guidelines set forth in the campaign. 
Campaign planners facing megacrises can learn from this study how 
best to develop effective campaigns. The first step is to be sure that 
the organization’s key constituents see it as credible. The second step 
is to provide a strong theoretical framework from which to develop 
the campaign. Finally, campaigns that address perceived susceptibility 
and severity of contracting a deadly virus and that identify perceived 
benefits of and barriers to practicing recommended preventive health 
guidelines are more likely to be successful.
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Framing of crisis events is to a large extent contested (Boin, t’Hart, 
& McConnell, 2009; Frandsen & Johansen, 2017; Seeger & Sellnow, 
2016). Even if risk and crisis communication research largely focus 
on how to create best practices for designing and disseminating crisis 
communications and reaching a common public understanding of 
CONTACT Bengt Johansson, PhD • E-mail: bengt.johansson@jmg.gu.se • University of Gothenburg, Box 
710, 405 30 Gothenburg, Sweden
Expressing Opinions About the Refugee 
Crisis in Europe: The Spiral of Silence 
and Crisis Communication
Bengt Johansson 
Department of Journalism, Media, and Communication, University of 
Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden
ABSTRACT
Framing of crisis events is to a large extent contested, with multiple sources and confl icting 
messages. Theories of crisis communication acknowledge how people try to deal with these 
competing messages, and this article seeks to deepen the understanding the process of sense 
making of crisis events by connecting crisis communication to the spiral of silence theory. The 
spiral of silence theory, founded by Elisabeth Noelle-Neuman, proposes that people are less 
willing to express their opinions if they believe their beliefs are shared by a minority. This will lead 
to a spiral in which those who feel their opinions are popular are more inclined to express their 
opinions, and those who perceive their opinions are unpopular among the public become more 
silent. This study analyzed changes over time in the willingness to express opinions about the 
refugee crisis in Europe using a two-wave Web-panel survey (N = 1,185) in Sweden in 2015–2016. 
The focus is the impact of changing government policy, which moved from a generous refugee 
policy toward a more restrictive policy. Changes toward a more restrictive refugee policy did 
not seem to change the overall picture. Those supporting a more restrictive policy were still less 
inclined to speak their true opinions about the refugee crisis, even if the policy had changed in 
their favor. On the other hand, respondents supporting a more generous refugee policy seemed 
to become more cautious about expressing their opinions about the refugee crisis after the policy 
change, especially when talking to strangers.
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crisis situations, it is also pointed out that crisis events take place in 
situations of framing contest (Frandsen & Johansen, 2017; Heath & 
O’Hair, 2010; Seeger & Sellnow, 2016). Questions of contest can be, Is 
there actually a crisis going on? Who is responsible for the upcoming 
situation? How can it be solved? What is the proper way of dealing 
with the crises? These questions will be addressed by decision makers, 
organizations, news media, and citizens, and crisis decisions are thus 
made in an environment of competing messages (Boin, t’Hart, Stern, & 
Sundelius, 2005).
When discussing citizens’ perceptions of crisis events, we have to 
consider how this frame contest affects the sense making of a crisis. Risk 
and crisis communication has shown how people use different strate-
gies to make sense of an uncertain situation (Sellnow & Seeger, 2013; 
Vigsø & Odén, 2016). One example of these strategies is convergence 
theory, which focuses on the ways in which individuals make sense of 
competing information by collecting and contemplatinge information 
from different sources and discussing this information with family, 
friends, and neighbors (Anthony, Sellnow, & Millner, 2013; Sellnow, 
Ulmer, Seeger, & Littlefield, 2009). However, one possible problem with 
the process of sense making might be that all these communication 
opportunities are not always at hand. In crises with competing frames, 
people might not always be comfortable expressing what they really 
think about different aspects of the crisis. Some speak out and discuss 
controversial issues with their families, friends at work, or even people 
they do not know. Others stay silent and are afraid to let others know 
what they really think about the issue at hand.
This article seeks to deepen the understanding the process of sense 
making of crisis events by connecting crisis communication to the spiral 
of silence theory. Even if theories of crisis communication acknowledge 
that people try to deal with competing messages, it has not taken into 
consideration the social dynamics of the sense-making process. The 
spiral of silence might be a way to further understand how people react 
to and communicate in times of crisis.
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Literature Review
The Spiral of Silence
The spiral of silence theory proposes that people are less willing to 
express their opinions when they believe their beliefs are shared by a 
minority (Noelle-Neuman, 1984). We are sensitive to our surrounding 
social environment and will not speak out if we fear becoming socially 
isolated. This will lead to a spiral in which those who feel their opin-
ions are popular are more inclined to express their opinions and those 
who perceive their opinions are unpopular among the public become 
more silent.
The spiral of silence is seen as one of the most influential theories 
of communication and political communication over the last half-
century (Donsbach, Salmon, & Tsfati, 2016) and has been tested in 
numerous studies. The general conclusion of meta-analyses shows a 
general but weak relationship between the perceived opinion climate 
and respondents’ willingness to express their opinions (Glynn, Hayes, 
& Shanahan, 1997; Glynn & Huge, 2016).
But the theory has been criticized and studies have been contested 
for a number of reasons. The spiral of silence theory is so complex and 
contains so many assumptions that the whole theory has never been 
(and probably never will be) comprehensively tested (Matthes & Hayes, 
2016). Scholars have, over the years, separated the model into manage-
able parts, but still, after almost 40 years of research, we find research 
criticizing everything from the assumptions and the generalizability 
to the design and how to measure key concepts of the theory (Hayes, 
2007; Matthes & Hayes, 2016; Neuwirth, Frederick, & Mayo, 2007).
One major critical point in previous research is how research has 
failed to capture the dynamics of the theory. As Matthes and Hayes 
(2016) argued, research has neglected to observe the spiral in the theory 
because of improper research design. Most studies use cross-sectional 
data or aggregate data; the former can only capture a frozen moment of 
the phenomena, and the latter have an ecology fallacy problem (Mat-
thes & Hayes, 2016). Whether people actually change their willingness 
to speak out because of the opinion climate is, to a large extent, still 
unknown.
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As stated previously, the general aim of this article is to use the spiral 
of silence in studying crisis communication, but the purpose is also to 
deepen the knowledge of the dynamics of the spiral of silence theory. 
Therefore this work builds on panel data from Sweden in 2015 and 2016 
in which respondents were asked questions about their willingness to 
express their opinions about the refugee crisis in Europe.
The Swedish government changed its refugee policy from an “open-
door policy” to one of the most restrictive in Europe in late fall 2015 
(Ghersetti & Odén, in press).1 Because of the policy change, we are 
able to measure people’s readiness to share opinions about the refugee 
crisis just before the policy changed and after the change was made. 
This makes it possible to evaluate whether respondents changed their 
willingness to speak out when the opinion climate changed.
By studying the refugee crisis, the study also fulfills one of the 
important assumptions of the spiral of silence—the requirement of 
a value-laden issue. Immigration and refugees have a strong moral 
component and are controversial and therefore in line with Noelle-
Neuman’s argument that it is only from a moral or normative element 
that one can fear the threat of isolation (Gearhart & Zhang, 2015; 
Noelle-Neuman, 1984; Scheufele & Moy, 2000). This will of course 
also be a good example of an issue were there are competing frames 
and opinions. The empirical aim is therefore to analyze to what extent 
individuals change their willingness to express their opinions when 
government policy concerning a value-laden issue changes.
The organization of the article is as follows. The next section re-
views the key assumptions and results of spiral of silence research. This 
framework is used in more detail to discuss some shortcomings and 
criticisms of spiral of silence research. On the basis of previous findings, 
a number of hypotheses are proposed, and thereafter the methodology 
and measures used in the study are described. After presenting the re-
sults, the article ends with conclusions, a discussion of the limitations 
of the study, and implications of the results for crisis communication.
The Spiral of Silence: Theory and Previous Findings
One of the important needs of the spiral of silence theory is a value-laden 
issue. As said earlier, fear of isolation is only relevant when the question 
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at hand is controversial. In spiral of silence research, immigration is 
categorized as a transitory issue (Gearhart & Zhang, 2015). Transitory 
issues are not constantly in the public eye but reemerge from time to 
time. The issue salience of immigration has increased during the last 
decade in Sweden and Europe in general (Green-Pedersen & Krogstrup, 
2008). Immigration in 2015 was, for the first time, viewed as the most 
important societal issue among Swedish citizens (53% mentioned im-
migration as an important societal issue; Ohlsson, Ekengren, & Solevid, 
2016), and immigration was also the most prominent issue during the 
2014 election campaign in the news media (Johansson, 2017). Analyses 
of the news media content of the election also indicates a strong focus 
on immigration, and the refugee crisis was the dominant news story 
during fall 2015 (Ghersetti & Odén, in press).
Some studies of the spiral of silence have focused on immigration 
to test the theory. Matthes, Morrison, and Schemer (2010) analyzed the 
national referendum about the naturalization of Swiss immigrants. The 
results provided empirical support because those perceived as being 
a minority expressed their opinions to a lesser extent. This tendency 
was especially prevalent among those who were less convinced of their 
opinions. Similar empirical support was also found in a study using 
Asian immigration to Australia as a case (Louis, Duck, Terry, & Lalonde, 
2010). Gearhart and Zhang (2015) also included a question on immi-
gration (if undocumented immigrants should have the opportunity 
to receive permanent residency) when testing different types of issues 
and the spiral of silence theory. The authors found robust support for 
the spiral of silence theory related to both immigration and the other 
investigated issues (abortion and gay marriage).
A recurrent criticism of spiral of silence research is the lack of lon-
gitudinal studies. In most cases, research uses cross-sectional data and 
can only, as Matthes and Hayes (2016) put it, analyze the social confor-
mity hypothesis. Cross-sectional data measure at a single moment the 
difference between respondents expressing their opinions and those 
being silent. However, this does not capture the dynamics of opinion 
change, which is one of the central aspects of the theory. To investigate 
if the opinion climate leads to changes in the willingness to speak out 
(the change hypothesis), studies over time are needed. Noelle-Neuman 
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(1984) used trend survey data to demonstrate how aggregate opinions 
increased or decreased depending on the opinion climate. As Matthes 
and Hayes (2016) noted, this might give an intuitive understanding of 
the phenomenon, but it is not a proper way to study changes on an 
individual level and might also suffer from ecology fallacy. Trend survey 
data are therefore not appropriate to study the dynamics of the spiral 
of silence theory. A few studies have used panel data. Shamir (1997) 
used a two-wave panel to investigate the spiral of silence and climate 
change, and McDonald, Glynn, Kim, and Ostman (2001) used a four-
wave panel from 1948 and conducted a secondary analysis on opinion 
climate and candidate preference.
The asylum regime in Sweden has been generous and sometimes 
described as an “open-door policy” (Ghersetti & Odén, in press). The 
policy had broad support among the political parties, and only the 
nationalist-populist Swedish Democrats (13% in the 2014 general elec-
tion) opposed the policy. It should also be noted that Swedes are more 
open to immigrants and welcoming refugees compared to citizens in 
the rest of Europe (Sides & Citrin, 2007).
The refugee situation escalated during fall 2015, when 10,000 refu-
gees arrived in Sweden every week and Migration Agency of Sweden 
estimates claimed that 190,000 would seek asylum in Sweden in 2015 
(in reality, it was 162,000).2 The Dublin Convention states that refu-
gees should seek protection in the first European Union (EU) land 
they enter,3 but most EU countries let refugees move to other coun-
tries. Sweden and Germany were considered popular because of their 
generous refugee policies, but the number of refugees caused strong 
tensions in the asylum-seeking process in Sweden (and Germany), not 
least in terms of housing. The Swedish government (a coalition of the 
Social Democrats and the Green Party), therefore, decided to change 
the policy, and in November 2015, identity checks were imposed on all 
modes of transport to Sweden, and the right to bring families to Sweden 
was severely restricted. In one day, Sweden had changed its refugee 
policy from being the most generous in the EU to being one of the 
most restrictive. The only party that opposed the new policy was the 
Left Party, with less than 10% support (Ghersetti & Odén, in press). The 
refugee situation in Sweden (and Europe) can therefore these years be 
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described in terms of a crisis as defined by Ulmer, Sellnow, and Seeger 
(2007): “a specific, unexpected, non-routine event or series of events 
that creates a high level of uncertainty and a significant or perceived 
threat to high priority goals” (p. 7).
From what we know from opinion research, we can expect changes 
in public opinion when policies change. Zaller (1992) discussed the elite 
dominance in the news and concluded that the public reacts to elite 
perspectives on information, and even if not everyone changes his or 
her mind, changes in elite opinions will have a major impact on citizens’ 
views of societal issues (Zaller, 1992; see also Bennet, 1990; Iyengar & 
Kinder, 1987). In fall 2015, many political parties abruptly changed their 
refugee policies. Results also indicate that media coverage also generally 
follows the framing of the changed policy (Ghersetti & Odén, in press).
Thus, in line with the spiral of silence theory, we would, before the 
policy change, expect a greater willingness to express opinions about 
the refugee crisis among respondents supporting a more generous 
refugee policy compared to those holding a more restrictive view. This 
scenario would probably change because of the changing policy, and 
we would expect that those favoring a more restrictive view would be 
more willing to share their opinions. Following this logic, the respon-
dents supporting a more generous policy would be silenced. The study 
hypotheses follow:
H1: Opinion congruency in refugee policy between respondents’ opin-
ions and government policy will be positively related to a willingness 
to express opinions about the refugee crisis.
H2: When government policy changes to a more restrictive refugee 
policy, respondents supporting a restrictive policy will increase their 
willingness to express their opinions about the refugee crisis.
H3: When government policy changes to a more restrictive refugee 
policy, respondents supporting a generous policy will decrease their 
willingness to express their opinions about the refugee crisis.
The spiral of silence phenomenon is generally tested on speaking out 
in front of unknown people (“talking to a stranger on the bus” is often 
used in survey questions) and is generally believed to be weaker when 
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it is related to the social groups to which the individual belongs. The 
fear of isolation tends to be less pronounced when it comes to talking 
with family, friends, and work colleagues and classmates (Hampton et 
al., 2014). Against this background, we would expect the willingness to 
express an opinion about the refugee crisis to be more accepted when 
it comes to family and friends than other reference groups:
H4: The willingness to express opinions about the refugee crisis will 
be more accepted when talking to family and friends, compared 
with work colleagues and classmates and people respondents do not 
know so well.
Because the elite opinion changed and the news media seemed to 
report this change without challenging the dominant frame (Ghersetti 
& Odén, in press), the two waves can be viewed as capturing the change 
in opinion climate on an aggregate level. In this sense, one could ar-
gue that the design follows Noelle-Neuman’s (1984) original measure 
of opinion climate, where she emphasized that the opinion climate is 
about the factual gain or loss of ground among the population, not if 
the individual also perceives this process. However, in most spiral of 
silence research, a common way to measure the opinion climate is to 
ask respondents how they perceive the general opinion position on 
the issue and compare these answers with their own issue position 
(Matthes & Hayes, 2016). Even so, there have been many suggestions 
about how to measure the opinion climate. Some have asked about the 
opinion among the general public (Shamir, 1997), while others have 
focused on different reference groups (Moy, Domke, & Stamm, 2001; 
Oshagan, 1996). An interesting and maybe also troublesome aspect in 
previous research is the lack of mass media indicators in many studies. 
Matthes and Hayes (2016) highlighted that only a few studies actually 
include media content in their analyses and fail to establish a connec-
tion between the media content to which respondents are exposed 
and their perception of the opinion climate. However, there are a few 
examples of studies where the climate of opinion is measured as seen to 
be conveyed through the mass media (Matera & Salwen, 1992). To arrive 
at a more thorough understanding of the processes, the design of this 
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study also includes an analysis of those respondents who changed their 
inclination to speak out (see also Gearhart & Zhang, 2015) to evaluate 
to what extent this disposition may be related not only to the changing 
opinion climate but also to perceptions of the news media’s reporting 
(media congruency), which can be viewed as a subjective measure of 
the opinion climate. A proposed research question is as follows:
To what extent can respondents’ willingness to express their opinions 
about the refugee crises be related to media congruency?
Method
To try to overcome some of the critical points referred to earlier, this 
study of the spiral of silence in crisis events uses (a) a two-wave panel 
study to be able to investigate changes in willingness to express opin-
ions; (b) analysis of a real-world event—not a hypothetical—which 
makes the situation more real for respondents (see Hayes, 2007); and, 
because there was a dramatic change in elite opinion of the refugee 
issue, where all major parties changed their opinions and decided to 
change the policy, (c) observations of whether the change of (elite) 
opinion climate also affects willingness to speak out.
Data Collection
Data for this study were collected in November 2015 (before the policy 
change) and April 2016 (after the policy change) and were generated 
by the Laboratory of Opinion Research (Lore) at the University of 
Gothenburg using a Web survey panel of Swedish citizens. The panel 
contains both self-recruited respondents (approximately 60,000) and 
respondents recruited from probability-based population samples 
(approximately 10,000).4
The chosen sample (2,500) was randomly selected from the citizen 
panel and was stratified to reflect the general population according to 
gender, age, and education. The first wave of the survey was collected 
between October 26 and November 5, 2015, with a response rate of 
63%. The second wave was sent out to respondents (who answered 
the first survey) between April 21 and May 3, 2016. The response rate 
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of the second wave was 71%. In both panel waves, 1,185 respondents 
answered the questions.
The design using a two-wave panel (i.e., interviewing the same per-
sons two times) enhances the possibility to track individual trajectories 
over time. It makes it easier to rule out other factors that might affect 
the results and strengthens claims of causal interpretations (Berrington, 
Smith, & Sturgis, 2006).
Measures
Willingness to speak out. The criterion variable in this study was 
measured by three questions capturing different social spheres: (a) fam-
ily and friends, (b) work colleagues and classmates, and (c) strangers. 
The following question was posed: “To what extent do you feel you 
can speak out about the refugee crisis with your family and closest 
friends?” Respondents were given a 5-point scale on which to place 
themselves, ranging from 1 (to a very large extent) to 5 (to a very small 
extent; Wave 1, M = 4.56, SD = 0.80; Wave 2, M = 4.57, SD = 0.78). The 
same scale was used to ask if respondents were willing to speak out 
about the refugee crisis with people at work and in school: “To what 
extent do you feel you can speak out honestly about the refugee crisis 
with work colleagues and classmates?” (Wave 1, M = 3.87, SD = 1.22; 
Wave 2, M = 3.79, SD = 1.21).
To measure the willingness to speak out in relation to strangers, 
the third question asked, “To what extent do you feel you can speak 
honestly about the refugee crisis with people you don’t know well?” 
Respondents were given a 5-point scale on which to place themselves, 
ranging from 1 (to a very large extent) to 5 (to a very small extent; Wave 1, 
M = 3.21, SD = 1.37; Wave 2, M = 3.04, SD = 1.38).
Own opinion. Respondents were asked to express their opinions 
about the refugee issue by measuring to what extent they would favor 
a more restrictive, status quo, or generous refugee policy. The question 
was posed, “How well do the following statements comply with what you 
think of the refugee reception?” Respondents answered using a 5-point 
scale to express their opinions about the refugee issue, ranging from 1 
(we should receive far fewer refugees than today) to 5 (we should accept far 
more refugees than today; Wave 1, M = 2.77, SD = 1.42; Wave 2, M = 2.68, 
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SD = 1.43). The variable was computed as a dichotomous variable in the 
analysis (restrictive/generous policy opinion). Respondents with the 
opinion of receiving fewer refugees in both waves and being pleased 
with the present level in Wave 2 were considered as supporting a re-
strictive policy. With the same logic, respondents claiming Sweden 
should accept more refugees in both waves and being content with the 
present level of refugee reception in Wave 1 were coded as supporting 
a generous policy. This recoding will of course create a loss of data 
concerning attitude change, but the rationale is to be able to include 
those changing their minds due to the policy change.
Perception of media congruency. As pointed out previously, 
there is a discussion in spiral of silence research about the importance 
of perceptions of opinion climate. The measure of media congruency 
(evaluation of news media reporting) is viewed as an alternative way to 
measure the subjective perception of the opinion climate. Even if this 
is not a straightforward question of how a respondent’s own opinion 
is related to the general opinion, we know from previous research that 
people tend to generalize media content to the general view of societal 
problems and their effect on public opinion (Gunther & Storey, 2003; 
Perloff, 2015; Schulz & Roessler, 2012). Evaluation of news media re-
porting can therefore be seen as a proxy for the respondents’ views on 
the opinion climate in society.
The respondents were asked to evaluate the news media reporting 
of the refugee crisis with the question, “How do you think the news 
media so far has reported on the refugee situation?” The scale had 7 
points, ranging from 1 (not good at all) to 7 (very good; Wave 1, M = 4.22, 
SD = 1.48; Wave 2, M = 3.89, SD = 1.45).
Noelle-Neuman (1984) raised the question of the importance of 
personal traits related to the spiral of silence phenomenon (Neuwirth 
et al., 2007; Scheufele & Moy, 2000). Controlling some of these aspects 
by inclusion in the analysis were political interest, education, gender, 
and age.
Political interest. A respondent’s political interest was measured 
by the 4-point-scale question “How interested are you in politics?” 
ranging from 1 (great interest) to 4 (no interest). The panel consisted of 
respondents with a greater interest in politics compared with the general 
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public (M = 1.74, SD = 0.66). This is related to the recruitment process 
and the questions asked in the panel, where societal issues dominated.
Education. In the survey, respondents answered a question about 
their highest level of education with fixed response alternatives (only 
elementary school; high school, less than 3 years; high school, 3 years 
or longer; postsecondary education [not university], less than 3 years; 
postsecondary education [not university], 3 years or longer; college/uni-
versity, less than 3 years; college/university, 3 years or longer; PhD). Even 
if the scale was ordinal, it was treated as interval in the analysis. The sam-
ple contained a larger number of people with college/university educa-
tions compared to the overall Swedish population (M = 6.91, SD = 1.87).
Gender. This variable is measured by a self-reported question with 
three alternatives: woman, man, and other. Only four respondents 
chose the last option, and they were excluded from the analysis. The 
sample had a larger proportion of male respondents compared with 
the general population (M = 1.52, SD = 0.50).
Age. Age was measured by the panelists’ self-reported years of 
birth. The sample contained respondents aged between 18 and 72 years 
(M = 47, SD = 13.99), which means that the sample contained more 
middle-aged and fewer young (<30 years) and old (>70 years) people 
compared with the population as a whole.
Results
The results in Table 1 indicate strong support for the proposed differ-
ence in the preparedness to give voice to opinions about the refugee 
crisis dependent on to whom a person talks. Overall, respondents are 
willing to express their opinions among family and friends, and the 
policy change did not change this attitude at all (Wave 1, M = 4.56; 
Wave 2, M = 4.57). As predicted in H4, respondents are a little less 
comfortable speaking out on this issue when talking to their colleagues 
and classmates, and over time, they tend to be less willing to express 
their opinions (Wave 1, M = 3.87; Wave 2, M = 3.79). But even after the 
policy change, a majority feel they can express their opinions when 
talking to people they meet at work or school.
This tendency is even clearer when asking about talking to people 









































































































































































































respondents do not know so well, both in terms of generally being less 
willing to speak out and changing toward being more silent after the 
policy change (Wave 1, M = 3.18; Wave 2, M = 3.03). On this general 
level, we therefore discover a significant tendency toward a more si-
lenced public opinion, in terms of being willing to express opinions 
outside the family setting. Even so, the effect size (d = .013, d = .07) 
indicates that the magnitude of the policy change on the willingness 
to speak opinions in public is rather low. It should also be noted that 
a majority of all respondents feel they can talk about the refugee crisis 
even if they talk to people they do not know so well, both before and 
after the policy change.
But are these tendencies uniform, or do they, as H1, H2, and H3 
predicted, depend on the opinions about the refugee issue among the 
respondents? In Table 2, the analysis is separated among those who 
support a generous and a more restrictive refugee policy.
Moving on to the first (H1) hypothesis, we expected to find a correla-
tion between supporting the government policy on the refugee issue 
and a willingness to speak out. However, the results show that those 
favoring a more generous refugee policy to a larger extent are willing 
to express their opinions about the refugee crisis, both before and 
after the policy change (family and friends, M = 4.86/4.81; work col-
leagues and classmates, M = 4.48/4.30; people you do not know so well, 
M = 3.97/3.68). The difference compared with respondents favoring 
a more restrictive policy is significant, where a clear majority instead 
are less comfortable expressing their opinions (family and friends, 
M = 4.33/4.37; work colleagues and classmates, M = 3.33/3.37; people 
you do not know so well, M = 2.46/2.46). On the basis of these two 
measurement points, it seems like those supporting a more restrictive 
policy are less likely to express their opinions, even if the policy has 
changed, favoring their position. H1 can therefore only be partly sup-
ported.
The second (H2) and third (H3) hypotheses focused on changes of 
expressing opinions, not the majority/minority position. H2 must be 
rejected because there was no change among those supporting a restric-
tive policy before and after the policy change, independent of whom 
they talk to. Even if the policy change supported their opinions, they 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE 3 Predictors That Impact the Willingness to Express Opinions About the Refugee 
Crisis in Conversations with Family and Friends, Work Colleagues and Classmates, and 
People You Do Not Know So Well
Willingness to 
speak out before 
policy change
Willingness to speak 






Own opinion (generous policy) .33*** .29*** −.11**
Media congruency .03 .07* −.04
Political interest (low) −.01 −.08** .06
Education (high) −.07 −.07* .00
Gender (woman) −.07 −.06 .03
Age .02 .06 −.04
Adjusted R² (%) 10 9 1
N 816 818 815
Work colleagues and classmates
Own opinion (generous policy) .48*** .43*** −.01
Media congruency .08* .12*** .02
Political interest (low) −.03 −.10** .08*
Education (high) −.04 −.10** .04
Gender (woman) .01 .02 −.01
Age .04 .04 .00
Adjusted R² (%) 20 12 0
N 815 811 807
People you do not know so well
Own opinion (generous policy) .50*** .45*** .12**
Media congruency .11** .09* .05
Political interest (low) −.04 −.09* .06
Education (high) .03 −.05 .02
Gender (woman) −.02 −.06 −.03
Age .04 −.01 .08*
Adjusted R² (%) 28 19 2
N 816 817 814
Note. Values are ordinary least squares, standardized regression coefficients. The dependent 
variables are created by computing the variable willingness to speak out in the two waves, where 
respondents could be more/less willing to speak out. The dichotomized variable for decreased 
willingness to speak out comprises those less inclined to express their opinions compared with 
those having the same opinion in both waves and those being more motivated to speak out. 
The media congruency measure is the absolute difference in opinion about the media reporting 
and respondents’ own issue opinions in both waves. Tests to see if the data met the assumption 
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still felt hesitant to speak out in public about their opinions. Moving 
on to H3, we find clear support for what was expected. Respondents 
supporting a more generous policy have to some extent been silenced. 
After the policy change, significantly fewer respondents were willing to 
express their views on the refugee crisis. This can be found independent 
of social sphere, even if the tendency is clearly related to social groups 
outside family and close friends.
To further examine the mechanisms of the spiral of silence, Table 3 
shows to what extent changes in the willingness to speak out are related 
to a person’s own opinion and perception of media congruency. We 
also control the results by demographics, which sometimes are treated 
as personal traits with a possible influence on willingness to speak out 
in public.
The results of three regression models are shown in Table 3, where 
the dependent variable measures respondents’ willingness to express 
their opinions, both at and between the two measurement points. 
The first two models analyze the data as cross-sectional data to see if 
media congruency affects the predisposition to speak out before and 
after the policy change. The last model analyzes changes and whether 
media congruency has an impact on opinion change (i.e., less willing 
to express opinions).
In all three social spheres, we find that issue position has an impact 
on the respondents’ willingness to reveal their opinions about the refu-
gee crisis, both before and after the policy change (family and friends, 
β = .33/.29; work colleagues and classmates, β = .48/.43; people you do 
not know so well, β = .50/.44). The more a person supports a gener-
ous policy, the more willing he or she is to speak out. This is the same 
tendency we saw in Tables 1 and 2.
Also, media congruency has an impact on the tendency to speak 
out. Respondents who are more critical toward the media reporting 
also seem to be less inclined to reveal their opinions. This is found in 
of collinearity indicated that multicollinearity was not a concern (values ranging between the 
four regression models, own opinion, tolerance = .78–.82, VIF = 1.22–1.28; media congruency, 
tolerance = .85–.90, VIF = 1.12–1.18; political interest, tolerance = .93–.94, VIF = 1.06–1.07; education, 
tolerance = .90–.91, VIF = 1.05–1.10; gender, tolerance = .88–.89, VIF = 1.13; age, tolerance = .95, 
VIF = 1.05–1.06).
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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all social spheres after the policy change (family and friends, β = .07; 
work colleagues and classmates, β = .12; people you do not know so 
well, β = .09). Before the change of policy, the effect of media con-
gruency was significant for talking to people at work and in school, 
β = .08, and strangers, β = .11, but not in discussions among family and 
friends, β = .03.
Political interest also affected this opinion, especially after the policy 
change. Those less interested in politics seem to be more inclined to 
hide their opinions, independent of whom they talk to (family and 
friends, β = −.08; work colleagues and classmates, β = −.10; people you 
do not know so well, β = −.09). The same holds for lower educated 
respondents, but only when speaking with family members and close 
friends, β = −.08, and people at work and in school, β = −.10.
When analyzing the change of willingness to speak out, the results 
indicate overall a weak relationship between the proposed variables 
(i.e., low explained variance). The most important factor is a person’s 
own opinion on the issue, but the effect goes in different directions, 
depending on social sphere. Among family and friends, we find that 
supporting a more generous policy does not lead to a decreased inclina-
tion to reveal opinions, β = −.11, but it does so when talking to strangers, 
β = .12. Moreover, there seems to be no direct effect on the inclination 
of changes in speaking out related to how news media performance 
was evaluated and the respondents’ own opinions (media congru-
ency). If someone changed his or her willingness to express his or her 
views, this change may not be related to the person’s perceptions of 
news media reporting. This does not, of course, rule out a possibility 
of indirect media impact in line with the spiral of silence theory. As 
said before, the media effect in the spiral of silence theory might be 
unconscious.
The other predictors show no significant effect, except that in-
creasingly age seems to be related to less willingness to talk about the 
refugee issue with strangers. Being a man or a woman, being low or 
highly educated, or having an interest in politics does not seem to 
matter.
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Discussion
The spiral of silence is one of the most influential media effect theories 
of the last half-century. Noelle-Neuman’s theory on how the media 
influences people’s willingness to speak their minds in public has been 
subject to many studies all over the world. However, the theory has been 
criticized in terms of conceptualization (Neuwirth et al., 2007), design 
(Matthes & Hayes, 2016), and generalization (Scheufele & Moy, 2000).
The present study analyzed changes over time in the willingness to 
express opinions about the refugee crisis in Europe using a two-wave 
Web-panel survey in Sweden in 2015–2016. In focus was the impact of 
the changing government policy, which moved from a generous refugee 
policy toward a more restrictive policy.
The posed hypotheses had mixed support. Government changes 
in policy toward a more restrictive refugee policy did not change the 
overall picture. Those supporting a more restrictive policy were still less 
inclined to speak their true opinions about the refugee crisis, even if 
the policy had changed in their favor. On the other hand, respondents 
supporting a more generous refugee policy seemed to be more cautious 
about expressing their opinions about the refugee crisis when talking 
to strangers after the policy change. The tendency to hide opinions 
about the refugee crisis was stronger when talking to strangers and less 
pronounced in relation to work colleagues and classmates, and a vast 
majority felt they could talk about the issue with family and friends.
When analyzing the research question about the extent to which 
media congruency affects willingness to speak out over time, there was 
no such influence. It is, however, important to understand the difference 
between analyzing changes and the situation at a given moment. Media 
congruency had a clear impact on the willingness to share opinions, 
both before and after the policy change, but media congruency did not 
affect changes in preferences to talk about the refugee crisis before and 
after the policy change.
What might need further discussion in relation to the spiral in 
the spiral of silence theory is the time lag in the process. Most stud-
ies include, in line with Noelle-Neuman’s suggestions about captur-
ing dynamics of the opinion climate, measures used to understand 
76 johansson
respondents’ perceptions of whether their opinions are likely to become 
majority or minority (Gearhart & Zhang, 2015; Jeffres, Neuendorf, & 
Atkin, 2010; Noelle-Neuman, 1984). People who feel their opinions are 
about to reflect the majority position are more inclined to speak out. 
The change in the predisposition to express opinions on the refugee 
issue follows this pattern for those rejecting a restrictive policy but 
not among those supporting a restrictive policy. Five months after the 
policy change, one could expect that those persons who were more 
critical about accepting refugees would be more eager to speak out. But 
according to the results, we do not see this development. In line with 
what previous research has shown in asking about opinions being on 
the rise or in decline, we should have seen such a change.
Situational explanations can be proposed to explain this lack of 
willingness to speak out among those supporting a restrictive refugee 
policy. Even if the policy has changed, many might still be uncertain if 
this opinion is shared among the general public, not least because the 
government made the decision with regret and claimed the restrictive 
policy was not intended to be permanent. A fear of stigmatization might 
therefore still be possible. Because the restrictive policy has not changed 
since April 2016, more measurement points could clarify if there is a 
time lag in processes of the spiral of silence. Over time, those favoring a 
more restrictive policy might speak out, but the opinion change process 
might be slower than 5 months. To further understand the dynamics 
of the spiral of silence, one might therefore need more measurement 
points. This also highlights that there might be different dynamics de-
pending on respondents’ perceptions of whether they are in a majority 
or minority position. Regarding the refugee issue, willingness to speak 
out first changes among those who have the majority position. They 
feel uncertain and become more silent as the refugee policy changes 
to a position that is different from their own. Maybe those having the 
minority position will change, but it will take longer before they dare 
to speak out. They are not sure this change of policy position will last, 
and even if there is a change of tone in the news media, reporting the 
process of experiencing a majority position might take a while.
This might indicate there are different time lags in the spiral of si-
lence dynamics depending on if one is to become part of the majority 
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or minority opinion. Further research on the spiral of silence would be 
beneficial to better emphasize the dynamics to be able to understand 
how the spiral in the spiral of silence actually works. Other shortcom-
ings of the present study can also be discussed. In terms of generaliz-
ability, a partly recruited panel of respondents might overestimate the 
willingness to express opinions. Participating in a panel with surveys 
predominately about politics will be more attractive to people interested 
in politics, and dropout from the panel will be higher among those less 
interested in politics.
Conclusion
Let us at last move back to where we started. What are the conse-
quences for crisis communication and, more specifically, citizens’ sense 
making of a crisis related to the spiral of silence? In the introductory 
section of this article, concerns were raised about the possible dif-
ficulty discussing a controversial issue, such as the refugee crisis, in 
the sense-making process. Strategies proposed by convergence theory 
were addressed in terms of how people find and use information from 
different sources, not least in discussion with other people to handle 
competing information (Anthony et al., 2013; Sellnow et al., 2009). The 
present study does not support the raised concerns. It seems like most 
people are willing to discuss a controversial issue among both family 
and friends and people with whom they work and go to school. People 
even dare to expose their opinions about a value-laden issue like the 
refugee crisis to people they do not know well. Even if there is a ten-
dency toward a more silenced public opinion, it is not alarming when 
talking to family and friends. So even if there is a spiral of silence, it 
does not seem to undermine citizens’ sense-making processes in times 
of crisis.
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U.S. college campuses have seen an array of deadly shootings in recent 
years (Braggs, 2004; Kaminski, Koons-Witt, Thompson, & Weiss, 2010; 
McIntyre, Spence, & Lachlan, 2011), including more than 400 active shoot-
er incidents between 1992 and 2015 (Mazer et al., 2015). Such situations 
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evoke terror and uncertainty for students, faculty, administration, and 
the surrounding community. “Right now, I feel helpless. . . . I’m 22 years 
old and scared to be on a college campus,” admitted a Northern Illinois 
University student when asked for her reaction to the shooting on her 
campus (Kelleher, 2008, para. 2). In responding to the Virginia Tech 
shooting, a student remarked, “You would think that a school or even 
a classroom would be a safe place, but over the past 10 years we have 
seen otherwise” (Montgomery, 2007, para. 7). Though crisis situations 
like school shootings often result in human losses and culminate in 
uncertainty for those associated with the school, organizations in crisis 
have the ability to foster learning for their publics, facilitate learning 
as a means to restore their image, and use public-focused learning as 
a means to grow as an organization. While past studies have relied on 
exposure to single stimuli or post hoc surveys to assess the impact of 
campus shooting messages on learning and attitudes (e.g., McIntyre et 
al., 2011), few have explored the impact of simultaneous stimuli deliv-
ered through different media. Furthermore, although sex differences in 
responses to these messages are articulated in the literature, they have 
for the most part been omitted from the experimental literature. The 
two studies herein seek to explain how organizations may create and 
utilize messages through varying media so that, in times of crisis, the 
organization is able to reduce uncertainty for stakeholders by provid-
ing accurate information. Study 2 also examines the mediating effect 
of sex on the relationship between knowledge acquisition and attitudes 
toward the organization.
Campus Shootings
Compared to other crises, little is known about communication 
processes associated with the crisis life cycle of campus shootings 
(McIntyre, Spence, & Lachlan, 2011). In particular, there is a gap in our 
understanding about ideal message placement and the effectiveness 
of different message placement strategies in engendering learning. 
Omilion-Hodges and McClane (2015) extended research in this area 
by examining how university media selection subsequently influenced 
stakeholders’ own choices in message content and media choice for 
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information dissemination. The authors found that regardless of the 
initial channel through which they learned of the university crisis, 
students were able to retain and communicate accurate information 
regarding the crisis. They were also most likely to utilize a phone call 
or a text message to immediately connect with others before turning 
to social media. However, despite the fact that social media is gaining 
attention in the area of crisis communication and school shootings 
(Mazer et al., 2015; Omilion-Hodges & McClane, 2015), legacy media 
are still the dominant source for information concerning most crises 
and disasters. Because social media often contains misinformation 
about crises (Lachlan et al., 2014), some organizations are understand-
ably reluctant to adopt it as a tool for crisis communication. Moreover, 
it may not be an appropriate medium for postcrisis communication, 
as affected audiences may be more likely to resort to traditional me-
dia for expanded coverage and detailed information. It may also be 
the case that audiences first become aware of a crisis or risk through 
interpersonal exchanges, then turn to other sources for updates or 
additional information (see Greenberg, Hofshire, & Lachlan, 2002; 
Seeger, 2006).
Although college campuses often rely on press coverage and press 
releases to inform the public, the question remains of which strategy 
is most effective in engendering learning. The current studies test the 
effectiveness of three different placement strategies—press release, 
televised news, and a combination of both—in fostering learning about 
a campus shooting. Furthermore, given past research suggesting sex 
differences in informational needs and responses following crises, the 
current studies investigate whether men and women will differ in terms 
of which medium fosters the most learning under the circumstances 
(Nelson, Spence, & Lachlan, 2009; Spence et al., 2006). There is also 
evidence of sex differences throughout the risk sciences literature. For 
example, Slovic (1997) and colleagues (Finucane, Slovic, Mertz, Flynn, & 
Satterfield, 2000) have offered that, on the whole, men tend to perceive 
risks as less threatening and may form unique opinions or vary in terms 
of their behavioral intentions. Given documented sex differences in 
both the communication and risk sciences literatures, Study 2 extends 
the first investigation to examine the separate and combined effects of 
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gender and knowledge acquisition on subsequent attitudes toward the 
organization in question.
Crisis Communication
Broadly, crisis and risk communication can each be considered sub-
components of strategic communication, as they are pieces of larger 
scale communication plans—taking place throughout the crisis life 
cycle—designed to both deal with negative psychological responses 
and minimize the harm experienced by those affected. Given the sud-
den, unexpected nature of campus shootings, response messages are 
universally tied to the trigger event and acute crisis stage, when it has 
become clear that something is very wrong and that routine condi-
tions have been cast asunder (see Fink, 1986). Under these conditions, 
anxiety reduction is paramount, and effective risk and crisis messages 
satisfy the public’s need for control by offering clear, factual informa-
tion that can be easily retained and acted upon. Crisis messages must 
detail tangible steps that can be taken by individuals to minimize their 
susceptibility to risk. Thus there is a critical learning component to 
successful crisis messages. Inaccurate or incomplete communication 
of risk will hinder individuals’ ability to make good choices in volatile, 
high-risk circumstances. Of equal importance is message placement: 
Learning cannot take place if the message does not reach its intended 
audience (Lachlan & Spence, 2014; Spence, Lachlan, & Burke, 2011). 
Furthermore, it may be the case that audiences will respond differ-
ently to messages delivered in different media formats (see later), thus 
making placement strategy a critical consideration. Communication 
efforts during crises and emergencies should facilitate learning on the 
part of the audience, offering tangible procedural recommendations 
and other advice (Spence, Lachlan, & Griffen, 2007).
A long history of research suggests that during crises and emergen-
cies, the mass media can be expected to serve as the primary source of 
information for those affected (Brashers et al., 2000; Burke, Spence, 
& Lachlan, 2010; Murch, 1971; Spence et al., 2006; Spence et al., 2005). 
The active process of searching for information through the media will 
bring about a sense of empowerment and control over the situation, and 
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knowledge acquisition is remarkably effective in reducing uncertainty 
under most circumstances (Brashers et al., 2000). Acquiring informa-
tion from mediated sources sets off several processes (Seeger, Sellnow, 
& Ulmer, 2003), one of which is observing the behavior of others. For 
all intents and purposes, this is a type of learning that begets both self-
efficacy and the ability to exert some control over the situation. Self-
efficacy, as Bandura (1994) noted, can be described as the belief someone 
has about his or her capability to take an action that provides influence 
over events that directly affect the person’s life. Bandura outlined four 
main sources of influence; most relevant to this study is the idea that 
self-efficacy can be achieved through vicarious learning or behavioral 
modeling. The role and benefits of self-efficacy in the crisis and risk 
literature are well established (Lachlan, Spence, & Lin, 2013; Neuwirth 
et al., 2000; Reynolds & Seeger, 2005; D. D. Sellnow & Sellnow, 2014; 
T. Sellnow & Sellnow, 2010, 2013; Spence, Lachlan, & Griffen, 2007; 
Spence, Nelson, & Lachlan, 2010; Witte, 1992).
Facilitating self-efficacy is considered an important aspect of numer-
ous functional and theoretical crisis frameworks and is considered a 
“best practice” in crisis communication (Houston et al., 2015; Seeger, 
2006; Veil, Reynolds, Sellnow, & Seeger, 2008). Learning about a crisis 
can impact an individual’s perception of control over the situation and 
reduce concerns regarding vulnerability (Seeger, 2006). When a disaster 
peaks, self-efficacy can be enhanced through instructional communica-
tion (Frisby, Veil, & Sellnow, 2014; T. Sellnow & Sellnow, 2010), such as 
a press release or media report. Also, engendering learning can poten-
tially save lives by helping the public manage risk through informed 
decisions (Reynolds & Seeger, 2005) and stress reduction (Veil, 2007).
When crises present some sort of real and tangible danger, people 
will seek information in an active and engaged manner (Brashers et al., 
2000). While initial alerts may come through interpersonal channels, 
people typically have a repertoire of trusted sources that they will rely 
upon for these messages, and they will continue to scan these sources for 
additional information as the conditions of the crisis change (Lachlan, 
Spence, & Seeger, 2009). When audiences seek information about crises 
and initiate learning processes, they often turn to the media (Heath, 
Liao, & Douglas, 1995; Murch, 1971).
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Unfortunately, it may be the case that new media outlets underutilize 
the opportunity for disseminating information that can engender self-
efficacy and maximize positive outcomes, perhaps owing to a lack of 
solidity in institutional linkages between government organizations and 
these outlets (see Samarajiva, 2005). Mobilizing information (Lemert, 
Mitzman, Seither, Cook, & Hackett, 1977)—that which is designed to 
capitalize on existing schema in terms of threat location, individuals 
impacted, and tangible steps that can be taken—may be present in less 
than half of the content concerning these types of events, and online 
resources may be inclined to use identificational information as opposed 
to tactical (Tanner, Friedman, Koskan, & Barr, 2009). However, this 
same research has suggested that when mobilizing information does 
appear, it is more likely to appear in syndicated and wire stories and 
is equally likely to appear in print or online (Hoffman, 2006). Thus, 
if such information is to be found anywhere, it may likely be located 
in wire stories, such as those generated by the Associated Press (AP), 
UPI, or Reuters.
Mediated Learning Processes
Mediated learning processes likely occur as a combination of direct 
instruction and observational, or vicarious, learning. Recent research 
in observational learning has suggested a biological component to 
these knowledge acquisition processes, including one that is driven by 
emotion and other “old-brain” functions (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2008). 
This body of research, along with classical social psychology work in 
vicarious learning, provides both biological and behavioral explana-
tions for learning from media (Nelson et al., 2009). Even in instances in 
which a person is relatively uninterested in the matter at hand, highly 
specified learning can still take place (Zukin & Snyder, 1984).
As with all forms of learning, there are likely a myriad of individual-
level variables that affect learning about crises and emergencies. Of 
particular interest is biological sex. Although little research has directly 
addressed sex differences in mediated learning processes, evidence 
exists of consistent sex differences in preferred information sources. 
This research has suggested that women may be drawn to less vivid 
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media for information, especially information that is particularly sen-
sitive or issue relevant (Jensen, 1988; Keinan, Sadeh, & Rosen, 2003; 
Morley, 1986).
Furthermore, there is some evidence that women may be better 
equipped than men to interpret nonverbal cues and may be more reli-
ant on these cues when negotiating interactions (Burgoon & Dillman, 
1995). There is also evidence that women may be generally more risk 
averse than men, relationally oriented, and inclined to seek infor-
mation related to both emotional needs and mitigation against risk 
(Burke, Spence, Lachlan, & Seeger, 2008; Lachlan, Spence, & Nelson, 
2010; Spence, Lachlan, & Westerman, 2009). If this is the case, then 
the sexes may be quite different not only in their preferred sources of 
information but in the observational processes they use to understand, 
interpret, and retain this information. Differences in preferred media 
sources and processing style thus necessitate an investigation of the 
separate and combined impacts of source and biological sex on learn-
ing. Furthermore, the preceding arguments force us to consider the 
role of emotion and arousal in these processes.
Emotion, Arousal, and Mediated Learning
Under conditions of extreme duress, it is typically assumed that medi-
ated information will serve to reduce this anxiety and uncertainty. This 
is consistent with Weick’s (1995) argument that observing the actions 
of others under the same circumstances can help people make sense 
of terrifying circumstances to which they have no understanding of 
how to respond. At the same time, some have argued the opposite: that 
media exposure may exacerbate these negative psychological responses. 
Some have presented evidence that repeated exposure to crisis infor-
mation may itself constitute a traumatic event (Ahern, Galea, Resnick, 
& Vlahov, 2004) and that repeated exposure to such information may 
lead to symptoms consistent with posttraumatic stress disorder (Pfef-
ferbaum et al., 2001; Saylor, Cowart, Lipovsky, Jackson, & Finch, 2003).
There may also be a traceable relationship between these strong 
emotional reactions and learning processes. Zillmann’s (1999, 2002) 
work on exemplification theory, for example, has offered that visual 
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media rely on highly emotional, arousing images that elicit immediate 
judgment of issues. In doing so, highly arousing imagery may lead to 
inaccurate perceptions of likelihood and magnitude of risk, as audi-
ences may be inclined to generalize to entire events from a single image 
or message (Zillmann, 2002). Evidence of the overestimation of risk 
under the arousal induced by mediated exemplars is well documented 
in the literature (Aust & Zillmann, 1996; Zillmann, 2002; Zillmann, 
Gibson, & Sargent, 1999).
Furthermore, there is evidence that people are inclined to remember 
general (or “gist”) information after a moderately arousing event but 
will lose details when pushed to extreme levels of emotional arousal 
(Zoladz & Diamond, 2008). Because emotional arousal may augment 
or impair learning depending on the circumstances, past research 
has not clearly indicated how much people will learn from coverage 
of a crisis, especially if they are directly affected. Even less clear is the 
relationship between medium of choice and learning. If we are to as-
sume that television coverage is in itself a traumatic event, as per the 
arguments of Ahern and colleagues (2004), then it may be the case 
that those watching televised coverage learn less than those who obtain 
information through other forms of media, such as official statements 
or press releases. It may also be the case that when affected publics 
receive information from both television and other sources, television 
coverage serves to attenuate the degree of learning experienced by 
those individuals.
Officials and organizations responding to crises must meet the 
public’s need for information and initiate learning processes so that 
those affected can make sound decisions (Omilion-Hodges & Mc-
Clane, 2015). In fact, recent research (Omilion-Hodges & McClane, 
2015) has convincingly argued that organizations in crisis may in fact 
best meet stakeholders’ need for information by involving them in the 
information dissemination process. Although television news coverage 
and official statements are the two venues through which postcrisis 
messages are typically transmitted under these circumstances, our 
knowledge of the impact of arousal suggests that other factors may be 
at play. If television coverage does in fact induce high levels of anxiety, 
it may be the case that it actually inhibits learning. Moreover, relying 
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solely on television coverage reduces an organization’s ability to frame 
messages for its stakeholders. As previously noted, past research has 
provided mixed results in terms of differences between men and women 
in learning responses. Thus, to inform future message placement strate-
gies under these circumstances, the following research questions (RQs) 
are posed:
RQ1: Will audiences learn more from emergency information em-
bedded in (a) a press release, (b) a televised news story, or (c) a 
combination of the two?
RQ2: Will men and women learn more from different sources?
Study 1
To explore these questions, a quasi-experiment was used to determine 
the effectiveness of different placement strategies in engendering learn-
ing. Participants were 180 undergraduate students at a medium-sized 
university in the Midwest who were randomly assigned to one of 
three conditions examining postevent communication. In Condition 1, 
participants were asked to watch a 2-minute AP news feature about a 
university shooting and to fill out a self-administered survey; AP news 
features were used given their ecological validity as content in which 
mobilizing information may be embedded (Hoffman, 2006; see earlier). 
Condition 2 asked participants to watch the same news feature as in 
Condition 1, then read an official university press release designed to 
provided tangible safety measures, followed by a self-administered 
survey. Condition 3 required participants to fill out a self-administered 
survey after having only read the press release. The press release restated 
the facts of the shooting and outlined measures of self-efficacy indi-
viduals can take to protect themselves. The news clip included a short 
message from the university’s president explaining safety procedures on 
campus, followed by faculty members and students explaining if they 
felt safe or not prior to and following the shooting. The video ended 
with a narrator explaining the university’s capabilities for maintaining 
safety on campus.
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Measures
After viewing the induction, participants were asked to fill out a self-
administered survey evaluating their responses to the stimuli. These 
responses included a series of items measuring learning from the press 
release and the news clip, adapted from previous research (McIntyre et 
al., 2012; Nelson et al., 2009). For each medium, respondents were asked 
if they learned something about their university’s emergency response, 
how people can protect themselves during a shooting, how lockdowns 
work, how they should respond in a similar situation, more about their 
personal safety, how they should travel around campus, and how to help 
others during a shooting; respondents replied on a 5-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree). Items from each 
of these subscales were averaged to produce a scale for learning from 
TV (α = .78) and learning from the press release (α = .82).
Results
The questionnaire included demographic items, including information 
such as race, gender, and age. Caucasian (n = 136, 79.1%) was reported 
as the highest, followed by African American (n = 19, 11%), other 
(n = 13, 7.6%), and, finally, Asian American (n = 4, 2.3%). Women 
(n = 114, 63.7%) participated more in this study than men (n = 65, 
36.3%; M = 1.64). A total of 56 participants were assigned to the TV-
only condition, 64 were assigned to the combined condition, and 60 
were assigned to the press release condition. Participant ages ranged 
from 18 to 56 years, with a mean of 20.69.
The RQs were examined using a series of t-tests. For the first research 
question, the condition in which participants were administered both 
the press release and the television news story was used as a comparison 
group. Against this group, the mean score for learning from the media 
was compared with the television-only condition. The dependent vari-
able for learning from the press release was evaluated by comparing 
this group to the press release–only group.
For learning from media, the results indicate that those in the TV-
only condition reported less learning (M = 3.7, SD = 0.7) than those in 
the combined condition (M = 3.0, SD = 0.8), t(114) = 5.34, p < .001. For 
learning from the press release, those in the press release–only condition 
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also reported less learning (M = 2.4, SD = 0.5) than did those in the 
combined condition (M = 2.00, SD = 0.6), t(117) = 3.75, p < .001. As an 
exploratory analysis, an aggregate measure of learning was computed 
by taking the mean score across all learning items in the analysis. A 
one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) then compared the mean scores 
across all three conditions. A priori power analysis performed using 
G*Power (see Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) demonstrated 
marginally adequate power for effect sizes as small as .05, 1 − β = .77. 
The results indicated strong effects for condition on total learning, 
F(2, 177) = 32.66, p < .001, η2 = .54. Bonferroni post hoc analyses re-
vealed that those in the TV-only condition (M = 3.7, SD = 0.7) reported 
learning substantially less than those in the press release (M = 2.4, 
SD = 0.5) or combined condition (M = 2.5, SD = 0.5).
To explore the second research question, a 3 × 2 ANOVA explored 
the impact of condition and sex on the aggregate learning measure. 
Power analysis suggested 1 − β = .85 for each main effect and 1 − β = .77 
for the interaction effect between sex and condition. The results indicate 
main effects for participant sex, F(1, 178) = 6.57, p < .01, η2 = .04, and 
condition, F(2, 178) = 98.37, p < .001, η2 = .53, but no interaction effect 
between the two, F(2, 178) = .735, p < .472, n.s. The results of this analysis 
provide further support for the findings from RQ1. Furthermore, men 
learned significantly less on the whole (M = 3.0, SD = 0.3) than did 
women (M = 2.8, SD = 0.2).
Study 2
The results of Study 1 offer preliminary insights into the role of message 
order in the learning processes associated with crises and disasters. They 
also underscore the importance of providing information concerning 
organizational response to a developing crisis, in an environment in 
which the news media will likely paint an unflattering portrait of the 
organization in question.
Each audience has unique needs for information, while media outlets 
also have specific agendas after the initial crisis event (Omilion-Hodges 
& McClane, 2015). In a volatile crisis, immediate and timely information 
is needed about the event, and the media can become a first source for 
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what actions to take (McIntyre et al., 2012; Nelson et al., 2009). The 
literature supports the notion that learning can be fostered at any point 
throughout the crisis life cycle. When an organization has caused or is 
perceived to have caused a crisis, it must respond with accounts, excuses, 
or actions to repair or retain its image (Benoit, 1995, 1997). However, 
one area that has not received attention is the relationship between an 
organization’s attempt to foster learning it its publics after a crisis and 
organizational image (public reputation). Unflattering depictions of 
the organization typically take place in the later stages of an organi-
zational crisis, when the public has developed a more comprehensive 
understanding of the events that took place and their ramifications for 
various stakeholders. Study 2, then, attempted to replicate and extend 
the findings from the first study by fully crossing the design in terms 
of the presentation of a news feature and press release. Study 2 also 
sought to examine the subsequent impact of learning on participants’ 
perceptions of the organization. In an attempt to replicate the results 
of Study 1 and to extend the findings to include consideration of the 
impact of learning on organizational image, the following hypotheses 
and RQ are offered:
H1: Participants who are provided a press release from an organization 
in the aftermath of a crisis will have more positive perceptions of the 
organization than participants who are not provided a press release.
H2: Participants receiving the press release before watching a news 
report about a crisis will have more positive perceptions of the or-
ganization than those who read the press release after watching the 
news report.
H3: Women will learn more about the organization regardless of the 
presence of a press release or order of presentation.
RQ: What is the separate and combined impact of order of presentation 
and biological sex on learning and perceptions of the organization?
Method
Participants. A total of 203 participants from undergraduate com-
munication courses took part in the current study; students were drawn 
from the same required course as in Study 1, but more than a year later; 
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thus it is highly unlikely that any student participated in both. Of the 203 
participants, 29.7% (n = 58) were men, with 70.3% (n = 137) female par-
ticipants (8 gave no response), with a mean age of 22.89 years (SD = 5.42).
Procedure. Participants were provided the study’s URL, where they 
were randomly assigned to one of four conditions examining postevent 
communication. The intricacies of each condition are described in the 
following pages; however, participants in each condition completed an 
identical self-administered survey after being subjected to the stimulus. 
Participants in Condition 1 watched a 2-minute news feature from the 
AP about a university shooting, whereas participants in Condition 2 
watched the same news feature but also subsequently received a press 
release that reiterated the facts of the shooting. Additionally, the press 
release provided tangible safety measures a person could take during 
campus shootings to protect himself or herself and increase his or her 
self-efficacy. In Condition 3, participants received the press release be-
fore watching the news feature that was utilized in Conditions 1 and 2. 
In Condition 4, participants were only administered the press release 
and asked to fill out the questionnaire.
Instrumentation. To examine perceived learning from the AP news 
feature in Conditions 1, 2, and 3, participants were presented with seven 
Likert-type questions on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) 
to 5 (strongly disagree). Questions included topics asking if respondents 
learned how to protect themselves, how lockdowns work, how to help 
others, about personal safety, about campus travel after a shooting, 
about university emergency response, and how to respond in a similar 
situation. The questions were also used in Conditions 2, 3, and 4 to 
obtain data about perceived learning from the university press release. 
Items from each of these subscales were averaged to produce a scale for 
learning from TV (α = .77) and learning from the press release (α = .90).
To examine participants’ perceptions of the organization, 12 items 
were adapted from the Organizational Reputational Scale (Coombs 
& Holladay, 1996). The items were measured on a 5-point Likert-type 
scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree). Items such 
as “This organization is basically honest” and “I do not trust the orga-
nization to tell the truth about this incident” are typical of the scale. 
Alpha reliabilities for the Organizational Reputational Scale were α = .81.
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Results
The analyses began with a simple bivariate correlation looking at the 
relationship between the dependent variables under consideration. The 
indicator for total knowledge was strongly correlated with attitudes 
toward the university in the AP news feature, r = −.190, p < .008. Given 
that the knowledge items were reverse scored, this indicated that those 
who acquired more information tended to hold higher opinions of the 
university. Next, hierarchical regression analyses were conducted exam-
ining the effect of condition on both learning and attitudes toward the 
institution. A priori power was determined to be 1 − β = .73 for effect 
sizes of .05. First, participant age, sex, and income were entered on the 
first block to serve as control variables. Condition was then added to 
the second predictor block to examine the difference in variance ac-
counted for in the two models.
For aggregated learning, the first predictor block failed to account for 
a significant proportion of the variance, F(3, 184) = 1.34, n.s. However, 
adding condition to the second predictor block did produce a significant 
model, F(4, 184) = 2.39, p < .04, ΔR2 = .03. Similar results were detected 
for attitudes toward the university. The first block failed to produce a 
significant model, F(3, 184) = 2.20, n.s., while adding condition to the 
predictor block significantly improved the model, F(4, 184) = 3.50, 
p < .009, ΔR2 = .08.
Given that the dependent variables were significantly correlated, 
a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was then conducted 
to examine the means for both dependent variables across all four 
conditions; power analysis indicated 1 − β = .73. While the analysis for 
learning did not produce significant results, F(3, 195) = 1.62, n.s., the 
model did account for 3% of the variance and indicates some evidence 
of linear trend in the data; the least amount of learning was reported 
in the feature-only condition, M = 2.42, SD = .743, followed by those 
who saw the feature and then read the press release (M = 2.31, SD = 
.469), then those who read the press release before seeing the feature 
(M = 2.23, SD = .465), with the greatest amount of learning taking place 
in the press release–only condition (M = 2.155, SD = .581).
Significant effects were detected for attitudes toward the institution, 
F(3, 195) = 2.43, p < .05, η2 = .04. The pattern of means suggested a pat-
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tern consistent with the relationship between knowledge and attitudes. 
Those in the feature-only condition reported the least positive attitudes 
toward the institution (M = 3.35, SD = .495), followed by those who saw 
the feature and then read the press release (M = 3.47, SD = .422), then 
those who read the press release before seeing the feature (M = 3.53, 
SD = .510), with the most positive attitudes found in the press release–
only condition (M = 3.64, SD = .433).
Path Analysis
Following the consistency in the findings across both studies, a path 
analysis was used to investigate the separate and combined effects of 
presentation order and learning on perceptions of the organization. 
Given past research indicating that men and women process risk in-
formation differently, and that women may be more inclined to experi-
ence both empathic responses to risk messages and internalize more 
information, the indirect effects of gender on organizational image 
were also included in the model (see Lachlan et al., 2010; McIntyre et 
al., 2011; Spence, Lachlan, Nelson, & Shelton, 2010; Spence et al., 2009).
Evidence was found to support the proposed model, CMIN/df = 1.76, 
RMSEA = .06, CFI = .91. Statistically significant paths were detected 
between experimental condition and learning, β = −.168, p < .02; con-
dition and image, β = .163, p < .02; and learning and image, β = −.142, 
p < .05. Standardized indirect effects of .03 were detected for both 
condition and sex on image, mediated by learning. Given the scoring 
of the indicators, order of presentation led to greater learning about 
the circumstances surrounding the shooting, and this knowledge was 
positively related to impressions formed of the institution. Female 
respondents were more likely to acquire information concerning the 
shooting, and subsequently, those who did were slightly less likely to 
form unfavorable opinions about the institution (see Figure 1).
98 lachlan et al.
Discussion
Taken together, the results offer some initial insight into both the mes-
sage placement strategies that may facilitate learning in the aftermath 
of a crisis and differences between men and women in their learning 
responses and subsequent assessments of the organization in question. 
The results are in some ways surprising and in others shed new light 
on contradictory arguments in the literature.
First, the findings concerning medium and placement shed some 
light on discrepancies in past research concerning the role of television 
in mediated learning processes. Although a substantial body of research 
has suggested that people use the news media to reduce uncertainty 
following crises, there is also some evidence in the literature that the 
use of television news in particular may lead to negative emotional and 
psychological reactions. These negative emotional and psychological 
reactions, if demonstrated, would logically predict that less learning 
would take place from television than from other, less vivid media.
The current findings suggest that this may be the case. In both 
comparative analyses, individual respondents reported more learning 
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when print press releases and television media were combined than 
from television alone. In other words, the aggregate presentation of 
information leads to learning. At the same time, the analyses com-
paring all conditions in both studies seem to indicate that audiences 
learned the least in the television-only condition. This would suggest 
that the television-only condition may be heavy on images and content 
that participants found to be distressing. In instances in which simple 
written descriptions were given through a press release, or in which 
emotionally disturbing video content was accompanied by factual writ-
ten information, respondents reported learning more. It is worth noting 
that this finding is largely supportive of the argument that individuals 
may learn less from television if the graphic and vivid nature of the 
medium leads to emotional and psychological distress.
If this is the case, the findings from both studies also shed light on the 
degree of arousal that may be expected by different mediated accounts of 
a crisis. Because past research has suggested that emotional arousal aug-
ments or impairs learning, it may be the case that printed information 
concerning a crisis of this magnitude is alarming enough; presenting 
graphic and vivid images of the threatening and uncertain crisis, without 
complementing them with “cool” media accounts of the events, may 
lead to an excessive level of arousal that inhibits learning. This would 
be consistent with the curvilinear relationship between arousal and 
learning posited by numerous authors (see Zoladz & Diamond, 2008).
The analyses in both studies also shed light on the sex differences, or 
perhaps lack thereof, that may be expected under the circumstances. The 
ANOVA analysis for sex and condition in Study 1 revealed strong main 
effects for both factors but not a significant interaction term between 
the two. This finding is supported in Study 2, where the path analysis 
reveals a mediation process whereby women are learning more about 
the organization and are therefore forming less unfavorable opinions, 
regardless of condition. This is somewhat consistent with past research 
indicating that women are prone to seek more information during cri-
ses. If this is the case, it may be that women are more prone to actually 
attend to the information given their standing desire for information 
on the matter.
What is not consistent with past research, however, is the absence 
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of an interaction effect between sex and medium. Past research has 
suggested that women may respond more favorably to less vivid media. 
This body of research has also suggested that while women place a 
value on both vivid and nonvivid media, they may be less interested in 
television news, attend to less television news, and express a preference 
for other media. In this instance, women were just as likely as men to 
have learned more from the combined condition. For both sexes, in 
both sets of analyses, the least amount of learning was reported in the 
TV-only condition. One explanation for this observation may be that 
women’s desire for information cancels out any differences in medium 
preference. In other words, if we know that women are more likely to 
want information, and we know that men prefer vivid media, it may be 
the case that women’s desire for information attenuates any difference 
in channel preference.
There are limitations with the current studies, as they only explore 
the responses of men and women to particular media. Radio, e-mail, 
the Internet, and other media are not considered in the current data. 
While this decision was made because crisis practitioners typically rely 
on these specific media when disseminating crisis information, it would 
be of worth to replicate the study across multiple media to investigate 
which combination of media makes the most sense in terms of message 
placement. Furthermore, the studies are confined to news coverage of 
one particular incident type and were not conducted on the campuses 
in which the incidents took place. Participants were asked how they 
would respond under the circumstances but were not actually in the 
middle of a crisis themselves when responding. Future studies should 
attempt to gather data from those who have been immediately affected 
by crisis to shine more light on these mediated learning processes. 
Nonetheless, the authors would argue that these studies, taken together, 
are a good first step in evaluating ideal message placement strategy fol-
lowing a crisis and the differences between men and women that may 
be relevant considerations under the circumstances.
Practical Implications
The current findings also offer practical implications for organiza-
tions dealing with crises and, more specifically, for college campuses 
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preparing for and responding to active shooter incidents. More than 
anything, they offer empirical support for the long-standing maxim 
that organizations facing crises need to provide information quickly, 
not only to ensure the safety of those impacted by the crisis but also 
to bolster their reputation to the extent possible. The current findings 
suggest that getting information to the public ahead of some kind of 
news report may impact both retention of information and attitudes 
toward the institution. In this sense, organizations in crisis have the 
ability to frame their messages in the manner of their own choosing, 
allowing them to play a more active role in shaping stakeholders’ un-
derstanding of the event and their perception of the organization. Thus 
organizations in the midst of a crisis may benefit by disseminating quick 
and accurate information, because this same language is likely to be 
recycled by the external news media.
In terms of the sex differences reported in the current studies, both 
crisis communication practitioners and first responders should consider 
that men are less likely to retain information concerning the event and 
more likely to form negative opinions regarding the organization. Thus 
information campaigns and responses may wish to appeal to men in 
terms of providing information to reduce anxiety, promote learning, 
and develop a more positive impression of the organization. Audiences 
will be better able to make rational decisions under equivocal circum-
stances if they are provided with information and brought around to 
an appropriate level of arousal and fear (see Lachlan & Spence, 2007, 
2009, 2010).
Conclusion
The findings of both studies add some degree of empirical evidence 
to old public relations maxims that have been followed for decades; 
as an organization experiencing crisis, it may be best to tell a story 
before the news media gets a chance to do so, or at the very least, an 
organization should present its response alongside media reports. The 
current findings offer evidence not only that this is important but that 
it may be particularly risky to issue no response at all. These findings 
are, however, restricted to one particular crisis scenario and explore the 
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use of ecologically valid, yet situationally specific messages. The extent 
to which these findings can be replicated to other campus shootings, 
and across other types of emergencies that take place with little to no 
warning, remains to be seen. It is also the case that campuses do not 
respond to emergencies in a vacuum; while the current studies build 
on previous work by exploring responses to multiple messages, the 
number of messages and their placement were chosen in an attempt to 
create easily manipulated quasi-experimental conditions; future studies 
should vary the number of messages, media, and content characteristics 
to further explicate these complex processes. Finally, researchers and 
practitioners alike may wish to consider replicating these findings and 
extending them to other, less volatile crisis scenarios to examine whether 
the presentation order and sex differences documented herein replicate 
across organization, crisis type, and stakeholder group.
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The scientifi c concept of the water–energy–food (WEF) nexus is fairly 
new. It fi rst emerged in 2011 at the Bonn Nexus Conference, which 
offi  cially announced water, energy, and food as the three pillars of the 
nexus (Endo, Tsurita, Burnett, & Orencio, 2017; Hoff , 2011). Following 
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the Bonn Conference, the German federal government launched the 
website Water, Energy, and Food Security Resource Platform.1 The 
World Economic Forum’s (2011) Water Initiative published a book 
Water Security: The Water–Food–Energy–Climate Nexus. The United 
Nations and its departments have also adopted the idea quickly. Its 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific issued the 
discussion paper “The Status of the Water–Food–Energy Nexus in 
Asia and the Pacific” (United Nations [UN], 2013b), and its Food and 
Agriculture Organization published the book An Innovative Account-
ing Framework for the Food–Energy–Water Nexus: Application for the 
MuSIASEM Approach to Three Case Studies (UN, 2013a) and the report 
The Water–Energy–Food Nexus: A New Approach in Support of Food 
Security and Sustainable Agriculture (UN, 2014). At the same time, the 
International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD, 2013) pub-
lished a report titled The Water–Energy–Food Security Nexus: Towards 
a Practical Planning and Decision-Support Framework for Landscape 
Investment and Risk Management. In only a few years, the concept has 
become central to academic and policy discussions regarding sustain-
able development and green economy (Biggs et al., 2015).
The idea of the WEF nexus is proposed to solve the conflict be-
tween the growth of human population, along with urbanization and 
globalization, and the constraint of resources. The traditional ap-
proach of managing natural resources only focuses on solving crises 
of a single resource and ignores the possible detrimental effects on 
other resources. For instance, policy makers favoring the traditional 
management approach are likely able to foresee that, with the current 
trend of rapidly increasing demand, global agricultural production will 
have to increase approximately 70% by 2050, and energy production 
will need to increase approximately 50% by 2035. However, they may 
not foresee the impacts of such increases on water resources, land re-
sources, and climate (Hoff, 2011; UN, 2014). They may also fail to take 
some critical natural resources into policy consideration. Water, for 
example, received attention in the green economy discussion only a few 
years before the nexus concept was launched at the Bonn Conference 
(Endo et al., 2017; Hoff, 2011). In fact, water, energy, and food are intri-
cately linked. Agriculture uses approximately 70% of global freshwater, 
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food production and transportation account for approximately 30% of 
global energy consumption, and energy generation also consumes a 
large share of water (UN, 2014). The nexus approach, with a system-
atic view that water, energy, and food security are interdependent and 
not easily disentangled (IISD, 2013), will improve WEF security and 
ensure a more consistent and coherent governance by identifying and 
managing trade-offs and building synergies (UN, 2014).
As significant as it may be, the WEF nexus is still unknown to the 
public and has no fixed interpretation (Endo et al., 2017). This new 
scientific concept needs to be promoted to the global public so that key 
stakeholders can be actively engaged in building a policy framework 
based on the nexus approach (UN, 2014). This study explores the ef-
fectiveness of two traditional but understudied message techniques, 
inoculation and conclusion explicitness, on audience knowledge, attitude, 
and behavioral intention toward the WEF nexus. Because the topic is 
significant but little known to the public, findings of this study can be 
considered more valid and less influenced by predisposition or other 
unknown confounding factors.
Literature Review
Many factors, from the details of message components to the sequence 
of multiple messages, may have a role in constructing a persuasive 
message (O’Keefe, 2016). Among these factors, message sidedness, 
from which the inoculation research was developed, and conclusion 
explicitness were two that received much attention at the milestone 
Yale Communication and Attitude Change Program presided by social 
psychologist Carl Hovland (Hovland, Lumsdaine, & Sheffield, 1949; 
Hovland & Mandell, 1952). They remain intriguing and perplexing 
aspects of strategic communication research (Belch & Belch, 2012), 
in part because research has not reached a consensus how these two 
message factors impact persuasion effects (O’Keefe, 2016).
Message Sidedness and Inoculation
Message sidedness addresses whether the persuasive message contains 
two sides (both positive and negative sides) or just one side (only the 
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positive side) of the story. Hovland and colleagues’ (1949) pioneer 
studies in their Yale Project found that two-sided messages were more 
effective than one-sided messages in changing the attitude of individuals 
who were initially opposed to the issue. They also found that one-sided 
messages worked more effectively than two-sided messages with indi-
viduals who were already convinced of the position being advocated 
or with those who were poorly educated.
Many following studies involved two-sided advertising (Crowley 
& Hoyer, 1994) and found that two-sided ads tend to be viewed as 
more credible (Eisend, 2006; O’Keefe, 2016; Pechmann, 1992). Even in 
celebrity-endorsement ads, two-sided ads are deemed to be significantly 
more credible and effective than their one-sided counterparts (Kamins, 
Brand, & Hoeke, 1989).
However, conclusions on the effectiveness of two-sided ads vary, 
which is demonstrated in two frequently cited studies. In one study, 
Pechmann (1992) found that when the opposing point was important 
(but less important than the promoting point), two-sided ads for a new 
brand of ice cream led to better brand evaluation, whereas when the op-
posing point is perceived as trivial, no difference in brand evaluation is 
caused by one- or two-sidedness. When the opposing point is negatively 
correlated with the promoting point, the two-sided ads have the greatest 
effect. Similar studies have even found that two-sided ads’ effectiveness 
increases with greater consumer exposure (Bohner, Einwiller, Erb, & 
Siebler, 2003). In another study, however, Crowley and Hoyer (1994) 
found that for receivers who have a positive preexisting attitude but 
are aware of the negative information covered in those two-sided ads, 
the two-sided ads are about as effective as the one-sided ads. If the 
negative attributes are important to the receivers, the effectiveness of 
those two-sided ads is lower than it is for their one-sided counterparts.
Inoculation research, first proposed by Hovland’s student William 
McGuire (1961, 1964), studies the persuasive effects of a special type of 
two-sided messages, in which the opposing points are weakened and 
refuted to resist future exposure to that type of opposing message (Nie-
derdeppe, Gollust, & Barry, 2014). The persuasion effectiveness of those 
refutational two-sided messages, according to inoculation researchers 
(McGuire, 1961; Miller & Levine, 1996), is much stronger than that of 
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their one-sided counterparts. In the inoculation approach, the message 
first provides some threatening ideas that are strong enough almost to 
turn the persuadees against the idea. It then equips them with argu-
ments refuting those threatening ideas and defending the original idea 
(Dillard, 2010). Inoculation researchers have concluded that, in many 
cases, no matter whether the threatening ideas are refuted, two-sided 
messages seem to be more persuasive than one-sided messages. How-
ever, they also acknowledge that in some studies, one-sided messages 
appear to be more persuasive (Szabo & Pfau, 2002).
Several meta-analyses on the effectiveness of one versus two-sided 
messages have been conducted and have also produced mixed results. 
Allen (1991) examined 67 experiments and found that when opposing 
points are raised and refuted (inoculation), two-sided messages are 
more persuasive than one-sided messages. However, when the op-
posing points are raised and not refuted, two-sided messages are less 
persuasive. Eisend (2006) analyzed 34 studies on consumer advertise-
ments from 1960 to 2004 and confirmed that two-sided advertising 
is generally more effective than one-sided advertising, although the 
effects are rather small. Such effects of two-sided advertising can be 
explained by attribution theory, which states that negative information 
in the messages may cause the audience to perceive the persuaders’ 
motivation to be to tell the truth instead of to make a profit (Burgoon, 
Pfau, & Birk, 1995; Eisend, 2006).
O’Keefe (2016) has concluded that no persuasive difference exists 
between one- and two-sided messages based on his own meta-analyses 
and synthetic literature review. When refutational (inoculation) and 
nonrefutational two-sided messages are differentiated, consistent with 
Allen (1991) but contradictory to Hovland et al. (1949), nonrefutational 
two-sided messages are less persuasive, whereas refutational two-sided 
(inoculation) messages can be more persuasive compared with their 
one-sided counterparts (O’Keefe, 2016). Nonrefutational two-sided 
advertisements, nevertheless, have no difference compared with their 
one-sided counterparts. O’Keefe also concluded that none of the pos-
sible moderating variables identified in previous studies, such as pre-
existing attitude, education, or topic involvement, change persuasion 
effectiveness.
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The WEF nexus approach, which scientists and international orga-
nizations view as a better concept with which to manage global water, 
energy, and food security, is relatively new to the public. Compared 
with other well-known and rather politicalized scientific topics, such 
as climate change or stem cell research, the WEF nexus rules out pre-
disposition, a critical confounding factor discussed in the literature. 
Thus, in this study, we aimed to determine if one-sided and refutational 
two-sided (inoculation) messages have different effects in promoting 
the WEF nexus.
Message Conclusion Explicitness
Conclusion explicitness research investigates whether messages with 
explicit conclusions (closed ended) and those with implicit conclusions 
(open ended) have different persuasion effects. Although terminology 
may vary in this literature (some studies, such as O’Keefe, 1997, used the 
terms standpoint explicitness, conclusion articulation, and conclusion 
specificity), closed-ended messages with explicit conclusions contain a 
direct statement of a conclusion, whereas open-ended messages with 
implicit conclusions do not (Martin, Lang, & Wong, 2003). Messages 
with explicit conclusions generate accurate understanding but may be 
perceived as threatening or insulting. By contrast, even though messages 
with implicit conclusions can sometimes generate misunderstanding, 
they may also be perceived as respectful and inviting and, therefore, 
as more persuasive (Martin et al., 2003; O’Keefe, 1997).
Hovland also initiated research on conclusion explicitness in his 
Yale Communication and Attitude Change Program and found that 
messages with explicit conclusions are more effective in changing au-
dience opinions in the desired direction (Hovland & Mandell, 1952). 
Later, some researchers found that such differences between closed-
ended messages with explicit conclusions and open-ended messages 
with implicit conclusions were often moderated by variables such as 
education (intelligence), preexisting attitude, audience involvement in 
the topic, and the complicity of the topic (Armstrong, 2010; Belch & 
Belch, 2012). Well-educated or highly ego-involved audiences are more 
likely to be persuaded by open-ended messages with implicit conclu-
sions, which provide room for them to make up their own minds, 
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whereas less educated or ego-involved audiences are more prone to 
closed-ended messages that provide explicit directions (Kardes, 1988; 
Sawyer & Howard, 1991). If the topics of the messages are too complex, 
however, even well-educated or highly involved receivers may need 
assistance and be more persuaded by messages with explicit conclu-
sions (Belch & Belch, 2012). For example, Ahearne, Gruen, and Saxton 
(2000) found that when the product is complex, such as a CD player, 
no difference in brand attitude is shown between ads with and without 
explicit conclusions.
However, again, the findings vary. For instance, Chebat, Charlesbois, 
and Gelinas-Chebat (2001) found that ads with implicit conclusions 
generate greater persuasive effects even with low-involvement consum-
ers, as long as those consumers have prior knowledge on the topic. 
Kardes (1988) found that highly involved consumers exposed to ads with 
implicit conclusions can generate brand attitude as favorable, as when 
they are exposed to ads with explicit conclusions, only brand attitudes 
formed based on ads with implicit conclusions are stronger and more 
accessible from memory. Other variables, such as the need for cognition 
and argument quality, have also been identified as moderators of the 
effectiveness of message conclusion explicitness (Martin et al., 2003).
Even several recent meta-analyses on the role of conclusion explicit-
ness have disagreed with each other. O’Keefe (2016) concluded that little 
evidence supports the traditionally speculative advantage of messages 
with implicit conclusions over their counterparts with explicit conclu-
sions. Messages with implicit conclusions are ambiguous and therefore 
actually encourage receivers to perceive the information as advocat-
ing a position either closer (assimilation effect) to or more discrepant 
(contrast effect) from their position than the messages actually do. In 
either case, messages with implicit conclusions are less effective than 
messages with explicit conclusions (O’Keefe, 2016).
Armstrong (2010), nevertheless, believed that O’Keefe’s (1997, 2016) 
conclusion is only valid when no resistance is expected among receivers. 
When resistance is expected, as in the case of advertising, open-ended 
messages with implicit conclusions (soft sell) are more advantageous 
than closed-ended messages with explicit conclusions (hard sell), as 
traditional advertising wisdom holds. When the audience’s freedom 
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of drawing conclusions is restricted by ads with explicit conclusions, 
the audience reasserts its original opinion and rejects persuasion 
(Armstrong, 2010).
Knowledge, Attitude, and Behavioral Intention
Research has shown that persuasion effects take place at different levels. 
Rogers (2003) described five steps of persuasion effects: knowledge, 
persuasion, decision, implementation, and confirmation. Knowledge 
means persuadees’ awareness and cognitive understanding of the idea; 
persuasion means the generation of a (favorable or unfavorable) atti-
tude toward it. On the basis of these two steps, decisions will be made 
to adopt or reject the idea. If the idea is adopted, actions will then be 
taken (implementation/confirmation). McGuire (1989) maintained 
that persuasive information needs to climb up 12 levels, from exposure 
to postbehavioral consolidation, to go through the whole processing 
procedure in the audience’s mind. It loses about half of its audience ad-
vancing each level. But in practice, researchers normally use three levels 
to summarize those cognitive, affective, and conative levels: knowledge, 
attitude, and behavior (Xu et al., 2010). Most previous studies on per-
suasion inoculation and conclusion explicitness have focused on one 
or two levels of effects. This study measures three levels: knowledge, 
attitude, and behavioral intention toward the WEF nexus. On the basis 
of the literature reviewed, we plan to test the following hypotheses:
H1: Subjects exposed to a message about the WEF nexus have a higher 
level of (a) knowledge, (b) supportive attitude, and (c) supportive 
behavioral intention toward the nexus approach, compared with 
those who are exposed to no messages on the nexus.
H2: Refutational two-sided message exposure, compared with one-
sided message exposure, is associated with a higher level of (a) knowl-
edge, (b) supportive attitude, and (c) supportive behavioral intention 
toward the WEF nexus.
H3: Closed-ended message exposure, compared with open-ended 
message exposure, is associated with a higher level of (a) knowledge, 
(b) supportive attitude, and (c) supportive behavioral intention to-
ward the WEF nexus.
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Method
This study used a 2 × 2 factorial design with a control group and was 
administrated through SurveyMonkey.com. Students from a mid-sized 
southwestern public university were invited to participate through Web 
links and e-mails. From December 1 to 24, 2016, 625 responses were 
collected, of which 524 were used, after incomplete or invalid responses 
were removed. Among the 524 subjects, ages ranged from 18 to 72 years. 
Freshmen accounted for 19%, sophomores for 16%, juniors for 20%, 
seniors for 33%, master’s students for 5.4%, doctoral students for 2.7%, 
and all-but-dissertation students for 2.7%.
Procedure
Subjects were invited to SurveyMonkey.com to answer a group of 
questions, which took about 15 minutes to complete. In the middle of 
the process, a question with five options was embedded. Four options 
represented four types of message stimuli; one option had no message 
and served as the control. The five options were designed to be ran-
domly shown, with equal chance, to the subjects.
The four types of messages as stimuli were refutational two-sided 
open-ended, refutational two-sided closed-ended, one-sided open-
ended, and one-sided closed-ended. All four types were adopted from 
a short essay on the website of UN Water (n.d.). The essay was about 
positive evidence supporting the WEF nexus. To produce the two 
refutational two-sided messages, a paragraph adopted from the UN 
(2014) was added at the end. The paragraph contained a criticism that 
the WEF nexus was just “the same old wine in new bottles” (p. 6) and 
its refutation (inoculation) that the WEF nexus was different from the 
traditional integrative approaches, which still only explicitly focus on 
one resource. For the two open-ended messages, the headlines and the 
ending paragraph both read, “Should we adopt a nexus approach?” 
For the two closed-ended messages, both the headline and the ending 
paragraph read, “Let’s adopt a nexus approach!”
Subjects could not go back once they passed the page with the 
stimulus. Among the 524 participants, 111 were exposed to the refuta-
tional two-sided open-ended message, 99 to the one-sided open-ended 
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message, 99 to the refutational two-sided closed-ended message, 104 
to the one-sided closed-ended message, and 91 to no message. Twenty 
subjects withdrew from participation before being exposed to the 
stimulus. After receiving the stimulus, four groups of questions mea-
suring subjects’ knowledge, supportive attitude, supportive behavioral 
intention to promote the WEF nexus, and general behavioral intention 
to reduce WEF consumptions in daily life were administrated.
Dependent Variables
Knowledge. Five true–false questions based on the messages were 
used to measure respondents’ recall of the information in the message. 
Answering a question correctly earned 1 point. Thus the index ranged 
from 0 to 5 (M = 1.64, SD = 1.44, α = .63).
Supportive attitude. Respondents’ supportive attitude toward the 
WEF nexus was measured with an index of six questions, which asked 
respondents if it was urgent, serious, important, and useful to treat water, 
energy, and food as a nexus, if the WEF nexus was just another new 
bottle for old wines in science (reversely coded), and if the respondent 
was concerned about the WEF nexus. This index ranged from 6 to 30 
(M = 20.41, SD = 3.97, α = .90), with higher values standing for higher 
levels of attitudinal support for the WEF nexus.
Supportive behavioral intention toward the WEF nexus. Re-
spondents’ behavioral intention to promote the approach of the WEF 
nexus was measured with an index of five items. These items asked 
respondents to rate the likelihood that they would help promote the 
WEF nexus approach, solve the problems in the nexus, donate to sup-
port the nexus approach, tell people about the nexus approach, or urge 
people to support the nexus approach. The index ranged from 5 to 25 
(M = 14.82, SD = 3.52, α = .89). Higher values represented a higher level 
of behavioral intention to promote the WEF nexus.
The indices of the supportive attitude and behavioral intention were 
adopted and revised from Gastil and Xenos (2010). To better understand 
persuasion effectiveness at the behavioral level, the following dependent 
variable was also measured and analyzed.
Supportive behavioral intention in general. Nine items were used 
to measure how much the respondents would change their life pattern 
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to reduce water, energy, and food consumption. The index ranged 
from 9 to 72 (M = 39.43, SD = 14.27, α = .90). Higher values stand for 
higher levels of behavioral intention to reduce water, energy, and food 
consumption in daily life.
Manipulation Check
After being exposed to each type of message or no message, respondents 
were asked to select if the message (a) provided both positive and nega-
tive opinions about the WEF nexus with a clear conclusion, (b) provided 
just the positive opinions with a clear conclusion, (c) provided both posi-
tive and negative opinions with no clear conclusion, (d) provided only 
positive opinions with no clear conclusion, or (e) was not shown. The 
actual message types and the subjects’ perceptions of the message types 
were tabulated for a chi-square independent test, χ2(16, N = 524) = 291.0, 
p < .001. The results of the manipulation check are in Table 1.
In each cell of Table 1, the count and the adjusted standardized 
residual are reported. Adjusted standardized residuals can be roughly 
treated as the z-values that help tell if, in the cell, the discrepancy be-
tween the count and the expected count is statistically significant. Like 
z-values, adjusted standardized residuals with an absolute value of 1.96 
or higher refer to statistical significance at the 95% confidence level, 
and absolute values of 2.56 or higher stand for statistical significance 
















Open ended/two sided 18, −0.2 15, −1.3 34, 3.6 24, 1.5 4, −3.9
Open ended/one sided 5, −1.2 11, 1.1 12, 1.3 12, 1.7 0, −3.1
Closed ended/two sided 49, 4.0 49, 3.5 30, −1.5 34, 0.4 3, −6.6
Closed ended/one sided 19, 0.8 22, 1.4 23, 1.4 17, 0.2 2, −4.1
No message 8, −4.1 7, −14.6 12, −3.7 12, −3.1 82, 16.3
Total 99 104 111 99 91
Note. Entries are the counts and the adjusted standardized residuals from a cross-tabulation 
analysis. The adjusted standardized residuals can be roughly treated as z-values that indicate 
the statistical significance of the differences between the counts and the expected counts in the 
cells (Gerstman, 2015). For the overall tabulation, χ2(16, N = 504) = 291.0, p < .001. The two-sided 
messages contain refutations (inoculations).
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at the 99% confidence level. As can be seen in Table 1, subjects who 
were exposed to the open-ended refutational two-sided message were 
much more likely to report that the message they read provided both 
positive and negative opinions with no clear conclusion (counts = 34, 
adjusted standardized residual = 3.6). Subjects exposed to the closed-
ended two-sided message tended to report the message as providing 
both positive and negative opinions with a clear conclusion (counts = 49, 
adjusted standardized residual = 4.0). Subjects exposed to the one-
sided messages did not report the distinctive message types correctly. 
However, as O’Keefe (2003) has argued, manipulation checks on mes-
sage characteristics do not hurt the validity of the stimulus even if they 
do not fit the expected pattern. A one-sided message is one sided, no 
matter how the subjects perceive it.
Results
Because the hypotheses involve four dependent variables (knowledge, 
attitude, behavioral intention toward the WEF nexus, and general 
behavioral intention toward reducing water, energy, and food con-
sumptions), four one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were con-
ducted to see the differences in the four dependent variables across 
the five groups. Statistically significant differences exist in knowledge, 
F(4, 499) = 14.68, p < .001; attitude, F(4, 469) = 2.48, p = .04; and general 
behavioral intention, F(4, 457) = 2.41, p = .049, but not in behavioral 
intention toward the WEF nexus, across the five groups. Fisher’s least 
significant difference (LSD) post hoc comparisons further revealed the 
differences between the groups (Table 2).
H1 hypothesized that reading any version of the message would 
increase knowledge, supportive attitude, and supportive behavioral in-
tention toward the WEF nexus. The hypothesis was partially supported. 
As shown in Table 2, the knowledge score of the no-message group 
was lower than the scores for any of the groups that read a version of 
the message (Differenceno message − open-ended two-sided = −0.98, p < .001; 
Differenceno message − open-ended one-sided = −1.18, p < .001; Differenceno 
message − closed-ended two-sided = −1.12, p < .001; Differenceno message − closed-
ended one-sided = −1.37, p < .001). This significant difference held even 
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with the more conservative Sheffe’s post hoc test, which controls the 
experiment-wise error rate (Rao, 1998). Meanwhile, the no-message 
group also had a lower attitude compared with the open-ended one-
sided group (Differenceno message − open-ended one-sided = −1.37, p < .001) 
and, surprisingly, a higher general behavioral intention than the two 
open-ended groups (Differenceno message − open-ended two-sided = 4.37, 
p < .05; Differenceno message − open-ended one-sided = 5.13, p < .05).
H2 hypothesized that the refutational two-sided (inoculation) mes-
sages, which the audience might perceive as more respectful, were more 
persuasive than the one-sided messages. That was not supported, as no 
difference was found between the refutational two-sided groups and 
the one-sided groups.
TABLE 2 Difference in Knowledge, Attitude, Behavioral Intention toward the WEF Nexus, and 
General Behavioral Intention in Water, Energy, and Food Consumptions Across Five Groups
Message version Knowledgea Attitudeb
General behavioral 
intentionc





B (open ended, one  
 sided)




C (closed ended,  
 two sided)
E = 1.12***




B = 1.71** B = 4.39*




B = 1.31* A = 4.37*
B = 5.13*
Note. Entries are mean differences generated from Fisher’s LSD post hoc tests of the one-way 
ANOVAs. With the more conservative Scheffe post hoc tests, only the difference of knowledge 
scores between the no-message group and the message group still holds. The two-sided mes-
sages contain refutations (inoculations).
aF(4, 499) = 14.68, p < .001. bF(4, 469) = 2.48, p = .04. cF(4, 457) = 2.41, p = .049.
***p < .001. **p < .01. *p < .05.
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H3 predicted that closed-ended messages, with explicit conclusions, 
would be more persuasive than the open-ended messages with implicit 
conclusions. This hypothesis was partially supported. The open-ended 
refutational two-sided group gained less knowledge than the closed-end-
ed one-sided group (Differenceopen-ended two-sided − closed-ended one-sided = 
−0.39, p < .05). The open-ended one-sided group, compared with the 
closed-ended one-sided group, had a lower attitude (Differenceopen-
ended one-sided − closed-ended one-sided = −1.71, p < .01) and general behavioral 
intention (Differenceopen-ended one-sided − closed-ended one-sided = −4.39, 
p < .05). Even compared with the no-message group, although the two 
open-ended groups increased the knowledge scores, they still showed a 
lower attitude (Differenceopen-ended one-sided − no message = −1.31, p < .05) 
and general behavioral intention toward reducing consumption of water, 
energy, and food (Differenceopen-ended two-sided − no message = −4.37, p < .05; 
Differenceopen-ended one-sided − no message = −5.13, p < .05).
Discussion
Population growth, urbanization, and globalization, among other fac-
tors, are creating drastic burdens on indispensable natural resources, 
particularly water, energy, and agricultural resources. By 2030, it is 
estimated that demands for water, energy, and food will increase by 
40%, 50%, and 35%, respectively (Endo et al., 2017; Hoff, 2011; U.S. 
National Intelligence Council, 2012). At the same time, water, energy, 
and food demands are intricately interwoven, and the concept of the 
WEF nexus is necessary to capture the complex interrelation of these 
global resources (UN, 2014). The WEF nexus has emerged as a useful 
concept that takes a central place in the latest discussion of sustainable 
development and green economy (Biggs et al., 2015).
At the same time, the concept is unfamiliar to the public. On Google 
Trend, “water–energy–food” is not even a search term, compared with 
“water security,” which generates, on average, two searches a day, or 
“climate change,” which generates, on average, 38 searches a day. In the 
sample for this study (N = 524), on a scale ranging from 1 (I have never 
heard about the water–energy–food nexus) to 10 (I am very knowledge-
able about the water–energy–food nexus), 75.9% chose 1 and 90.3% 
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chose 4 or lower. The concept of the WEF nexus enables a better 
understanding and a systematic analysis of the interactions between the 
natural environment and human activities as well as more coordinated 
management and use of natural resources (UN, 2014). It is crucial to 
promote this concept to the public, because public endorsement is 
key to adopting policy concepts (Endo et al., 2017). The lack of public 
knowledge regarding the WEF nexus, on the other hand, makes it an 
ideal topic to test the functions of message inoculation and conclu-
sion explicitness in the effects of strategic promotions, because it rules 
out the possible moderation of audience predisposition (Armstrong, 
2010; O’Keefe, 2016). Unlike heavily politicized scientific topics, such 
as climate change, the WEF nexus is essentially unknown and clear of 
political controversy, which eliminates a multitude of possible con-
founding factors, including audience predisposition.
This study was designed to test if message inoculation (two sided 
with refutation vs. one sided) and conclusion explicitness (open ended 
vs. closed ended) make a difference in knowledge, attitude, and behav-
ioral intention toward the WEF nexus as well as general behavioral 
intention toward improving water, energy, and food security. The study 
used an experimental design with five randomly assigned groups: one 
receiving no message and four each receiving an open-ended refuta-
tional two-sided, open-ended one-sided, closed-ended refutational two-
sided, and closed-ended one-sided version of the message, respectively.
As a major point of interest, the data of this study suggest, consistent 
with O’Keefe (2016) but in contrast to Armstrong (2010) and Belch and 
Belch (2012), that closed-ended messages with explicit conclusions are 
more effective in generating desirable results in audience knowledge and 
attitude toward the WEF nexus as well as the general behavioral inten-
tion toward lowering water, energy, and food consumption. Although 
people tend to think that recognizing an audience’s freedom of thinking 
by providing room for the audience to reach a conclusion themselves 
may persuade more effectively, it is clear from the evidence generated in 
this study that messages with an explicit conclusion are more persuasive 
overall than messages with an implicit conclusion. The evidence was 
seen in the LSD post hoc tests but not the more conservative Scheffe 
post hoc tests. However, since the evidence was generated from using 
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only one short essay as the stimulus, and the results were consistent 
with each other, we still deem this finding interesting. Messages with 
explicit conclusions may appear more confident and therefore heuristi-
cally more persuasive. At the same time, conclusion explicitness reduces 
assimilation effects and/or contrast effects, generating little confusion 
among the audience (O’Keefe, 2016). By contrast, open-ended messages 
with implicit conclusions may make both supporters and opponents of 
the concept of the WEF nexus believe that the message argues for their 
point of view. Confusion is therefrom produced. The recommendation 
from that finding is that science communications—at least, communi-
cations promoting the WEF nexus—will be better served by including 
an explicit conclusion.
Message inoculation is not found to make a difference in persuasion 
effects. Providing criticism of the concept of the WEF nexus and then 
refuting it does not persuade the audience any more than just arguing 
for the WEF nexus approach. Researchers have maintained that provid-
ing both sides of the story may enhance the credibility of the message 
in the minds of the audience (Armstrong, 2010; Eisend, 2006) and that 
refuting a weakened opposing side may enhance the persuasiveness 
of the supporting side of the message (Dillard, 2010; McGuire, 1964; 
O’Keefe, 2016; Szabo & Pfau, 2002). That argument is not supported in 
this study. The failure to find inoculation effects in this study may be due 
to the lack of a preexisting favorable attitude toward the WEF nexus, a 
new topic of megacrisis, or a perception of threat against it among the 
subjects. Some scholars hold the preexisting favorable attitude or the 
perception of threats to be the ideal situation for inoculation effects to 
occur (McGuire, 1964; Niederdeppe et al., 2014). It may also be because 
the inoculation treatment is not strong enough or because a typical 
posttest-only method, in lieu of the three-wave method widely used 
in inoculation studies (first, measuring preexisting attitudes; second, 
applying inoculation to the experimental group; and third, delivering 
a subsequent attacking message), was used to measure the inoculation 
results (Niederdeppe et al., 2014). We are aware, of course, that no dif-
ference in communication effects found between the one-sided groups 
and the refutational two-sided groups in this study means that we fail 
to support the argument for inoculation messages to be more effective 
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than their one-sided counterparts. We cannot, however, simply conclude 
that no difference exists between inoculation messages and one-sided 
messages. Further studies on the inoculation effects on new scientific 
topics need to be accumulated.
It is also worth noting that being exposed to any type of message 
generates more knowledge on the WEF nexus in the audience’s mind. 
This is the only finding that can be confirmed with the conservative 
Scheffe post hoc tests. The post hoc analyses also reveal that knowl-
edge is positively correlated with attitude, r(474) = .22, p < .001, and 
general behavioral intention toward reducing water, energy, and food 
consumption, r(462) = .14, p < .01, but not behavioral intention toward 
promoting WEF nexus. Attitude, however, is substantially positively 
correlated with both behavioral intention toward the WEF nexus, 
r(465) = .66, p < .001, and general behavioral intention toward reduc-
ing water, energy, and food consumption, r(451) = .47, p < .001. That 
provides some evidence for the deficit model, which holds that provid-
ing information on scientific topics to the public increases the public’s 
scientific knowledge and therefrom changes its attitude toward science 
(Sturgis & Allum, 2004). It is true that groups exposed to a version 
of the message generate higher levels of supportive attitudes, except 
the open-ended one-sided group, which generates a lower attitude 
(Differenceopen-ended one-sided − no message = −1.31, p < .05) than the no-
message group. But if knowledge on the WEF nexus of all groups 
exposed to a version of the message increases, knowledge is positively 
correlated with attitude, and attitude is positively correlated with be-
havioral intention, it is reasonable to expect that when the informa-
tional stimuli turn stronger than just a short essay, public attitude and 
behavioral intention toward the WEF nexus may increase accordingly.
Conclusion
In summary, this study confirms that messages with explicit conclusions 
are more effective in promoting knowledge and attitudes toward the 
WEF nexus as well as the general behavioral intention toward reducing 
water, energy, and food consumption, whereas sidedness (inoculation) 
has no persuasive effects. Providing more information about the WEF 
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nexus no doubt increases public knowledge on the nexus approach. 
When knowledge increases, the public attitude toward the nexus ap-
proach may turn more supportive, and the public may have higher levels 
of intention to do something in support of the nexus approach. The 
results, although valuable, may be limited in the experimental context 
with one essay as stimulus. More studies on how message sidedness 
(inoculation) and conclusion explicitness impact persuasion effects and 
how persuasion effects travel along the cognitive, affective, and conative 
levels in the hierarchy of effects should be conducted.
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ABSTRACT
The Ebola outbreak and its rapid spread throughout West Africa and other countries was a 
megacrisis that imposed numerous challenges to those communicating to nonscientifi c publics 
about the epidemic. This article examines the instructional risk messages off ered in the days that 
followed the 2014 infection and death of Liberian national Thomas Eric Duncan in Dallas, Texas. 
More specifi cally, we apply the IDEA model for eff ective instructional risk and crisis communication 
embellished by exemplifi cation theory to conduct a thematic analysis of messages off ered locally 
(Dallas news stories and press releases), nationally (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
Live Chat Twitter posts), and internationally (website content from the World Health Organization, 
the United Nations Children’s Fund, and Doctors Without Borders). Our conclusions reveal that the 
majority of messages off ered from each organization privileged the element of explanation over 
internalization and action as well as negative over positive exemplifi cation. On the basis of these 
conclusions, and informed by previous research, we propose a number of potential implications 
and recommendations for off ering a balanced representation among internalization, explanation, 
and action as proposed in the IDEA model. We also suggest that positive exemplifi cation could 
be used strategically to motivate receivers to attend to these messages (internalization), reduce 
potential misunderstandings (explanation), and take appropriate self-protective actions (action). 
Agency spokespersons and media reporters may fi nd the conclusions and recommendations 
drawn from this analysis to be useful when crafting similar instructional risk preparedness and 
crisis response messages.
KEYWORDS: IDEA model; exemplifi cation theory; Ebola; megacrisis; instructional risk and 
crisis communication
Instructing nonscientifi c publics to take appropriate self-protective 
actions during risk and crisis events is an ongoing challenge for crisis 
communicators (e.g., Coombs, 2009; Rowan, Botan, Kreps, Samoilenko, 
& Farnsworth, 2009). This is due, in part, to the imminent threat 
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imposed, the potential consequences of wrong actions or inaction, the 
need to translate scientific information accurately and intelligibly to 
disparate nonscientific publics, and the short response time afforded 
for delivering such instructions (e.g., Seeger, 2006; D. D. Sellnow & 
Sellnow, 2014b; T. L. Sellnow & Seeger, 2013). More specifically, some 
of the major challenges communicators face when instructing nonsci-
entific publics during a risk or crisis event focus on (in)accessibility of 
some people and groups to receive the messages delivered via certain 
channels, lack of motivation among some people and groups to attend 
to them, misinformation in and misinterpretation of messages, distrust 
of the message source, and a lack of clarity about what actions to take 
for self-protection. Consequently, instructional risk and crisis commu-
nication is emerging as an insightful body of research for measuring the 
affective, cognitive, and behavioral learning outcome effectiveness of 
such messages (e.g., Frisby, Sellnow, Lane, Veil, & Sellnow, 2013; Frisby, 
Veil, & Sellnow, 2014; D. D. Sellnow, Lane, Sellnow, & Littlefield, 2017; 
D. D. Sellnow, Limperos et al., 2015; D. D. Sellnow & Sellnow, in press).
The rise of megacrises in recent years has increased both the sense 
of urgency felt during risk and crisis events and the complexity of 
communicating instructions successfully during them (Helsloot, Boin, 
Jacobs, & Comfort, 2012). Megacrises “defy boundaries, limits, neat 
demarcations, patterned connections and linear consequences” (p. 5). 
Moreover, because megacrises do not respect preconceived boundaries 
or national borders, they often have an extensive global impact. Conse-
quently, timely and effective responses are even more critical, as well as 
more difficult to achieve. Some of the most compelling examples include 
health epidemics and pandemics such as AIDS, BSE, SARS, and H1N1.
A case of the Ebola virus disease appeared in a small village in Guinea 
in December 2013 but was not identified as Ebola until March 2014. 
In the months that followed, the world would experience a megacrisis 
epidemic as the disease spread quickly throughout the region and to 
several other countries (World Health Organization, 2015). Although 
travel warnings and bans were put into place in an attempt to contain 
the spread of the virus, the gestation period can range from several 
weeks to months (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2015). 
Thus travelers could (and did) easily spread the disease unknowingly. 
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Containing the transmission of Ebola and communicating accurate 
and effective instructional messages for self-protection became seri-
ous challenges.
When Liberian native Thomas Eric Duncan traveled from Liberia to 
Dallas, Texas, in September 2014 and then died from the Ebola disease 
one month later, the megacrisis became a real perceived threat in the 
minds of the American people. Hysteria ruled as nonscientific pub-
lics wrestled with uncertainty about the disease. News media offered 
wall-to-wall coverage of the virus, politicians and pundits weighed 
in urging travel bans of all persons arriving from Africa (not just the 
affected regions), parents withdrew their children from schools, and 
people living in the same apartment complex as Duncan were scared 
for their own health and safety.
The apartment of the first nurse to contract Ebola from Duncan, 
Nina Pham, was quarantined. Neighbors were alarmed, and some even 
moved away. Another nurse who treated Duncan, Amber Vinson, 
studied nursing at Kent State University (KSU) in Ohio. When Vinson 
contracted Ebola, officials at KSU banned both her mother and two 
other family members who worked at the university from campus for 
21 days because of their contact with Ms. Vinson. The airline that Ms. 
Vinson flew on to and from Ohio forced employees who had been in 
contact with her to take paid leave. Other passengers were worried 
about potentially contracting the disease from Ms. Vinson, although 
she had received permission from the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) to travel prior to doing so.
Communication experts agree that much of the hysteria was exac-
erbated by the conflicting and contradictory messages the public got 
from the media, Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital officials, and the 
CDC. This article examines instructional risk messages communicated 
to nonscientific publics during the 2014 Ebola crisis as a means to im-
prove such messages when megacrisis epidemics arise in the future. 
We begin by describing the Duncan case, as it illustrates how the Ebola 
epidemic moved from a crisis event in West Africa to a megacrisis 
crossing national borders. We then clarify the IDEA model for effective 
instructional risk and crisis message design grounded in experiential 
learning theory and embellished with exemplification theory as well 
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as the methods we employed to answer our research questions. Next, 
we describe the results of our analysis of (a) messages sent via a CDC 
live chat on Twitter, (b) news stories and press releases distributed in 
the Dallas–Fort Worth area, and (c) messages offered on the websites 
of the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Chil-
dren’s Fund (UNICEF), and Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans 
Frontières; MSF) during the peak of the crisis in the United States. 
Finally, we offer a discussion as to how this analysis can inform future 
decisions about effective instructional risk and crisis messages during 
megacrisis events, as well as propose suggestions for future research.
The Case
When Liberian national Thomas Eric Duncan sought medical care at 
Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital in Dallas on September 25, 2014, 
for a sharp headache, fever, and other symptoms, no one predicted that 
he would be the first Ebola victim identified in Texas. Duncan allegedly 
traveled knowingly to the United States after having contracted Ebola 
in Liberia. A few weeks earlier, Kent Brantly and Nancy Writebol, both 
medical missionaries who contracted Ebola while working in Liberia, 
were airlifted to Emory University Hospital in Atlanta, treated with the 
experimental drug ZMapp, and made full recoveries. Duncan, how-
ever, was sent home from the Dallas hospital with antibiotics. Three 
days later, on September 28, Duncan was rushed to the hospital in an 
ambulance and placed in isolation.
During this time, Duncan’s apartment was not decontaminated, and 
family members in the apartment were not quarantined nor told to take 
any precautionary actions. News media broadcast speculations about 
the prospect of others contracting the disease. The Richardson Inde-
pendent School District near Dallas pulled from school three children 
who had reportedly had contact with Duncan. Many parents worried 
about the safety of their own children and withdrew them from the 
Richardson schools as well. Meanwhile, Duncan’s health deteriorated. 
He died on October 8, 2014.
Two days after Duncan’s death, Nina Pham, a 26-year-old nurse who 
had treated Duncan at Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital, reported 
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fever symptoms. She was immediately placed in isolation at the same 
hospital. Her dog was seized and quarantined. Her frightened neigh-
bors told television reporters that they had no information about what 
precautions to take. Fortunately, Pham was discharged as healthy on 
October 24, as documented in photos taken of President Obama hug-
ging her in the Oval Office.
Despite complaining of a fever, another nurse who had treated 
Duncan, 29-year-old Amber Vinson, was cleared by the CDC to fly 
from Dallas to Ohio to visit family. After returning to Dallas, Vinson 
began experiencing Ebola symptoms, was admitted to the hospital, and 
was placed in isolation. However, some parents believed Vinson may 
have been in contact with some schoolchildren before she was admit-
ted to the hospital and pressed the schools to shut down. Passengers 
who flew on the same plane as Vinson to and from Ohio were equally 
concerned. The inconsistent and contradictory messages coming from 
the CDC and the Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital, the frightening 
images of hazmat-clad health and emergency workers that played out in 
the media, and the politicians and pundits declaring gloom and doom 
heightened public fears about the virus.
Although the hospital, the city of Dallas, the Dallas news media, and 
the CDC eventually improved their messaging, the mismanagement 
of key risk communication during these crucial first few hours and 
days of the breaking crisis caused considerable anxiety and confusion 
among members of the public. Thus this project focuses on improving 
instructional risk and crisis communication messages offered in times 
of urgent threat (real or perceived) to individuals and groups using this 
Ebola event as a case study. More specifically, we conducted a thematic 
analysis of messages disseminated to the public according to the IDEA 
model of effective instructional risk and crisis communication embel-
lished by exemplification theory as they may influence affective learning 
(perceived value/utility/relevance), cognitive learning (comprehension/
understanding), and behavioral learning (self-efficacy/behavioral ac-
tions). The following section provides a rationale for grounding our 
analysis theoretically in the IDEA model and exemplification theory.
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Theoretical Grounding
This study is grounded in the IDEA model for effective instructional 
risk and crisis messages (D. D. Sellnow & Sellnow, 2014b) and extended 
with exemplification theory (Zillmann, 1999). The IDEA model is 
grounded in experiential learning theory as first conceived by John 
Dewey (1938) and then extended by David Kolb (1984) and colleagues.
The components of the IDEA model are internalization (perceived 
value and relevance via proximity, personal impact, and timeliness), 
distribution (multiple channels—such as TV, radio, social media, smart-
phones—through which such messages are/should be delivered), ex-
planation (accurate science from credible sources translated intelligibly 
to nonscientific publics), and action (specific steps to take/not to take 
for self-protection in a given risk or crisis situation; D. D. Sellnow & 
Sellnow, 2014b). In the case of a health crisis event, effective instruc-
tional risk messages would include mention of the potential effects of 
the disease on people who become infected, how much time one has 
to notice symptoms and to seek medical help, and where the disease 
is appearing (internalization). Such messages would also explain what 
the disease is and how it is contracted in simple, nonscientific language 
(explanation). Finally, such messages would propose specific actions to 
take (or not to take) to avoid contracting the disease as well as what to 
do (or not to do) if one has been exposed to an infected individual or 
is experiencing any of the symptoms (action). This consistent message 
ought to be delivered by a variety of credible sources via multiple chan-
nels (distribution) to ensure as many people as possible receive it and to 
reduce the number of inaccurate, misleading, or conflicting messages.
We selected the IDEA model because it has demonstrated its util-
ity across risk and crisis types, among disparate cultural groups, and 
across international borders (e.g., Frisby et al., 2014; Littlefield et al., 
2014; D. D. Sellnow, Iverson, & Sellnow, 2017; D. D. Sellnow, Johans-
son, Sellnow, and Vigso, 2016; D. D. Sellnow, Limperos et al., 2015; T. L. 
Sellnow, Sellnow, Lane, & Littlefield, 2012). In essence, the IDEA model 
provides a framework for designing effective messages when the goal 
is to instruct nonscientific publics to take appropriate actions for self-
protection during risk and crisis events.
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Exemplification theory (Zillmann, 1999) is also used in this analysis 
as it enhances several elements of the IDEA model. Exemplification 
theory centers on the notion that everyone is familiar with examples 
and how examples can represent large and complex ideas in compre-
hensible ways. The key to exemplification is the “recognition of shared 
features between an example (aka exemplar) and the exemplified, as well 
as between all possible examples of the exemplified” (p. 72). Exemplars 
are essentially evocative words, phrases, images, and sometimes sounds 
that serve as cognitive shortcuts to glean meaning about complex ideas 
or situations (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Zillmann, 2002, 2006). In other 
words, they are easy to understand and process with limited (if any) 
analytic thought. Exemplification operates in three distinct ways.
First, exemplification theory argues that information is evaluated 
subjectively, relying on biases in making risk assessments rather than 
assessing risk systematically (Zillmann & Brosius, 2000). It also sup-
poses that risk perception is altered through exposure to exemplars. 
Exemplars are made memorable through the use of “visually vivid and 
emotionally strong” (Aust & Zillmann, 1996, p. 788) words and images. 
Exemplars can come in the form of “any combination of image and 
text” (Zillmann, 2006, p. S224) that influences risk perception when 
viewed frequently and recently.
Second, an exemplar represents a group of similar cases through 
one instance (e.g., one individual who suffers the effects of fetal alcohol 
spectrum disorder represents all fetuses that have the potential to be 
born with similar disadvantages if the mother chooses to drink alcohol 
while pregnant). Zillmann (2006) argued that exemplification theory 
functions by means of a “quantification heuristic,” suggesting that fre-
quency of exemplars are continually monitored and the prevalence of 
a particular exemplar directly impacts its retrieval from one’s memory.
Third, exemplars can have a positive (e.g., “superfood” as healthy 
foods) or negative (e.g., “Frankenfood” as unhealthy foods) valence. 
In the case of the Ebola megacrisis, we argue that negative exempli-
fication fueled misperceptions and triggered fear among a variety of 
publics about its symptoms, how it is spread, how to protect oneself 
from contracting it, and how to treat it.
Exemplification theory in combination with the IDEA model is 
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particularly suitable for examining the instructional risk messages 
sent during the fall 2014 Ebola outbreak that occurred in the United 
States. By understanding how exemplars were used in the context of 
the IDEA model, the ways in which exemplars may affect individuals’ 
understanding of a crisis event like Ebola as well as their decisions to 
follow recommended self-protective actions may become apparent. To 
clarify, the use of exemplars may help people internalize the relevance 
and potential impact of Ebola on them and their loved ones. Similarly, 
exemplars might serve as effective cognitive shortcuts to increase un-
derstanding of complex information about the virus (explanation) and, 
ultimately, to foster appropriate self-protective actions (Spence, Lachlan, 
Lin, Sellnow-Richmond, & Sellnow, 2015).
On the basis of the implications of the messages sent during the 
Ebola megacrisis in the United States and the tenets of the IDEA model 
and exemplification theory, the authors sought to answer the following 
four research questions (RQs):
RQ1: In what ways do Ebola crisis messages distributed by the CDC 
during a live chat on Twitter employ elements of the IDEA model for 
effective instructional risk and crisis communication?
RQ1a: In what ways do Ebola crisis messages distributed by the CDC 
during a live chat on Twitter employ elements of internalization?
RQ1b: In what ways do Ebola crisis messages distributed by the 
CDC during a live chat on Twitter employ elements of explanation?
RQ1c: In what ways do Ebola crisis messages distributed by the 
CDC during a live chat on Twitter employ elements of action?
RQ1d: In what ways is exemplification used in communicating 
internalization, explanation, and action during the CDC Ebola 
live chat on Twitter?
RQ2: In what ways do Ebola crisis messages distributed via Dallas area 
news stories and press releases employ elements of the IDEA model 
for effective instructional risk and crisis communication?
RQ2a: In what ways do Ebola crisis messages distributed via Dallas 
area news stories and press releases employ elements of internal-
ization?
RQ2b: In what ways do Ebola crisis messages distributed via Dallas 
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area news stories and press releases employ elements of explana-
tion?
RQ2c: In what ways do Ebola crisis messages distributed via Dallas 
area news stories and press releases employ elements of action?
RQ2d: In what ways is exemplification used in communicating 
internalization, explanation, and action in the Dallas area Ebola 
news stories and press releases?
RQ3: In what ways do Ebola crisis messages distributed via websites 
sponsored by the WHO, UNICEF, and MSF employ elements of the 
IDEA model for effective instructional risk and crisis communication?
RQ3a: In what ways do Ebola crisis messages distributed via web-
sites sponsored by the WHO, UNICEF, and MSF employ elements 
of internalization?
RQ3b: In what ways do Ebola crisis messages distributed via web-
sites sponsored by the WHO, UNICEF, and MSF employ elements 
of explanation?
RQ3c: In what ways do Ebola crisis messages distributed via web-
sites sponsored by the WHO, UNICEF, and MSF employ elements 
of action?
RQ3d: In what ways is exemplification used in communicating in-
ternalization, explanation, and action about Ebola on the websites 
sponsored by the WHO, UNICEF, and MSF?
RQ4: What similarities and differences exist regarding IDEA model 
components embellished by exemplification in Ebola crisis messages 
distributed via the CDC live Twitter chat, Dallas news stories and press 
releases, and websites sponsored by the WHO, UNICEF, and MSF?
Method
The research team conducted a thematic analysis of all messages sent by 
several key entities during the first hours, days, and weeks of the 2014 
Ebola outbreak in the United States. More specifically, all messages sent 
during a CDC-hosted live question-and-answer Twitter chat on October 
2, 2014; all Dallas news stories and press releases published between 
September 24 and October 31, 2014; and all website content published by 
the WHO, UNICEF, and MSF during that same period were examined.
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Before conducting the analysis, the researchers consulted with Ebola 
experts at the CDC to collect accurate information about the infection, 
how it is spread, its symptoms, and the actions people should take for 
self-protection. To ascertain the kinds of information being shared 
with general publics, the researchers also collected information from 
the Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital in Dallas, official documents 
from the city of Dallas, Dallas newspapers and TV reports, and news 
releases from universities and schools in the Dallas–Fort Worth area. 
Doing so ensured ecological validity, accurate scientific information, 
and a comprehensive understanding of what messages were being 
conveyed at the time.
Sample
Because research has suggested that different publics perceive different 
entities as more and less credible (T. L. Sellnow & Seeger, 2013), the 
research team examined messages from multiple sources: the CDC, 
Dallas area news media and health agencies, and three international 
health organizations (WHO, UNICEF, and MSF). Also, on the basis of 
previous research suggesting that different publics seek information via 
a variety of media channels (Anthony & Sellnow, 2011, 2016), messages 
distributed via a variety of channels (Twitter, traditional news media 
and press releases, and organization websites) were examined. Finally, 
the research team focused on messages that may be accessed easily 
online (as well as via other outlets) because the Internet is becoming 
an increasingly popular source for both relaying news and seeking 
information (Rosenstiel, Mitchell, Purcell, & Rainie, 2011).
The authors collected all of the tweets exchanged during the CDC 
question-and-answer Twitter session held on October 2, 2014. To clarify, 
the CDC hosted a live chat for individuals concerned about contracting 
the Ebola virus after Duncan was reported to have tested positive. The 
authors also collected all Dallas area news stories and press releases 
discussing the virus and this incident from September 24 to October 
31, 2014. Finally, all Ebola-related material posted on three international 
organizations’ websites (WHO, UNICEF, and MSF) was collected and 
used to contextualize the messages about the Ebola virus from the 
perspective of the global community. In all, this comprehensive census 
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of data collected from September 24, 2014, through October 31, 2014, 
yielded 282 tweets, 31 local news stories, and 38 international organiza-
tion website articles.
Procedure
An etic approach was used to analyze the content of messages distrib-
uted from these disparate sources via these diverse channels (Lindlof & 
Taylor, 2011). To clarify, an etic approach uses established “conceptual 
categories provided by our disciplinary knowledge and theory” (p. 95). 
In this case, message content was coded according to the internalization, 
explanation, and action components described in the IDEA model as 
well as for the use of positive or negative exemplars within each com-
ponent. Two researchers developed a codebook, which was then used 
to examine all message content (see the appendix). Any disagreements 
were resolved through discussion. The messages were examined for 
the presence (or lack thereof) of each element as well as the role of 
exemplification in them. From these results, conclusions and implica-
tions were drawn regarding instructional risk messages conveyed in 
this case as well as for informing similar message content and design 
in future crisis and megacrisis events.
Results
Research Question 1
To evaluate the use of the IDEA model elements in the CDC’s Twit-
ter live chat, 282 tweets were thematically coded for internalization, 
explanation, and action as well as the incorporation of exemplifi-
cation within each of these elements.1 Of these 282 tweets, 61 (21%) 
incorporated elements of internalization. For example, Jacin tweeted, 
“Press conference said asymptomatic people aren’t contagious; Travel 
guidance on CDC site suggests otherwise. What gives?” The CDC re-
sponded, “People aren’t contagious during incubation period; they’re 
only contagious when they start having symptoms.” Jacin’s fears ap-
peared to be averted: “Then there is no need for United Airlines to 
be contacting all of those passengers? Simply over-abundance of pre-
caution?” And the CDC confirmed, “Since the patient didn’t develop 
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symptoms until AFTER travel, there was no risk to other passengers.”
Of these 282 tweets, 250 (88%) focused on elements explanation. 
For example, in response to Rawlings’s question about how patients 
are being treated, the CDC responded, “Patients are given supportive 
care. Some experimental treatments are being tried.” And in response 
to Apodaca’s query about Ebola surviving on sterile surfaces for 6 days, 
the CDC responded that it cannot do so unless it is in body fluid, does 
not survive long outside of the body, and is only contagious if a person 
is experiencing active symptoms. In numerous other exchanges, CDC 
experts not only responded but also pointed to websites where par-
ticipants could get more information and explanation about the virus, 
how it is spread, and what is being done to contain it.
Of these 282 tweets, 53 (19%) incorporated elements focused on ac-
tion steps. For example, Em D tweeted, “Does ebola respond to ‘Purell’ 
and alcohol based sanitizer, or soap and water? How about bleach?” 
The CDC responded that “alcohol-based hand sanitizer and chlorine 
can kill Ebola.” Sometimes, however, the action steps were not specific, 
as was the case when the CDC responded to Galiano’s query about 
how to properly disinfect and what product to use by saying, “Use an 
EPA-approved hospital grade disinfectant.” Finally, as was the case 
with internalization, many times the CDC experts responded to que-
ries about self-protective actions by pointing participants to a website 
for more information. For example, when Victory Healthcare asked, 
“What symptoms should someone look out for, in regards to Ebola?” 
The CDC responded with, “Here are new resources: go.usa.gov/vEwP.”
In terms of exemplification, only 9 (less than 1%) of the 282 tweets 
used exemplars, and 8 of the 9 instances represented negative rather 
than positive exemplification. More specifically, only 3 (less than 1%) of 
the 61 tweets that focused on internalization incorporated exemplars, 
and all 3 were negative. For example, Robrod4g wrote, “I have a 7 yr. 
old & a 7 mo. pregnant wife who works in the health care community. 
YES! I AM SCARED!!” The CDC responded, “Understandable, #Ebola 
is scary. New threat & deadly disease.” Six (less than 1%) of the 250 
tweets focused on explanation-incorporated exemplars. Only one of 
these was coded as a positive exemplar by using a graphic illustration 
as a cognitive shortcut regarding how the Ebola virus is contracted 
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(see Figure 1). No exemplars were identified in the tweets that focused 
on action steps. Ultimately, a majority (88%) of the live chat tweets 
emphasized explanations of the situation and events, and fewer than 
1% offered exemplars.
Research Question 2
In total, 31 news stories and press releases focused on Ebola were pub-
lished in the Dallas area between September 24 and October 31, 2014. 
These reports were collected and thematically coded for internalization, 
explanation, and action as well as the incorporation of exemplification 
in each of these elements. Of these 31 publications, 10 (32%) incorpo-
rated internalization. For example, an initial statement published by 
the Dallas Independent School District (2014) began with a note of 
compassion by saying, “The health and safety of our students is always 
our top priority” and then addressed proximity and personal impact 
by revealing that the five students who may have had contact with 
the infected individual had “been advised to stay home from school.” 
FIGURE 1 Positive explanation exemplar.
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Similarly, a Texas Christian University (2014) press release reported that 
“TCU is aware of the confirmation of an Ebola case in Dallas, Texas 
(proximity). The University is in contact with local health care officials 
and will continue to monitor the situation and keep families, students, 
faculty, and staff informed during this time” (compassion, relevance, 
personal impact, timeliness).
Nearly every article—that is, 30 (97%) of 31—incorporated elements 
of explanation. A common theme throughout them was a statement 
refuting a common misunderstanding that Ebola could be spread 
through the air. These refutations were then typically followed by a 
statement explaining that Ebola is only spread via “direct contact with 
the body fluids of a person showing symptoms of the illness” and that 
the risk of contracting it was very low according to both “national and 
local health officials” (source credibility; Southern Methodist University, 
2014). Another common theme focused on the steps being taken by 
government agencies, health care providers, and other area experts to 
manage the outbreak. For example, the Governor’s Press Office (2014) 
released a statement announcing “the creation of a state-of-the-art 
Ebola treatment and infectious disease bio containment facility in North 
Texas” that would “allow us to act quickly to limit the virus’ reach and 
give patients the care they need.”
Regarding the action element, only 2 (6%) of the 31 articles proposed 
specific action steps. Instead, many of them simply pointed readers to 
seek such information from additional websites, such as the Tarrant 
County Health Department, the Texas Department of State Health 
Services, or the CDC. The reports that did offer specific action steps 
tended merely to discourage “travel to the affected African counties,” 
to monitor people for symptoms, and to “see a physician in a medical 
setting for an evaluation” when symptoms emerged (Texas Wesleyan 
University, 2014).
Finally, 7 of the 31 articles (22%) offered negative exemplars, and none 
used positive exemplars. More specifically, 2 (20%) of the 10 articles 
that incorporated internalization did so with the use of exemplars. For 
example, one NBC Dallas–Fort Worth story described Ebola as “a fire 
straight from the pit of hell” (Young, 2014). Five (16%) of the 30 articles 
that focused on explanation incorporated exemplars to aid explanation. 
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For example, WFAA, an ABC Dallas news affiliate, reported that the 
“once-bustling” Texas Health Presbyterian hospital had turned into 
a “ghost town,” accompanied by photographs of empty hallways and 
waiting rooms (Lupkin, 2014). No exemplars were offered as cognitive 
shortcuts for specific action steps. In sum, as was the case with the 
CDC Twitter exchange, nearly all of the Dallas area news stories and 
press releases emphasized explanation over internalization or action 
and offered only negative exemplification.
Research Question 3
To examine the use of IDEA model elements among international health 
organizations, all 38 Ebola-related articles posted on WHO, UNICEF, 
and MSF websites between September 24 and October 31, 2014, were 
collected and thematically coded for internalization, explanation, ac-
tion, and exemplification. Of these 38 articles, 12 (31%) incorporated 
internalization. For example, the MSF website discussed the negative 
impact of imposing a forced quarantine of asymptomatic health work-
ers returning from West Africa to the United States. That is, there is 
no reason to quarantine asymptomatic people because asymptomatic 
people with the Ebola infection do not transmit the virus. The organi-
zation also emphasized the lack of risk the U.S. population faced when 
health care workers returned from fighting the epidemic in West Africa. 
In a press release following Dr. Craig Spencer’s discharge from the 
hospital after contracting Ebola while working with MSF, for instance, 
the organization reiterated that asymptomatic people like Dr. Spencer 
cannot spread the virus and that “the public must not stigmatize and 
even threaten these volunteers” (Doctors Without Borders, 2014b).
A majority of the articles—36 (95%) of 38—focused on explanation. 
For example, the MSF website posted this explanation about what was 
being done to contain the disease and treat infected patients:
MSF will work in collaboration with organizations, academics, compa-
nies, the Ministries of Health in the affected countries, and the WHO 
in order to implement fast-tracked clinical trials for some of the new 
treatments for Ebola at existing treatment sites. Experimental treatments 
are currently being selected and trial designs are being developed to 
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ensure that disruption to patient care is minimal, that medical and re-
search ethics are respected, and that sound scientific data is produced. 
(Doctors Without Borders, 2014b)
These kinds of explanations about what Ebola is, how it is contracted, 
and what is being done to contain it and treat patients were posted on 
each of the websites sponsored by the WHO, UNICEF, and MSF.
Of the 38 website articles, 25 (66%) proposed specific action steps. 
An article posted on the WHO website (World Health Organization, 
2014), for instance, explained that
WHO and its partners have recommended exit screening at airports and 
land-border crossings in countries affected by Ebola, and it is now an 
established practice. WHO stresses that only two categories of people 
should not travel: those who are infected and those identified as their 
close contacts as they may be infected with Ebola virus.
According to an article posted on the UNICEF website (Gilliam, 2014), 
“avoiding shaking hands is possibly the easiest of the [behavioral] 
changes” to make.
In terms of exemplification, 6 (16%) of the 38 website postings used 
exemplars. More specifically, 4 (33%) of the 12 articles that integrated 
internalization also used exemplars. For example, an MSF article de-
scribed its “sickest patients” to be treated for Ebola and the “miracle” 
of their recovery. The MSF wrote, “When Hassan was brought in, he 
was almost dead. He wasn’t moving or speaking; he had constant diar-
rhea; he was confused, disoriented, and lethargic” (Doctors Without 
Borders, 2014a). One of the 36 articles offering explanations did so 
using exemplars. This article was actually an infographic by UNICEF 
explaining what life-saving supplies had been delivered to Ebola-affected 
countries between August and November 2014 (United Nations Chil-
dren’s Fund [UNICEF], 2014). Finally, one exemplar was also identified 
as helping to convey self-protective action steps to be taken. UNICEF 
(2016) emphasized the important role of handwashing in preventing 
the spread of Ebola using the WASH acronym, which stands for “water, 
sanitation, and hygiene.”
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In sum, a majority of international articles emphasized explanation 
over internalization or action, although more of these messages did 
offer action steps compared to the local newspaper reports or national 
CDC Twitter exchange. In addition, as was the case with the Twitter 
chat and Dallas area news stories, very few exemplars were offered, and 
of those that were, most were negative.
Research Question 4
Descriptive statistics from each of the distribution channels—local 
news stories and press releases; national CDC live Twitter chat; and 
international (WHO, UNICEF, MSF) website articles—were compared 
to discover similarities and differences regarding the use of IDEA model 
elements and exemplification in the Ebola crisis messages. Regarding the 
IDEA model elements, Figure 2 illustrates that 21 % of the CDC Twitter 
feed, 32% of Dallas newspapers, and 31% of international organization 
newspaper reports incorporated internalization. The vast majority of 
messages across distribution channels focused primarily on explanation 
(88% of the national CDC Twitter messages, 97% of the local Dallas 
news articles, and 95% of international organization website articles). 
With regard to the action element of the IDEA model, only 19% of the 
national CDC exchange tweets and 6% of the local Dallas area news 
reports offered specific actionable instructions. However, 66% of the 
international organization website articles proposed them. Finally, 
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regarding exemplification, although exemplars can serve as cognitive 
shortcuts for translating complex subjects, fewer than 1% of the CDC 
Twitter messages, 29% of the Dallas news stories and press releases, 
and 16% of the international organization website articles used them. 
Moreover, those that did use exemplars tended to use negative rather 
than positive ones.
Discussion
This examination of messages distributed nationally via the CDC Twit-
ter live chat, locally via Dallas area news stories and press releases, and 
internationally via website postings from the WHO, UNICEF, and MSF 
when the first case of and death from Ebola occurred in the United 
States yields some fruitful conclusions. Moreover, the conclusions give 
rise to some interesting implications and recommendations.
Perhaps the most formidable conclusion to be drawn from this 
analysis stems from the fact that messages shared by all sources via a 
variety of distribution channels focused extensively on explanation over 
internalization and action. Although multiple message-testing studies 
have confirmed that the most effective instructional risk and crisis 
messages integrate all three elements, this study reveals that current 
risk and crisis reporting practices continue to privilege explanation 
over internalization and action (e.g., D. D. Sellnow, Lane et al., 2015; 
D. D. Sellnow et al., in press; T. L. Sellnow, Sellnow, & Helsel, 2017). 
This privileging of explanation is not surprising, however, in that it 
confirms the results of previous research, for example, by Frisby et al. 
(2014), who focused on news reports during the 2010 nationwide egg 
recall in the United States, and by D. D. Sellnow et al. (2016) regarding 
blended meat contamination in Sweden. However, if the goal of such 
instructional risk and crisis messages is learning, then it follows that 
they ought to contain elements that research has confirmed are neces-
sary to achieve affective and behavioral, as well as cognitive, learning 
(e.g., Dewey, 1938; D. D. Sellnow & Sellnow, 2014b). In fact, failing to 
do so could lead people to do nothing or to do precisely the wrong 
thing, which could result in devastating consequences (D. D. Sellnow 
et al., 2017).
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With regard to the Ebola outbreak megacrisis as experienced in 
the United States, failing to integrate internalization and action into 
most of the messages could have played a role in the level of fear felt 
by nonscientific publics seeking information about the crisis and how 
to protect themselves. To clarify, instructional risk messages that offer 
explanation without internalization often fail to achieve compliance, 
and even when specific action steps are offered, they are typically 
ignored or not sustained when internalization is not also integrated 
(D. D. Sellnow et al., 2017).
In the midst of a public health megacrisis like the 2014 Ebola epi-
demic, organizations ought to provide accurate information to diverse 
publics about what the disease is and how it is spread. All sources 
examined in this study (CDC Twitter exchange, Dallas area news sto-
ries and press releases, and international organization websites) did 
so. However, only the international organization website articles also 
offered specific self-protective action steps in a majority of them. It is 
certainly possible that, because the Ebola outbreak had been going on 
for some time in West Africa before it reached the United States, these 
organizations were more concerned with revealing actions needed to 
contain the spread of the virus than with providing general base-rate 
information about the virus. In other words, because the virus was 
spreading quickly in West Africa, emphasizing specific action steps may 
have been a more immediate concern. It is unfortunate that the CDC 
and Dallas new stories and press releases did not capitalize on sharing 
the abundance of information available from these international sources 
long before Ebola surfaced in the United States. Perhaps they consid-
ered it a “West African disease” and believed it would be contained 
there before having a chance to migrate overseas. Thus preparing U.S. 
publics to take preventative action may have appeared to be somewhat 
irrelevant prior to the Dallas case. This seems plausible, given that 
CDC experts reiterated many times that such an outbreak was highly 
unlikely in the United States owing to the access to advanced medical 
treatment centers. Regardless, previous research has suggested that 
messages including specific action steps tend to be most effective when 
preparing for a potential crisis as well as in response to crises (Frisby 
et al., 2014; T. L. Sellnow et al., 2017; D. D. Sellnow & Sellnow, 2014b).
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With regard to exemplification, research has demonstrated that it 
can be a valuable cognitive shortcut for making complex information 
easier to process and retain (Spence et al., 2015). However, this analysis 
reveals that, overall, very few of the messages integrated exemplars. 
This is somewhat surprising, given that exemplars are commonly used 
in mass media generally (Aust & Zillmann, 1996) and to achieve per-
suasive goals specifically (Brosius & Bathelt, 1994). Moreover, negative 
exemplars were being shared throughout social media during this same 
time period. Not only that, but most of the exemplars that appeared in 
the Dallas area news stories were negative. The failure to offer positive 
exemplars in the messages shared by the CDC, Dallas news stories, and 
international organization websites as a counter to them appears to be 
an unfortunate oversight. Research has reported that positive exemplars 
can be effective in countering negative ones, reducing fear, and foster-
ing self-efficacy, but only if they are actually offered and received by 
target populations (D. D. Sellnow & Sellnow, 2014a; Spence et al., 2015; 
Spence, Sellnow-Richmond, Sellnow, & Lachlan, 2016).
Findings from this study also suggest important recommendations 
both for crisis communicators and for future research. First, none of 
the three sets of messages examined offered a balanced integration of 
all three message content elements (internalization, explanation, and 
action) according to the IDEA model. Given conclusions drawn from 
existing research, failure to include all three may have contributed to 
a lack of motivation among receivers to attend to them as well as mis-
understandings about the epidemic, its relevance, and what to do for 
self-protection. When communicating to nonscientific publics about 
risk and crisis epidemics, spokespersons reporting locally, nationally, 
and internationally may be wise to take strategic measures to incorpo-
rate each of these elements into their messages. Moreover, the various 
spokespersons ought to coordinate their efforts to ensure that mes-
sage content and distribution efforts are consistent. To clarify, because 
people seek convergence among such messages during megacrisis 
events, doing so may help ensure that diverse publics (a) accurately 
understand what the disease is and how it is spread and (b) engage in 
appropriate actions for self-protection (Anthony & Sellnow, 2011, 2016; 
T. L. Sellnow & Seeger, 2013).
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Second, exemplification was rarely present in these instructional 
risk messages distributed locally, nationally, or internationally. When 
used strategically, exemplars can make complex information easier to 
understand and remember (Zillmann, 2006; Zillmann & Brosius, 2000). 
They can also be used to counter misleading negative exemplars, which 
often go viral on social media (D. D. Sellnow & Sellnow, 2014a; Spence 
et al., 2016). Incorporating positive exemplars may effectively reduce 
fear and heighten self-efficacy among disparate nonscientific publics 
receiving the messages. In the future, it may behoove crisis communi-
cators to thoughtfully consider the strategic use of exemplification to 
bolster internalization by motivating receivers to attend, explanation 
by making complex information easier to comprehend and retain, and 
action by serving as a cognitive shortcut for instigating appropriate 
self-protective actions.
Finally, the results of this study point to the utility of doing additional 
research applying the IDEA model embellished with exemplification. 
Additional thematic and content analyses on existing crisis messages 
across distribution channels and crisis types could add to what we know 
about current practices. Surveys, interviews, and focus group studies 
could enhance our understanding of the effectiveness of instructional 
risk and crisis messages among various stakeholder groups. Similarly, 
additional message-testing experiments could inform our understand-
ing of the effectiveness of such messages in achieving affective, cognitive, 
and behavioral learning outcomes among diverse people and groups 
in various countries and regions, regarding a variety of risk and crisis 
types, and distributed via a range of channels. Finally, although IDEA 
model messages have been tested empirically, confirming their utility in 
a variety of crisis situations, similar experiments ought to be conducted 
on messages designed specifically for Ebola to confirm the validity of 
potential recommendations offered to health organizations and media 
professionals charged with communicating about the disease. Such 
experiments could confirm the degree to which IDEA model messages 
instruct nonscientific publics specifically about Ebola (i.e., what it is, 
how it is spread, and what to do for self-protection) more effectively 
than status quo ones like those examined here.
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Limitations
We acknowledge several limitations of this study. First, we were able 
to collect more tweets than Dallas area news stories and press releases 
or website content provided by international health organizations. 
However, a more balanced sample of messages across sources and 
channels was not possible because more messages simply did not exist 
during the time frame of this case study. That said, we did examine a 
comprehensive census, which included everything available from those 
outlets during the time period. Moreover, if we take word count into 
consideration, the tweets were quite short and the news stories, press 
releases, and website articles considerably longer. Bearing this in mind 
indicates less imbalance among the sources than might be perceived 
by number alone. Second, the Ebola outbreak had been going on for 
many months in West Africa before it emerged in the United States. 
As such, the nature of the story lines was bound to be different in the 
local stories compared to the international articles, which may have 
complicated the results of the study. Finally, our decision to conduct a 
thematic analysis was based on the lack of work done across distribution 
channels (local, national, international) to date. Thus these exploratory 
results ought to be considered, as they may spur future research using 
different methodological approaches.
Conclusion
Indeed, effective risk and crisis communication when targeting non-
scientific publics presents formidable challenges. When attempting not 
only to inform the public about an event but also to instruct them to 
take appropriate self-protective actions, the challenges become even 
more complicated. Moreover, when the event is a megacrisis that crosses 
international boundaries and impacts diverse publics, communicators 
must be strategic about the content to include in their messages and 
the channels through which they distribute them. The IDEA model for 
effective instructional risk and crisis communication embellished with 
exemplification may provide a workable framework for doing so. This 
Ebola epidemic analysis revealed, however, that current risk and crisis 
message practices continue to privilege explanation over internalization 
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or action. Consistent messages coming from various health organiza-
tions and media outlets that integrate internalization, explanation, and 
action embellished with appropriate exemplars may achieve successful 
affective, cognitive, and behavioral learning outcomes among disparate 
nonscientific publics. As such, we may increase the likelihood that 
these messages will achieve what we intend from them—which is, of 
course, to save lives.
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Appendix: IDEA Model Thematic Analysis Codebook
Internalization
Goal: To get attention and to aid retention.
Question: Am I (or those I care about) affected, and how?
a. Compassion (People don’t care how much you know, until they 
know how much you care.)
• Does the message say something to this effect (e.g., empathetic 
messages about supportive care being given to infected patients, 
as well as to their loved ones)?
b. Personal relevance
• How likely am I (or those I care about) to be affected?
• What and how severe might the consequences be?
c. Proximity
• Where is the event occurring, and how close is that to me and/
or those I care about?
• Is location specified, and to what specificity?
d. Timeliness
• When is the event occurring?
• How much time do I have to prepare?
• How much time do I have to respond if exposed?
• How much time do I have to respond if infected?
e. Exemplification
• What if any positive exemplars are offered to get attention and 
make it memorable?
• What if any negative exemplars are offered to get attention and 
make it memorable?
Distribution
Goal: To get the correct message to the target audience(s).
Question: What channel or channels is/are the message(s) being sent 
through?
• Convergence of multiple messages being sent through diverse 
channels.
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Explanation
Goal: Provide accurate information about what is happening and being 
done about the event.
Question: What is happening, and why?
a. Source credibility (international, national, local)
b. Accurate science, accurate information
c. What are the responsible agencies doing to deal with the event?
d. Intelligible translation for target audience?
e. Is exemplification used to help make complex information easier 
to understand, and if so, is it positive and helpful or negative in 
ways that foster misunderstanding?
Action
Goal: To empower people to take appropriate action to save lives.
Question: What should I (and those I care about) do (or not do) for 
self-protection?
a. Specific preparation action steps
b. Specific response steps
c. Exemplification in action steps?
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Note
1. For the live Ebola #CDCchat, see https://storify.com/CDCgov/live-ebola 
-cdcchat-october-2-2014#publicize
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